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 1 
ABSTRACT 
 
In works such as Eros and Civilization and One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse 
provided both a forceful critique of modern industrial society and a path to collective 
liberation.  His work was largely influenced by Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, and Sigmund 
Freud, and was adopted by parts of the New Left and the 1960s Counterculture, who felt, 
by and large, that he articulated what they perceived.  Marcuse’s popularity may have 
declined after the “Sixties,” but that does not diminish the relevance of his thoughts, nor 
the contribution of his philosophical project.  Marcuse insisted that a philosophy of 
liberation founded in dialectical thinking and critical theory must change with the 
existing conditions.  As such, this paper will be an exegesis of the Marcusean concepts of 
liberation, domination, and The Great Refusal, and also attempt to elucidate some of the 
Marcusean concepts that have maintained their relevance, but can fall victim to 
misinterpretation.   
 2 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
 
It seems to be that wherever these radicals and the so-called New Left appear, 
Marcuse’s somewhere’s [sic] in the background.  We are convinced that he has to convey 
some of his ideas and thoughts directly to the students and this lies [sic] the danger of 
Marcuse. 
 American Legionnaire Harry Foster, Herbert’s Hippopotamus, 1968 
 
On January 15, 1969, on the grounds of the San Diego City Hall, some locals, 
presumably opposed to the impending renewal of Herbert Marcuse’s teaching contract 
with the University of California at San Diego, hanged him in effigy atop the flagpole.
1
  
By that time, Marcuse had found himself, somewhat reluctantly, in a position of notoriety 
as the “father of the New Left.”  Naturally, local conservative groups in and around San 
Diego vehemently challenged his presence, most famously the American Legion, who 
offered to pay the remainder of Marcuse’s contract if he would leave.2  The backlash 
against Marcuse, often exceedingly venomous, speaks to the influence, real and 
imagined, that Marcuse had in the 1960s, and the threat to capitalist hegemony his ideas 
represented.   
This is a somewhat strange phenomenon.  How did Herbert Marcuse, a relatively 
obscure German-born critical philosopher become such a media celebrity?  Why did he 
                                                          
1
  Marcuse, Harold. Herbert's Hippopotamus: A Story about Revolution in Paradise. June 10, 2005. 
http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/soundvideo/herbhippo.htm (accessed April 1, 2013) --  from The Official 
Herbert Marcuse Website: http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/soundvideo/herbhippo.htm.  On the chest of the 
effigy was a sign labeled “Marxist Marcuse.”  The website is run by members of the Marcuse family, and 
contains several links to the video cited.  The video is a documentary video made by University of 
California at San Diego film student Paul Alexander Juutilainen in 1996. It examines Herbert at the 
university mainly from 1968 to 1969.  The only textual reference I could find containing a reference to 
those responsible for the effigy was Perlstein, Rick  (2009). Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the 
Fracturing of America. New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 383.   
2
  Interestingly, the tactics of the American Legion, who had appointed themselves the moral arbiter for the 
region, were successful elsewhere (e.g. San Diego State University), but it appears Marcuse was fortunate 
to have a supportive Chancellor…and tenure. 
 3 
become the most controversial and talked about intellectual of the decade? Even though 
Marcuse regularly dismissed the suggestion that he was some sort of intellectual guru of 
New Left ideas -- often being critical of their tactics and rejecting the suggestion that the 
movements of the 1960s needed a leader -- his arguments did resonate with the cultural 
and political milieu of the time.
3
   
According to Douglas Kellner, Marcuse’s “uncompromising critique of advanced 
industrial society articulated the anger and disgust felt by a generation of young people 
outraged by the continued existence of poverty alongside the wealth of the consumer 
society.”4  Marcuse’s analysis provided intellectual vindication for the New Left and 
counterculture, and their feelings of alienation and disillusionment.  It penetrated to the 
roots of their discontent, and provided a sense of reputability for their refusal.  Marcuse 
helped explain (and justify), to many, why they were so discontent.  It must be 
remembered that these folks were living through the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights 
Movement, the conformity of suburbia and consumerism, the women’s movement, and 
the emergent belief that growing up and getting a job (i.e. entrance into the affluent 
society) meant becoming a meaningless cog in the corporate machine.  Marcuse explored 
the easily missed causes of this intuited sadness and provided an alternative to the 
impersonal and irrational technocratic society.    As Kellner states, “the New Left found a 
sharp critique of capitalism and an uncompromising defense of a type of democratic and 
libertarian socialism quite congenial to their radicalism.   Marcuse thus legitimated 
                                                          
3
 See Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston, Beacon Press), 1969 and Counter-Revolution and 
Revolt (Boston, Beacon Press), 1972.    
4
 Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1984), 2. 
 4 
liberation and revolutionary struggles.”5  Finally, unlike most other scholars, who were 
unwilling to cross the boundary between academic and activist, Marcuse actively 
embraced both New Left and youth revolts, a relationship which suggests that the 
“rebellion-caused-by generation-gap” trope was largely a media fabrication.   
The spotlight left Marcuse as the “Sixties” was ending – and the New Left had 
split into factions -- but not before it left a legacy of polemics, simplifications, and 
misinterpretations of his works.  It is our task to look past the media figure, and re-
examine his project in order to assess and better understand his contribution to 
philosophy, society, and human liberation -- and to offer some thoughts on what he might 
argue today.   
 
1.1 - A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE EARLY HERBERT MARCUSE 
 
What is true of the classics of socialism is true also of the great artists.  They break 
through the class limitations of their family background, environment.  Marxist theory is 
not family research. 
     Hebert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, 1977 
 
 
 Herbert Marcuse was born in 1898, into a middle class merchant family in Berlin, 
Germany.
6
  In the Lebenslauf (i.e. vita, biography) section of his doctoral dissertation on 
the artist-novel, Marcuse described himself as follows: 
 
I was born on July 19, 1898 in Berlin, the son of the businessman Carl Marcuse 
and his wife Gertrud, born Kreslawsky.  I attended the Mommsen Gymnasium 
                                                          
5
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 3.  
6
 Herbert Marcuse, The Essential Marcuse, ed. Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss. (Boston, Beacon 
Press, 2007), vii. 
 5 
and from 1911 the Kaiserin-Augusta Gymnasium in Charlottenburg until my 
summons to military service in 1916.  After completing my final examination 
(Reifepüfung), I entered Reserve Division 18 but remained in the homeland on 
account of my poor eye-sight and was transferred to the Zeppelen Reserves where 
I received permission and the opportunity to visit lectures.  After my release in the 
winter of 1918, I studied regularly for four semesters in Berlin and four semesters 
in Freiburg, first Germanistik, and then Modern German literary history as my 
main subject (Hauptfach) and philosophy and political economy as subsidiaries 
(Nebenfach).
7
 
 
Marcuse was Jewish, but his family was not devout.  In an interview with Douglas 
Kellner, he claimed his upbringing was typical for a German middle-class family, and his 
Jewish heritage never caused any sense of alienation from German society.
8
  Indeed, 
Marcuse claims that his Lebenslauf is a poor place to search for the taproot of his later 
works (see above epigraph from Aesthetic Dimension.)
9
  His adolescence may not 
provide clues, but his entrance into the military and the onset of World War I had a 
profound effect on him.   
 Marcuse never saw combat during the war, but was not spared the disillusionment 
felt by many following the war.  Marcuse witnessed humans beings used as cannon 
fodder by military leaders seemingly incapable of handling the greater ability to destroy 
                                                          
7
 Herbert Marcuse, ’Lebenslauf”, as appended to his doctoral dissertation, Der duetsche Kunstlerroman 
(The German Artist Novel) (Freiburg and Berlin, 1922), quoted in Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 13. 
8
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 13. 
9
 Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension (Boston, Beacon Press 1978), 18-19. The quote is part of a 
larger argument in which Herbert was defending bourgeoisie art. 
 6 
that was granted to them by modern technology.  After the dust settled, the war had taken 
the lives of approximately nine million, and injured another twenty-one million in total.  
To Marcuse, the war was inexplicable, and he was greatly troubled because the nations 
involved claimed to be the pinnacle of civilization and enlightenment.
10
  Additionally, 
prior to the war, the pre-war German economy was prospering, and the predictions of 
Karl Marx seemed to be developing – i.e. the proletariat was expanding in tandem with 
the wealth gap. As such, like many in Germany at that time, Marcuse was radicalized by 
the war.  He was drawn to socialism when stationed in Berlin, but viewed the support of 
the war by many of the socialist opposition in Germany to be an utter betrayal of that for 
which socialism stood.
11
   
He joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1917 as a protest against the war.  
At that time, the party (SPD) was, by some accounts, the most important socialist party in 
the world, relying on the large working class in Germany.  By 1914, the party was 
dominated by a more Lenin-style Marxism (which advocated strong central institutions), 
but had a very visible minority advocating a more libertarian Marxism with Rosa 
Luxemburg being, perhaps, the most well-known of this group.
12
 
Marcuse’s decision to join the party was interesting considering that many in the 
party began using Marxist arguments to justify the war, and in 1917, it expelled most 
party members who were against the war (including Rosa Luxemburg).  In Marcuse’s 
defense, he was an eighteen year old just beginning his political education, his beliefs 
                                                          
10
 Leiss and Feinberg, The Essential Marcuse, viii. 
11
 Leiss and Feinberg, The Essential Marcuse, viii. 
12
 Dauvé, Gilles, and Denis Authier, Marxist Internet Archive, last modified in 1976, 
http://marxists.org/subjMarcuse, Eros and Civilization,  t/germany-1918-23/dauve-authier/ch.02.htm.  The 
site was accessed on April 4, 2013.  Also, Rosa Luxemburg called Lenin and the majority of the SPD 
“organizational fetishists.” 
 7 
were in their infancy, and he very likely did not fully understand the political options 
open to him.
13
  Marcuse remained in the Socialist Democratic Party, and never joined 
Luxemburg’s Spartacus League (formed as an anti-war alternative to the SPD), but was 
sympathetic to their project during the general strike in Germany in 1918.
14
  In that same 
year, there was a (not unrelated) military revolt throughout Germany known as the 
“November Revolution,” and Marcuse, after the military command lost control, was 
elected to the revolutionary soldiers’ council in Berlin.  His hopes were dashed as he 
witnessed the council quickly re-elect their once-jettisoned officers to lead them.  Not 
only were the soldiers lacking in administrative experience and confidence, but also, 
according to Marcuse, were rapt with a desire to return home as soon as possible.
15
  He 
then came to the conclusion that not even Luxemburg’s radical Spartacus League was 
ready for revolution – a theme that is to be found in his later arguments, to be known as 
“the return of the repressed." 
Throughout the November Revolution, Marcuse found himself increasingly 
drawn to the positions of the Spartacus League, and eventually concluded that the 
Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) was too conciliatory and was moving towards a closer 
alliance with the ruling powers of the German bourgeoisie.  Unsurprisingly, he quit the 
Socialist Democratic Party after his discharge from the army in 1918, and became a vocal 
opponent of the party.  After the “arrest” and murder of Luxemburg and her fellow 
                                                          
13
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 14- 15.  
14
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 380 n8.  The general strike was instigated in Berlin by revolutionary show 
stewards of the metal workers’ union, in alliance with the Spartacus League.  The strike advocated 
workers’ control and revolutionary struggle.  See Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 15. 
Leiss and Feinberg, The Essential Marcuse , viii, and Kellner, Crisis of Marxism,  15 and 380  n7, n9, n14. 
 8 
travelers, in which the SPD government was thought to be instrumental, Marcuse 
delivered the following words to a crowd of students in Berlin in 1967: 
 
Let me say something personal.  If you mean by revisionism the German Social 
Democratic Party, I can only say to you that from the time of my own political 
education, that is since 1919, I have opposed this party.  In 1917 to 1918 I was a 
member of the Social Democratic Party, I resigned from it after the murder of 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and from then on I have criticized this 
party’s politics.  Not because I believed that it could work within the framework 
of the established order – for we all do this, we all make use of even the most 
minute possibilities in order to transform the established order from inside it – 
that is not why I fought the SPD.  The reason was rather that it worked in alliance 
with reactionary, destructive, and repressive forces.  Since 1918 I have always 
been hearing of left forces within the Social-Democratic Party, and I have 
continually seen these left forces move more and more to the right until nothing 
left was left in them.
16
   
 
Marcuse was maturing intellectually, fostering a greater level of independent thought.  He 
thought himself too young and inexperienced to be a professional revolutionary, so it is at 
this time (1918) that he immersed himself in the writings of Karl Marx in an attempt to 
better understand the symbiotic relationship between capitalism and imperialism.   He 
was also nagged by an inability to completely identify with the left parties in Germany – 
                                                          
16
 Marcuse, Five Lectures, 102-3, and Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 17, 380 n16 and n18. 
 9 
i.e. the Social Democrats and Communists, so he returned to the texts of Marx to learn 
firsthand his socialist theories of revolution.
17
  To Marcuse, the conditions necessitating a 
revolution in Germany were present and his desire to understand why it failed -- and why 
people do not revolt in the face of oppressive conditions -- is a paradox that would haunt 
him his entire professional life. 
 As Marcuse mentioned in his Lebenslauf, he returned to formal studies in Berlin 
from 1919-1920, and eventually transferred to Freiburg where he studied German 
literature, with an emphasis in philosophy and political economy.  It is here that Marcuse 
was a student of Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological school of 
philosophy (i.e. the study of “phenomena,” or rather, our immediate experience, the way 
external objects appear, and are experienced and understood by our consciousness) and, 
in 1922, wrote and defended his doctoral dissertation on Der deutsche Künstlerroman 
(The German Artist-Novel).
18
   
 
                                                          
17
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 16 for an account of Marcuse’s decision to leave the SPD, and see Marcuse, 
Five Lectures, 102-103 
18
 Husserl proposed a philosophy of immediate experience.  This involved a rejection of the over-emphasis 
on science (positivism), an appropriate reaction to the carnage of WWI.  Husserl provided the method that 
would be used by Martin Heidegger, an early, and arguably lasting, influence on Marcuse.  Husserl’s 
method – called “phenomenology” -- focused on the “phenomena” of existence.  In other words, when we 
perceive something – for example, a table – we naturally assume that even though we may have different 
perceptions of that table (when viewed from different angles), our perceptions are held together by the 
“fact” that they are all attached to a real,  t (i.e. the table) out there to be experienced.  Husserl did not 
necessarily disagree with that, but he also argued that to stop there is to fail to appreciate the actual process 
of organizing perspectives and holding them together in our consciousness.  Husserl was interested in the 
structure of experience.  What appears to the subject as an act of “knowing,” is bound up with an object, the 
known, remembering, and the remembered.  From the perspective of phenomenology, acts of 
consciousness create meaning in experience.  Husserl argued that experience is more than an interaction 
between a subject and object (which is our natural assumption).  In other words, we naturally think of 
consciousness as in-the-mind and our encounters with external objects as an interaction between two 
things-in-the-world.  This account, according to Husserl, does not accurately describe experience.  To put it 
another way, there is a difference between a robot sensing a table and avoiding it, and a human sensing a 
table.  To describe experience as merely an interaction between two things-in-the-world is to describe 
humans as simple creatures of reflex.   As such, Husserl argued that, on this level, experience is a realm 
independent of the brain – a realm of being called “pure consciousness.” 
 10 
1.2 - THE GERMAN ARTIST-NOVEL 
Joy appears to me as the end of life and the only thing useful in the world.  God too 
wanted it: he made women, perfumes, light, beautiful flowers, good wines, curly hair, 
lips, and angora cats; he did not say to his angels: Have Virtue, but: Make Love. 
 
  Théopile Gautier, quoted by Marcuse in Der deutsche Künstlerroman 
 
 The extent to which Der deutsche Künstlerroman hints at later Marcusean ideas is 
staggering.  Marcuse’s approach in his dissertation was strongly influenced by György 
Lukács’ theory of the novel, Wilhelm Dilthey’s method of empathy, and Friedrich 
Hegel’s aesthetics and dialectical thinking.19  Indeed, the very structure of and flow of 
The German-Artist Novel -- in which Marcuse examines novels which situate the artist as 
the protagonist, only to then discuss the tensions, contradictions and competing positions 
inherent in the novel -- is similar to Hegel’s dialectic.  Not only was Marcuse learning to 
think and write dialectically, he first introduces his thoughts on the emancipatory power 
of art and the tension between the “is” and “ought,” that would become fully articulated 
in his later work. 
 An “artist-novel” is a novel centered around a protagonist-as-artist that is 
struggling to find reconciliation between the artistic calling and the external reality.  Like 
Lukács’, Marcuse emphasizes conflicts between the demands of the ideal (artistic calling, 
or “ought”) and the real (the “is”, or the demands of everyday life).    In Marcuse’s 
estimation, the artist-novel demonstrates the alienation of the artist from social life, 
thereby expressing the protagonist’s yearning for a more authentic and harmonious 
existence.  The protagonist-as-artist does not find fulfillment in the “as is,” and needs 
some sort of resolution.  This lack of harmony, as Marcuse sees it, fosters an “eruption of 
                                                          
19
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 18-32, and Leiss and Feinberg, The Essential Marcuse, vii and ix. 
 11 
self-conscious activity,” in which the artist either attempts to shape reality according to 
his artistic ideals, or to seek refuge in the world of artistic illusion.  This aesthetic 
argument prefigures later works where Marcuse provides a more mature theory of art as 
revealing utopian images of harmony (an “ought”), thereby evoking a sense of rejection 
of the alienating world (the “as is”).  In demonstrating a quest for harmony between the 
“as is” and the “ought,” the protagonist-as-artist demonstrates the desire for liberation, as 
well as a “Refusal” to accept an alienated existence – both which would in time become 
major Marcusean themes.
20
   
As Kellner argues, every chapter of Marcuse’s dissertation contains previews of 
his later ideas.  Not only does the word “befreiung” (liberation) appear throughout 
Marcuse’s dissertation, he demonstrates great sympathy for liberation movements and 
praises the “experience of love” in his chapter on the Sturm und Drang (i.e. Storm and 
Drive) movement.
21
  Moreover, Marcuse’s sympathy for the Strum und Drang writers 
and his demand for a “Kingdom of Beauty and Love” anticipate both his later emphasis 
on the importance of the aesthetic-erotic and his analysis of the shortcomings of the 
Enlightenment and its concomitant positivism.
22
   Finally, Marcuse’s empathy with each 
novelist (i.e. the protagonist-as-artist) presents the novel as a way of life, or a life lesson.  
In other words, the novel-as-art reflects what ought to exist – i.e. the human subject ought 
to (and indeed, does) struggle in much the same fashion as the artist-as-protagonist.
23
  
Marcuse was suggesting that this struggle needs to be a conscious effort – a line of 
                                                          
20
 Herbert Marcuse’s dissertation as cited in Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 20-21. 
21
 The Sturm und Drung movement was a late eighteenth century German literary movement that 
emphasized nature, feeling, and authenticity, while rejecting the Enlightenment and, as they saw it, over-
emphasis on Rationalism.   Citation: Roy Pascal, The Modern Language Review Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 
1952) 129-151, published by Modern Humanities Research Association. 
22
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 27.   
23
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 27. 
 12 
argument he would later tackle in One Dimensional Man.  Ultimately, Der deutsche 
Künstlerroman is a treasure trove of proto-Marcusean ideas. 
 
1.3 - WHY A RETURN TO MARCUSE? 
There are no visible alternatives to this form of life.  What else is left for us then, but at 
least to search out practical improvements within this form of life? 
 
Jürgen Habermas, The Past as Future, 1994 
 
 As mentioned above, Marcuse’s popularity, both in the media and among leftist 
crowds, was winding down with the “Sixties.”  The “first generation” of Frankfurt School 
philosophers (i.e. Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Herbert Marcuse, 
and Walter Benjamin) was being replaced by a new generation led by Jürgen Habermas.
24
 
The second generation of critical theorists, writing in the last few decades, is, by many 
accounts, less critical of society.
25
   In view of this allegation, it should be unsurprising 
that there has been a recent surge of interest in Marcuse and his liberation philosophy, 
                                                          
24
 Benjamin, who opted not to flee Germany with his Frankfurt School colleagues, was killed during 
WWII.   
25
 For example, in his seminal work, The Theory of Communicative Action (1985), Habermas attempts to 
create a communicative approach – called a “discourse ethics” -- that would liberate humans from 
systematically distorted communication wherein one or more persons attempts to control or dominate 
another.  In other words, the dominated person has an interest in liberation from the condition of distorted 
communication.  (See Arnold Farr’s Critical Theory and Democratic Vision, 140). As Habermas sees it, the 
knowledge needed to release the rational capabilities of humans is to be attained through a social, 
historical, and inter-subjective self-formative process. (See Arnold Farr’s Critical Theory and Democratic 
Vision, 147).   The Habermasian approach, inasmuch as it aims to create a more democratic mode of 
communication that will overcome the presuppositions of the speakers and listeners, thereby creating a 
more egalitarian and just world, strives to construct an emancipatory dialogue -- but in adding praxis to 
theory, Habermas loses his critical edge.  This is not to diminish the contributions of a philosophical giant, 
but his “discourse-ethics” approach fails to be sufficiently critical and cannot escape a tendency towards 
positivism .  Indeed, Iris Marion Young, lamenting the less than critical turn of the second generation 
theorists (and calling for a return to Marcuse) delivered a lecture in 1996 entitled, “What’s Critical about 
Critical Theory?” (See Martin Beck Matustik, foreword to New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. Ed. 
by William W. Wilkerson and Jeffrey Paris (New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 
2001) viii. 
 
 13 
largely in response to scholarly dissatisfaction with not just Habermas, but also to 
poststructuralist and postmodern frameworks.
26
  But that does not specify why scholars, 
having several first generation critical theorists from which to choose, have turned to 
Marcuse.  It is difficult to deny that the flattened world of One Dimensional Man 
described by Marcuse in 1964 has not increased its tendency to erase the negative.  That 
alone is enough to pay attention to his work.  Moreover, we have had time to read and 
absorb his arguments in a less politically charged atmosphere, and thereby have a clearer 
understanding of his oeuvre than readers in the “Sixties.”  Marcuse’s project is 
dialectical, that is, firmly rooted in the historical and material world.  As such, his 
insights can serve as an excellent point of departure in any analysis of the current 
organization of society.  Finally, Marcuse provides us with hope, which in turn rests on 
the capacities of human imagination and our need for a non-oppressive society. It is 
notable that he ended his most pessimistic work, One Dimensional Man, with a quote 
from Walter Benjamin: “It is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to 
us.”27 Marcuse steadfastly argued that the seeds of hope for a liberated society are to be 
found in the current state of affairs, and within all of us.
28
   
 In works such as Eros and Civilization (1955) and One Dimensional Man: Studies 
in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (1964), Herbert Marcuse provided both a 
forceful critique of modern industrial society and a path to collective liberation.  His 
                                                          
26
 See Wilkerson and Paris, New Critical Theory and Farr, Critical Theory and Democratic Vision.  To 
describe poststructuralism and postmodernism is beyond the purview of this essay, but it’s enough to know 
that critical theorists (Habermas included) rightly argue that, in it’s insistence on micro-analysis of events, 
they are ultimately positivist and incapable of changing the status quo. 
27
 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston, Beacon Press: 1964) 25. 
28
 It should be noted that while Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Marcuse’s colleagues at the 
Frankfurt School (which will be discussed in greater detail later) often held ideas similar to Marcuse and all 
had an influence on each other, Adorno and Horkheimer are decidedly more pessimistic in their critique of 
modern society, and leave little room for liberation. 
 14 
project was largely influenced by Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, and 
was adopted by parts of the New Left and the Counterculture of 1960s America, who felt, 
by and large, that he articulated what they perceived -- even if many did not fully grasp 
his ideas.   
Marcuse’s popularity may have waned after that tumultuous decade (or so) but his 
thoughts are as germane now, if not more so, than when originally written.  His works, 
when read in sequence of publication, demonstrate that Marcuse lived up to his belief that 
a philosophy of liberation founded in dialectical thinking and critical theory must change 
with external and internal conditions.   This essay will attempt to elucidate some of the 
Marcusean concepts that have maintained their relevance, but can fall victim to 
misinterpretation.  To that end, the second and third parts of my essay are exegeses of 
Marcuse at different stages of his thought.  Part two will focus on the evolution of 
Marcuse from his early days as a quasi-Orthodox Marxist heavily influenced by Martin 
Heidegger.  This section will also describe Marcuse’s turn toward Hegel, and eventual 
return, of sorts, to Marx during the interwar period.  Finally, I will introduce Marcuse’s 
appropriation of Freud after World War II.   The third section takes place entirely after 
World War II, but will be more thematic, that is, focus on some key Marcusean ideas.  
Appropriately, there will be a special focus on concepts such as “The Great Refusal,” the 
distinction between true and false needs, the “irrationality of the whole,” one-
dimensionality and Marcuse’s thoughts on the absorption of the working class -- that is, 
the exploited -- into the capitalist class.   
In 1922, after completing his studies in Freiburg, Marcuse went to work for 
several years in a book-dealer and publishing firm in Berlin, which was not unusual for 
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the sons of Jewish businessmen.
29
   In 1924, he married a woman named Sophie (whom 
he had met in Freiburg), and was able to buy a partnership in the book firm through the 
financial help of his father, who had survived the economic crisis of 1923 intact.
30
   After 
preparing a lightly annotated bibliography of the various editions of the works of 
Friedrich Schiller (1925), Marcuse read the very influential book by Husserl’s former 
assistant and eventual successor, Martin Heidegger.  In Marcuse’s (somewhat curt) 
words:  
Here are the basic facts – I read Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) when it came out 
 in 1927 and after having read it I decided to go back to Freiburg (where I had 
 received my Ph.D. in 1922) in order to work with Heidegger until December 
 1932, when I left Germany a few days before Hitler’s ascent to power, and that 
 ended the personal relationship.
31
  
Martin Heidegger was at the time a very prominent German philosopher, and his Being 
and Time attempted to synthesize Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and a new mode of 
thought called “existentialism.32   To Marcuse, this book seemed to promise an 
alternative to traditional Marxism (i.e. Orthodox, Scientific) and helped explain the failed 
German revolutions that haunted Marcuse’s thoughts.  Appropriately, in 1928 he returned 
to Freiburg to return to his studies, this time as a professional philosopher.   
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PART II – EVOLUTION OF THE MARCUSEAN PROJECT 
 
Indeed, I believe that it is impossible to correctly understand the Marcuse of 
today without reference to this earlier Marcuse. Whoever fails to detect the persistence of 
categories from Being and Time in the concepts of Freudian drive theory out of which 
Marcuse develops a Marxian historical construct runs the risk of serious 
misunderstandings. 
Jürgen Habermas, 1968  
 
 Many of Herbert Marcuse’s early writings have been brought to light since 
Habermas first warned us against overlooking this period in Marcuse’s professional life.  
These early works can help us correct some of the confusions and misperceptions borne 
out of Marcuse’s relatively late (he was in his sixties in “the Sixties”) and very rapid rise 
to notoriety.  These texts can provide us with answers and foster important discussions, 
which, in turn, will help improve our understanding of his later writings.  Indeed, this is a 
fascinating period in Marcuse’s personal and academic life.  How is it that a leftist Jewish 
revolutionary thinker in Germany in the 1930s moved to Freiburg to study under a man 
who would very publicly go on to become a member of the right-wing Nazi Party, 
effectively serving as a symbol of its intellectual justification?  In fact, Marcuse closes 
the introduction to his 1932 book Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity by 
stating, “Any contribution this work may make to the development and clarification of 
problems is indebted to the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger.”33   Did Heidegger’s 
project contain any tendencies that make his acceptance of Nazism less surprising? In 
other words, should Marcuse, and Heidegger’s other Jewish students, have been so 
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shocked at this development?  Were they blinded by adulation for their teacher, or was 
his philosophy substantively altered, in a sense, to align with the Nazi Party?    
In 1977, Marcuse was interviewed by Heideggerian scholar Frederick Olafson, 
and responded to that question as follows: 
 
…discussing the famous question of whether Heidegger’s Nazism was already 
noticeable in his philosophy prior to 1933…from personal experience I can tell 
you that neither in his lectures, nor in his seminars, nor personal, was there any 
hint of his sympathies for Nazism.  In fact, politics were never discussed – and to 
the very end he spoke very highly of the two Jews to whom he dedicated his 
books, Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler.  So his openly declared Nazism came 
as a complete surprise to us.  From that point on, of course, we asked ourselves 
the question; did we overlook indications and anticipations in Being and Time 
and the related writings?  And we made one interesting observation, ex-post: If 
you look at his view of human existence, of being-in-the-world, you will find a 
highly repressive, highly oppressive interpretation.
34
 
 
To be sure, Marcuse, prior to 1933, expressed meaningful skepticism regarding the 
concreteness of Heidegger ‘s project whilst attempting to fuse the latter with Marxism, 
but it is notable that Marcuse did not drop Heidegger as a primary interlocutor until the 
latter affiliated himself with Nazism.   
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 Marcuse expressed concern that Heidegger’s existentialism was not explicitly 
applicable to any specific state of affairs.  For one thing, Marcuse was concerned that 
Heidegger’s project seemed to argue that the alienation of the individual was universal 
and inevitable, thereby making it difficult, or slippery, to apply to any particular historical 
era.  It’s that philosophical looseness allowed by Heidegger’s project that ultimately 
convinced Marcuse it was too risky, and thus fruitless, to continue his attempt to fuse 
Heidegger with Marx.  To put it another way, while Marcuse was attempting concretize 
Heidegger in a way that would move the latter’s project towards radical action and 
liberation, Heidegger, in using his own project to intellectually legitimize Nazism, moved 
in the opposite direction, thereby demonstrating the potential perils inherent in his own 
system.
35
  To Marcuse, the ability of Heidegger to use his own project to justify an 
oppressive social reality indicated that Heidegger’s system was, at least directly, not 
where liberation was to be found.
36
   
 As mentioned above, it is notable that Marcuse did not clearly see the oppressive 
tendencies in Heidegger’s project, and did not expressly abort his attempted fusion of 
Heidegger and Marx until the former accepted Nazism.  Speaking of Heidegger’s 
categories in Being and Time Marcuse, in 1977, stated: 
 
…”idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, falling and being thrown-into, concern, being 
toward death, anxiety, dread, boredom” and so on.  Now this gives a picture 
which plays well on the fears and frustrations of men and women in a repressive 
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society -- a joyless existence: overshadowed by death and anxiety; human 
material for the authentic personality.  It is for example highly characteristic that 
love is absent from Being and Time -- the only place where it appears is in a 
footnote in a theological context together with faith, sin, and remorse.  I see now 
in this philosophy, ex-post, a very powerful devaluation of life, a derogation of 
joy, of sensuousness, fulfillment.  And we may have had the feeling of it at that 
that time, but it became clear only after Heidegger’s association to Nazism 
became known.
37
 
Indeed, to Marcuse, the ability of Heidegger to employ his own categories to legitimize 
Nazism, while maintaining a correct (but, perhaps, not the only) interpretation of those 
concepts, revealed, to Marcuse, the danger in engaging so directly with a project that was 
predominantly existential.      
 Discussing his only postwar encounter with Heidegger, Marcuse stated: 
 
… [Heidegger] admitted it was an “error”; he misjudged Hitler and Nazism -- to 
which I want to add…that is one of the errors a philosopher is not allowed to 
commit.  He certainly can and does commit many, many mistakes but this is not 
an error and this is not a mistake, this is actually the betrayal of philosophy as 
such, and of everything philosophy stands for…In my view, it is irrelevant when 
and why he withdrew his enthusiastic support of the Nazi regime -- decisive and 
relevant is the brute fact that he …idolized Hitler… [Thus] the only philosophy 
that remains is the philosophy of abdication, surrender. 
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Marcuse proceeds to argue that Heidegger’s rejection of the pre-Hitler democracy of the 
Weimar Republic should be unsurprising considering it did not conform to the latter’s 
existential categories, thereby implying the state of affairs under Nazism did as much.
38
  
To Marcuse, Heidegger’s association and legitimization of Nazism was nothing less than 
a surrender of his own project.  When viewed from this angle, the timing of Marcuse’s 
abandoning of Heidegger makes more sense.  The lack of concreteness and the 
ambiguities within Heidegger’s project always concerned Marcuse -- but it was not until 
Heidegger himself demonstrated the perils of such a project, thereby abdicating all 
philosophical repute, that Marcuse dropped him as a primary interlocutor.  Even with 
Marcuse’s adamant rejection of Heidegger, there is a question that still needs to be 
addressed -- to what extent did the existentialism of Heidegger remain a lasting influence 
on Marcuse’s project after they had parted ways?  
In that same 1977 interview, Olafson’s line of questioning and the tone of the 
interview suggest an over-eagerness to lead Marcuse into a discussion of Heidegger’s 
continuing influence on his thought.  Attempting to explain his initial interest in 
Heidegger, Marcuse states: 
 
Let’s say from 1928 to 1932…[I] saw in Heidegger what …[I] had first seen in 
 Husserl, a new beginning, the first radical attempt to put philosophy on really 
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 concrete foundations – philosophy concerned with the human existence, the 
 human condition, and not with merely abstract ideas and principles.”39 
 
At a later point, Marcuse provided the following assessment: 
 
I…believed there could be some combination between existentialism and 
 Marxism, precisely because of their insistence on concrete analysis of the actual 
 human existence, human beings and their world.   But I soon realized that 
 Heidegger’s concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness, and 
 that in fact his philosophy was just as abstract and just as removed from reality, as 
 the philosophies which at the time had dominated German universities, namely a 
 rather dry brand of neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, neo-Idealism, but also 
 positivism.”40 
Putting aside the consideration that Olafson may have prodded Marcuse into an overly 
negative analysis of Heidegger, and an overemphasis of the antagonism between 
existentialism and Marxism, Marcuse does concede that Heidegger did provide him with 
“a kind of thinking” that continued to influence his later writings.41  Even with Marcuse’s 
insistence that Heidegger’s existential categories were quite insignificant to his later 
work, a careful reader will nevertheless find traces of them throughout his later project. 
After these early “Heideggerian” years, Marcuse turned to Hegel’s dialectic, and 
then to Freud’s drive theory -- viewing both as correctives to Heidegger.  Appropriately, I 
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will endeavor to discuss the components of Heidegger’s phenomenological existentialism 
Marcuse eventually determined to be in need of correction.  Such a task will provide us 
with valuable insights that will enrich our understanding of the oeuvre of Marcuse.   To 
that end, the remainder of this section will be split into three segments.   The first will 
discuss the first five years of Marcuse’s professional career, a time period that is often 
labeled as his “Orthodox Marxist” years.  As mentioned above, Marcuse began these 
years heavily influenced by Heidegger and ended them by turning to Hegel as a 
corrective to what he concluded were the shortcomings of Heidegger’s project.  The 
second segment will focus on the years (1933-1942) Marcuse spent with the Institute for 
Social Research (i.e. the Frankfurt School) and will discuss Marcuse’s return to Marx 
upon his examination of Marx’s landmark Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844 (not published until 1932).  It is during these years Marcuse found to be explicit in 
Marx what he had been searching for in Heidegger.  His project was also heavily 
influenced by colleagues at the Frankfurt School, and took on a visible “Frankfurt Style.”  
The final portion of this section picks up Marcuse after his years working for the United 
States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and eventually the State Department during and 
after World War II.
42
  After a period of relative professional inactivity, Marcuse returned 
after the war to use Freud’s theories to locate potential liberation in the human drives.  It 
is during these years that Marcuse began to take on a more “Marcusean” cast.  Even 
though Marcuse’s project seems to appear “inconsistent and unstable”43 at times, this 
essay will, in part, attempt to demonstrate that despite the many fluctuations in the 
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Marcusean oeuvre, his theories remained consistent.  To that end, it is necessary and 
appropriate that Marcuse be viewed dialectically -- that is, every so-called “turn” in his 
thought be analyzed in light of the context in which it arose, and the available and visible 
modes of liberation within that social setting.   Indeed, Marcuse insisted that a dialectical 
analysis must adapt to the current state of affairs, and as such, we must appreciate that 
every apparent detour in his project necessarily contained elements from his earlier 
thoughts.  Thus, Marcuse must be dissected in the same manner in which he thought.  
One would hope he would not have it any other way. 
 
2.1 – MARCUSE IN DIALECTICAL TENSION WITH ORTHODOX MARXISM 
AND HEIDEGGER – 1928-1933 
To be radical is to seize something by the roots.  The root of man, however, is 
man himself. 
 
 
Karl Marx, Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 1843 
 
In 1928, Herbert Marcuse began his attempt to lay the groundwork for the 
synthesis of Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological existentialism and Marxism.  It must 
be noted that Marcuse was attempting to rescue individuality from the tendency towards 
conformity he found Western society demanded.  Moreover, Marcuse was attempting to 
revitalize a scientific and dogmatic Marxism that was prevalent at that time.  To put it 
another way, Marcuse was responding to what he observed as crises of Marxism and of 
individual authenticity.  To him, they were not unrelated.  It is necessary to understand 
this context when discussing the developments of Herbert Marcuse’s early critical theory 
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if we are to attempt to apply them to current circumstances, and if we are to claim that his 
project remained consistent from beginning to end.  To that end, we will explore the 
social and intellectual environment in which the early Marcuse thought, and the key 
ingredients of the young Marcuse that hold his whole project together and help explain its 
fluctuations.
44
 
To Marcuse, the Marxism prevalent at the time he returned to his studies in 1928 
was riddled with three fatal flaws, all of which were founded in reductionist arguments.  
The Orthodox Marxism of the Second International (1889-1914) had a strong tendency 
toward a positivist and scientific orthodoxy.  To be sure, the Second International was 
diverse, but there were certain tendencies that seemed to represent a dominant trend 
toward a scientific world view, characterized by strict determinism -- that is, a dogmatic 
belief in the strict Marxian notions of revolution by the proletariat as inevitable and borne 
out of economic necessity due to the economic alienation of the working class.  This is 
Orthodox Marxism par excellence.  To Marcuse, this rejected the dialectical vein of 
Marx’s theory, ignored the role of human subjectivity, and was overly optimistic and 
simplistic.
45
  
Arnold Farr refers to the two flaws of the Second International as “scientific 
reductionism” and “economic reductionism.”  As Farr describes it, “scientific 
reductionism entails a naïve view toward science to the extent that it reduces all 
phenomena (even social, political, and moral) to the goals, methodology, expectations, 
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and rules of the natural sciences.”46 As a result, this brand of Marxism “subordinates 
human agency to the laws of nature” while also creating a tendency to equate technical 
progress with moral progress.  As such, there is a propensity to think of people as 
instruments in the domination of nature, and, considering this Marxist framework views 
the socialist revolution as inevitable, there is less need to worry about the class or self-
consciousness (i.e. their awareness of the “ought”) of the proletariat.  The Second 
International, in an attempt to create a socialism that was more approachable, attempted 
to merge the “is” of science with the “ought” of morality, but in the process ignored the 
antagonism between the two.
47
   
The Second International was also guilty of economic reductionism, which Farr 
describes as “the reduction of all human struggle to economic struggle.”48 In other words, 
it ignored other areas of contestation, such as culture, politics, race, ethnicity and gender.  
Additionally, it failed to recognize the ability of capitalism to adapt and absorb any 
possible threat to its hegemony, a trope that would become ever-present in Marcuse’s 
later project.
49
   
Moving on to the Third International (1919-1934), Marcuse witnessed a socialist 
movement mired in political reductionism.  Bruce Brown characterizes this brand of 
Marxism as placing an over-emphasis on the political resistance needed for a socialist 
revolution.  Brown argues that in viewing the opposition as nothing but a physical force 
to be defeated in the political realm, the Third International failed to recognize capitalism 
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as the hegemonic and ideological force it is.  In focusing solely on the material and 
political levels of resistance, the Third International ignored the qualitative change 
needed in the consciousness of the proletariat as a prerequisite for any revolution.
50
   This 
is another trope that would become central to the project of the later Marcuse. 
To be sure, the boundaries between these three flaws are blurry, and this was but a 
cursory explanation, but it is enough to know that this is the context in which Marcuse 
attempted to reconstruct Marxism.  Indeed, it is in Marcuse’s response to these conditions 
that we can see the early formations of what will mature into his critique of positivism, 
and science-as-positivism in Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man, as well as 
his usage of the phrase “advanced industrial system,” (as opposed to merely using the 
term “capitalism”) a term intended to include Soviet-style bureaucratic Marxism.  
Marcuse writes: 
 
Since its first usage … the term “positivism” has encompassed (1) the validation 
of cognitive thought by experience and facts; (2) the orientation of cognitive 
thought to the physical sciences as a model of certainty and exactness; (3) the 
belief that progress in knowledge depends on this orientation.  Consequently, 
positivism is a struggle against all metaphysics, transcendentalisms, and idealisms 
as obscurantist and regressive modes of thought.  To the degree to which the 
given reality is scientifically comprehended and transformed, to the degree to 
which society becomes industrial and technological, positivism finds in the 
society the medium for the realization (and validation) of its concepts -- harmony 
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between theory and practice, truth and facts.  Philosophic thought turns into 
affirmative thought; the philosophic critique criticizes within the societal 
framework and stigmatizes non-positive notions as mere speculation, dreams of 
fantasies.
51
 
 
To Marcuse, this is devastating precisely because any “harmony between theory and 
practice, truth and facts” is illusory.  In this case, the individual fails to conceive the 
object (external reality, phenomena) as antagonistic -- or rather, the individual fails to 
distinguish between what an object appears to be (appearance, its immediate qualities) 
and what it really is (essence, its essential qualities).  In Marcuse’s words, to see clearly 
is to experience an “object of thought … as that which it really is (in its essential 
qualities), and in antagonistic relation to its contingent, immediate situation.”52  Marcuse 
refers to this as “intuition,” but is describing what it means to perceive something 
dialectically.  It is also what we will see Marcuse refer to as “multi-dimensional” 
thinking.  At any rate, the positivistic individual winds up dependent on a system (the 
advanced industrial system) that appears to create a harmony between our internal and 
external, truth and facts, thought and practice.  Thus, in Marcuse’s view, the positivistic 
individual will tend to lose sight of what is true and untrue, and thus all genuinely critical 
thought is lost because the individual “criticizes from within the societal framework” -- 
does not perceive anything other than the “is.”  To Marcuse, positivism, in the final 
analysis, creates the illusion of an impossible harmony, which he refers to as a “terrifying 
                                                          
51
 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 172. 
52
 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 125-126. 
 28 
harmony of freedom and oppression, productivity and destruction, grown and 
regression.”53   
According to Farr, embedded within the crisis of Marxism was also the issue of 
the revolutionary subject – that is, where is the person predisposed to radical action to be 
found?  This is a question that was to preoccupy Marcuse for the rest of his life, and the 
conflicting answers provided by Marcuse during this five year period help explain the 
level of debate surrounding the issue of his Orthodox Marxism.  If we were to subject 
Marcuse to the same type of positivist analysis that he spent his life refusing, then we 
would conclude that he was, indeed, an Orthodox Marxist from 1928 to 1933.  Thus, his 
“appearance” in those years can be described as that of an Orthodox Marxist because he 
had not yet fully rejected the notions that the proletariat is the revolutionary agent, and 
their rebellion is inevitable due to the contradictions found within capitalism. Marcuse 
seemingly demonstrates his commitment to the Orthodox Marxist theory of class struggle 
in his 1928 essay “Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism” when he 
writes: 
 
In the historical situation that we have been addressing, class is the decisive 
historical unity and the knowledge of the unique, historical-social necessity is the 
achievement of “class consciousness.” In class consciousness, the chosen class 
arises to become the bearer of the historical act. Should the revolutionary situation 
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be at hand, it can only be seized by that class that is conscious of its historical 
situation.
54
  
 
Here we find tension between Marcuse’s existential argument that revolutionary 
consciousness begins in the individual’s quest for authenticity, and his reluctance to fully 
reject the notion that the proletariat is the authentic subject of radical action.  To be sure, 
Marcuse is very skeptical that the proletariat will fulfill its revolutionary purpose, which 
is unsurprising considering Marcuse’s first-hand experience of the failed November 
Revolution in Germany,
55
 and his attempt to utilize Heidegger (instead of say, György 
Lukács, whose framework was centered around the idea of class consciousness) suggests 
additional uncertainty.  This apparent contradiction seems to make Marcuse guilty of 
being non-committal and inconsistent.
56
   
To scrutinize Marcuse in the manner in which he would prefer -- that is, 
dialectically -- would bring us to more complex and nuanced conclusions.   The evolution 
of a seed into that of a plant will help us understand this type of analysis.  It is very tough 
to deny that the seed “appears” as nothing but a seed.  Eventually, if placed in proper 
circumstances, the seed will develop into a plant.  Thus, its “appearance” can now be 
described as that of a plant.  That is a positivist analysis.  Dialectically speaking, the seed, 
having the potential, through the destruction of its “appearance” as a seed, to become a 
plant, was in its “essence,” both a seed, a plant, and appropriately, the soil into which it 
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will eventually decompose.
57
  Additionally, every new “appearance” contains elements of 
the old.  That, in a nutshell, is how progress is conceptualized dialectically, and that is 
how Marcuse should be conceptualized.
58
  On this level, Marcuse’s reluctance to fully 
jettison Orthodox Marxist notions becomes less relevant, for he was already destroying 
the seed of the “early Marcuse,” in order to become, for lack of a better phrase, his later 
self -- one able to articulate his unique brand of Marxism.  Even though Marcuse still 
held on to some of the primary ideas of an Orthodox Marxist, his “movement” was away 
from orthodoxy.
59
  Indeed, his very attempt to utilize Heidegger (and eventually Hegel) 
and his search for the revolutionary subject – a project begun during these years -- 
suggests a healthy skepticism of Orthodox Marxism.  Thus, his “essence” had already 
rejected orthodoxy, and to argue otherwise is to render oneself vulnerable to accusations 
of reductionism.   More pressing is the issue of Heidegger’s influence after Marcuse’s 
aborted attempt to fuse Heidegger and Marx.  
In Marcuse’s essay ‘Contributions’ he attempted to produce a “concrete 
philosophy” that would grapple with the philosophical and Marxist issues at that time.  It 
situates him within the historical vein of “critical Marxists” that attempted to provide an 
alternative to the reductionist Marxism mentioned above and the abstract philosophies 
found in academia that Marcuse believed were inapplicable to concrete life.  
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‘Contributions’ marks the professional point of departure for Marcuse in his life-long 
project to create a philosophy and social theory that would move society toward 
necessary and radical social change.  Consequently, this and subsequent early essays 
anticipate his entire theoretical project and contain many elements that would be 
significant in his later works.
60
 It is also where we will find a Marcuse in constant tension 
with both Orthodox Marxism and Martin Heidegger.  
Marcuse opens ‘Contributions’ with the following passage: 
 
The object of the investigation must first be provisionally determined according to 
 its givenness. Marxism, in whose epistemological context historical materialism 
 enters into history, does not appear in the form of a scientific theory -- as a system 
 of truths whose meaning rests wholly in its accuracy as knowledge [Erkenntnisse] 
 -- but rather in the form of a theory of social action, of the historical act [Tat].  
 Marxism is both the theory of the proletarian revolution and a revolutionary 
 critique of bourgeois society; it is a science insofar as the revolutionary action that 
 it wishes to set free and to stabilize requires insight into its own historical 
 necessity -- into the truth of its being. It lives in the inseparable unity of theory 
 and praxis, of science and action…61 
 
In the above passage, Marcuse, influenced by his readings of György Lukács and Karl 
Korsch, indicates that he views Marxism as more than a positivist analysis of the “is,” 
(i.e. a scientific socialism focused primarily on formulating objective scientific laws 
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rooted in the economy) but, rather, a theory of revolutionary practice grounded in 
historical knowledge and historical necessity.
62
  We also see that Marcuse has not yet 
begun his scathing critique of science-as-positivism that becomes a distinctive feature of 
his analysis in the 1950s, but it must be remembered that he encountered a much different 
(and he would argue, much more “one-dimensional) social order in the postwar “Affluent 
Society” of the United States.63  Nevertheless, this line of argument represents, at least in 
part, a rejection of the Orthodox Marxism of the day. 
 Additionally, Marcuse does not advocate a voluntaristic concept of radical action, 
arguing that it becomes an historical necessity. Building off of the above argument, 
Marcuse writes: 
 
 The question of radical action can only meaningfully be posed at the 
 moment when the act is grasped as the decisive realization of the human 
 essence and yet when, at the same time, precisely this realization appears to 
 be a factical [factual] impossibility—that is, in a revolutionary situation. 64  
 
To put it another way, Marcuse is arguing that capitalism robs humans, called Daesin in 
Heideggerian terms, of an authentic existence.  He continues: 
 
 All of these activities seem to be detached from the human actors who, in turn, 
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 do not seem to live in them, but merely to be occupied with them; or -- the 
 ultimate absurdity -- one sees actors carrying out actions not to live, but for 
 the sake of mere survival! Here one sees the “transformation of personal powers 
 into thingly ones,” and what is left behind is an “abstracted  individual […], 
 robbed of all life-content,” whose “own deed becomes an alien power opposed to 
 him.”65 
Marcuse is arguing that capitalist society suppresses the real content of human activity 
and calls for radical action in the face of this alienated existence.  He clearly argues that 
this radical act is necessary because of the tension between the inhuman capitalist system 
that dominates and reifies Daesin, and the human need for free life-affirming activities.  
It is here we find similarities between the early Marcuse and his later usage of Freud in 
Eros and Civilization.  In Marcuse’s words, “the erotic energy of the Life Instincts cannot 
be freed under the dehumanizing conditions of profitable affluence.”66 
 For the early Marcuse, the radical act is an historical act demanded by being in a 
specific historical situation, that is, an insufferable social reality.  Marcuse was positing 
that this need for revolution is to be found in human consciousness, injecting a subjective 
element into Marxist revolutionary theory.
67
  For the later Marcuse, Freud infused this 
abstract line of reasoning with concreteness, placing this inauthenticity squarely on the 
instinctual or biological level.  As Jürgen Habermas explained to Marcuse in a 1979 
interview, “Freudian metapsychology later assumed the role of Heidegger’s existential 
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ontology.”68  Nevertheless, the early Marcuse is rejecting the dominant Marxist 
ideologies that posited the revolutionary subject as an inevitable creation of capitalist 
economics, and is attempting to draw attention to the need for a substantive change in 
consciousness needed within the individual.  Moreover, he is anticipating his later, and 
more explicit, move away from the Orthodox view of the proletariat as the primary agent 
of revolution.  Thus, this represents a pushback, in a sense, against the notion that a 
socialist revolution is inevitable (albeit not as forcefully as Marcuse will do so later), for 
it relies on the historical knowledge and consciousness of the individual in the face of 
intolerable circumstances, as opposed to a predicable human response to economic 
conditions.      
 Heidegger’s project was important to the early Marcuse because it demonstrated 
that to live a meaningful life is to be authentic.  In Marcuse’s view, inauthenticity (i.e. a 
meaningless existence) is akin to alienation – that is, the separation from one self and 
from other human beings.
69
   This is an important categorical link between Heidegger, 
Marx, Freud, and Hegel, which suggests an ideational continuity throughout Marcuse’s 
project.  That is to say, Heidegger’s category of inauthentic can be seen as analogous to 
Marx’s concept of alienation, and Freud’s discussion of the discontented and repressed 
“self.”  Moreover, Heidegger’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic can be seen 
as analogous to Hegel’s distinction between essence and appearance (which demands a 
dialectical analysis of phenomena resulting in a full view of potentialities), as well as 
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Freud’s call for humans to sublimate (i.e. locate socially acceptable activities that 
compensate for the necessary oppression imposed on the human drives by the 
requirements of civilization).  In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse, turning to Freud, will 
refer to the demands of modern society as the performance principle, and will refer to 
those demands placed on the human being that are greater than what is necessary to 
maintain civilization as surplus repression.  Those terms will be discussed in greater 
detail later.  For now, it is enough to be aware of the categorical continuity.  Thus, it is 
important to realize that surplus repression necessarily creates an alienated or inauthentic 
existence.  A discussion of Heidegger’s categories of throwness and fallenness will help 
us see the persistence of this line of thought in Marcuse’s project.  Our discussion of 
these categories will lead us to the concept of historicity, another category that Marcuse 
adopted from Heidegger and, although eventually found only in the background, 
remained significant to his later project. 
  In Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to create a method of “existential 
phenomenology” -- i.e. the analysis of the Being of human beings.  As mentioned above, 
Heidegger calls human beings Dasein, which means “being-there.”   Heidegger writes: 
  
This characteristic of Dasein’s Being -- this “that it is” -- is veiled in its “whence” 
and “whither,” yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the 
“throwness” of this entity into its “there”; indeed, it is thrown in such a way that, 
 36 
as Being-in-the-world, it is the “there.”  The expression “throwness” is meant to 
suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.
70
 
 
For Heidegger, Dasein comes to be in the world through throwness.  In other words, at 
birth Dasein is simply thrown into existence.  To be sure, for Heidegger, this is a pre-
existing world of meanings, but Daesin is eventually expected to provide self-direction.  
In clear dialectical fashion, the thrown is expected to also become, as much as possible, 
the thrower.   Arnold Farr helps clarify the concept of throwness with the following 
analogy: 
 
[B]eings or individuals find themselves thrown into the unfolding, happening, or 
movement of Being.  It is as if one awakes to find oneself inserted into a chapter 
of a story that is already being written.  One must find one’s bearings in this story 
as one travels from one chapter to the next.  One is thrown into a chapter that one 
did not choose, yet one is expected to make a contribution to the development and 
completion of this chapter and perhaps the entire book.
71
 
 
It must be noted that, for Heidegger, this “throwness” necessarily implies that Dasein 
shares the world with others, thus becoming a being-with-others-in-the-world.
72
  
Accordingly, the existence of Dasein in the world with others means that the thrown 
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necessarily exists with the “they” (das Man) or the anonymous anyone.73  The beginnings 
of a theory of intersubjectivity within Marcuse are discussed elsewhere.
74
  Our purpose is 
to understand that, in the Heideggerian project, it is in Dasein’s relation to other human 
beings and society at large, where the thrown can find room to provide direction (i.e. in 
Farr’s analogy, to contribute to the writing of one’s own book).  It is this realm of 
personal autonomy -- or in Marcusean terms, of dialectical or negative thinking -- that 
Marcuse, in his seminal work One Dimensional Man (1965), warned was largely missing 
from our individual and collective consciousness.  Appropriately, it now becomes 
necessary to discuss the categories of fallenness and historicity. 
 Implicit in the Heideggerian idea of being-in-the-world-with-others are the 
categories of authentic and inauthentic existence.  For Heidegger, Dasein will fall into 
the “they,” thereby becoming inauthentic.  In Being and Time, Heidegger writes: 
  
“Fallenness” into the “world” means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in 
so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.  Through the 
Interpretation of falling…we have (now what we) called the inauthenticity of 
Dasein …75 
 
Put another way, the individual tends toward domination by social forces, conformity to 
standard modes of behavior and interests, thereby failing to develop individuality or to 
assert genuine personal autonomy, thus falling into an inauthentic (or meaningless) 
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existence.  An inauthentic existence, for Heidegger, tends toward an instrumental 
existence -- that is, one’s relation to self and others is increasingly dominated by external 
factors such as one’s connection to material objects.76  Increasingly, we interact with our 
self and each other as if we are objects, thereby losing a desire and capacity for genuine 
love, caring, and mutual understanding.
77
  For Heidegger, Dasein is not aware that its 
Being is, to an alarming degree, controlled, and taken away, by das Man (i.e. the “they,” 
or anonymous anyone).  Thus, if one is to become authentic, one must be aware of what it 
means to be a self in interaction and tension with others and objects in the world.  In One-
Dimensional Man, Marcuse will argue that advanced industrial society, through various 
methods, tends to homogenize and to strip humans of the ability to think of any 
alternative (and presumably better) realities (i.e. the “can be,” or a “second dimension” of 
thought).  In describing individuals increasingly incapable of genuine personal autonomy 
and moving rapidly towards a state of affairs that regards people as instruments, while 
being unaware (or even desirous) of this reality, Marcuse is presenting us with a 
reformulated, concretized, and more nuanced dialectical version of Heidegger’s 
categories of throwness and  fallenness. For Marcuse, this helped explain the failed 
revolution in Germany in 1918, and it also brings us to the concept of historicity.   
 If inauthenticity is understood as Dasein’s getting lost in the “they,” and 
authenticity requires an awareness of one’s place in the (past, present, and future) world, 
then this implies a realization of possibilities (or potentialities).  As John Abromeit states, 
this suggests an “awareness of one’s own-most possibilities and the firm resolve to 
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realize them in the future.”78  This necessarily points to one’s potentiality, and to future 
modes of Being.  It also reveals the temporal axis of Heidegger’s existential analysis, that 
is, Dasein is connected to the past, present, and future, and must be aware of its own 
connection if it is to be authentic.  This notion of historicity is central to Heidegger and 
Marcuse, for it refers to “the way in which individuals proceed to self-awareness of the 
way they live in history.”79  This concept provided, for Marcuse, a bridge between Hegel 
and Heidegger.
80
 Heidegger and Hegel posited similar notions of historicity, yet it was 
Hegel’s explicit employment of the dialectical method that compelled Marcuse to view 
Hegel as corrective to Heidegger.   
 In the early 1930s Marcuse began to engage with the philosophic categories of 
Friedrich Hegel.  He wrote a series of articles on dialectics while preparing a second 
dissertation under Heidegger, eventually called Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of 
Historicity.  This makes sense when one considers that Hegel was an important source for 
Marx and was an interest of Heidegger.
81
 
The concept of historicity is a major trope of Hegel’s Ontology (published by 
Marcuse in 1932) and Marcuse’s 1928 essay Contributions to a Phenomenology of 
Historical Materialism.”82  In the introduction to Hegel’s Ontology Marcuse writes:  
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Historicity is what defines history and thus distinguishes it from “nature” or from 
“economy.”  Historicity signifies the meaning we intend when we say of 
something that it is “historical.”  Historicity signifies the meaning of this “is,” 
namely the meaning of the Being of the historical.
83
 
 
For Marcuse, historicity is the historical in all of its moments -- past, present, and future.  
It is a dialectical view of history, and even injects traces of an “ought to be.”  In this 
framework, the historical is intended to counter the positivist view of history, which 
conceives of historical movement as a chain of events -- as artifacts of the past.  
Historicity argues that past eras continue to infiltrate the present and future, and effect the 
continual movement of history.   
 Marcuse’s definition of historicity does not provide us with a very good 
clarification of the concept, thus it is now necessary to introduce two definitions that can 
help us to better understand.  In his essay “Inhabiting Hope: Contributions to a New 
Materialist Phenomenology” William Wilkerson writes: 
 
Historicity captures how individuals find themselves thrown into a world that is 
not their own making, a world that presents them with ready-made projects, 
values, and ideals contained in a culturally specific heritage.  Furthermore, 
individuals come to terms with themselves and their social milieu by finding their 
place within it and by taking a stand on it.  Human existence exhibits its 
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historicity in that it takes its projects and self-understandings from a historically 
specific form of life.
84
 
 
Wilkerson contrasts historicity with what he calls “historicality,” or the “empirically 
discoverable, material, and social conditions of a society, based in the mode of 
production, and manifested in part through the division of labor.”85   He goes on to 
describe “historicality” as an analysis of the “macrodevelopment of societies,” and the 
role that material conditions and structures play in the tasks, projects, and ideals of 
particular individuals in their daily human existence.  In other words, historicity can be 
conceived as an individual concern that is directly related to authenticity, while 
“historicality” refers to a more concrete historical endeavor.  As we will see, Marcuse 
thought the two concepts are relational.  Offering additional clarification Robert Pippin 
argues: 
 
In its broadest sense, the notion of historicity just means that the historical past 
has a continuing effect on the present (is, as Heidegger claims, “stretched along 
into” the present) and that that effect cannot be treated as a causal effect.  That is, 
historicity cannot be understood as a “scientific” theory about the relation 
between events, and certainly not a causal theory, because the historicity thesis is 
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that there are not “separate” events “in” history affecting each other.  One of the 
events is what it is only in relation to its past.
86
 
 
For Marcuse, the notions of historicity and authenticity create a space for Dasein to act 
radically, that is, react to oppressive conditions that do not allow for an authentic 
existence by attempting to change the “is” in a manner that is conceivable within one’s 
own potentialities.  Marcuse was using the notion of historicity and authenticity to rescue 
human subjectivity from the positivism and reductionism of Orthodox Marxism.  
Nevertheless, by the early 1930s, Marcuse was moving past Heidegger (at least as a 
direct interlocutor), much the same way he was moving away from Orthodox Marxism. 
As stated above, Marcuse was concerned that Heidegger’s’ ontological analysis, 
by itself, could not provide an ontic concretion.  For this reason, Marcuse was aware that 
Heidegger’s existential analysis needed to turn to the “decisive facts of today in their 
historical concretion.”87  Whereas Heidegger is concerned with universal ways of Being 
and explores what is authentic existence and how it is possible, examining the ontological 
conditions requisite for possible authenticity, Marcuse wants to move past that, thus 
asking “what is authentic existence concretely?”88   This line of critique would move 
Marcuse beyond Heidegger’s ontological analysis of authenticity and look towards Hegel 
in an attempt to show what is blocking authenticity in the current state of affairs.  It is 
here we find the “ought” in Marcuse’s view of historicity and authenticity. 
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 For Marcuse, a major point of concern with Heidegger’s abstract existentialism is 
that it seems to argue that his categories are universal, that is, applicable to all humans in 
every historical situation.  William Wilkerson writes: 
 
Analyses of historicity to not simply enumerate various things that people in fact 
believe and do, but instead present the structure in which any particular thing that 
someone believes is found … the analysis given by the existential 
phenomenologists describe formal structures into which the content of a particular 
social existence can be placed.  Thus, Heidegger’s analysis of the resolute human 
existence supposedly holds for any social existence.  Individuals in all social and 
historical situations would fit in his descriptive account …89 
 
According to Heidegger’s ontology, all societies in all historical time periods demonstrate 
the characteristics of fallenness and inauthenticity. Thus, it was clear to Marcuse that 
Heidegger’s project could not adequately conceive of historical movement.  According to 
Wilkerson, a Heideggerian analysis of historicity can  
 
explain how the human relation to history is fundamental to our everyday 
existence (we find ourselves in the historical world and take on its tasks as our 
own), but … [does] this at the cost of placing human existence outside history.  
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The historicity that enables our relation to history is itself the same for all humans 
across history.
90
 
 
 Moreover, in positing fallenness as universal and inevitable, Heidegger’s Dasein, who 
can achieve authenticity through what he called “resoluteness,” or a turn inward to make 
authentic choices, is rendered asocial and apolitical.  In fact, this notion of an 
individualistic self-transformative turn falls short of Marcuse’s notion of a radical act.  To 
Marcuse, a radical act must demonstrate a change in the individual and society.  
Heidegger’s category of authenticity remains primarily conformist precisely because it 
fails to require any action aimed towards the social order.  Thus, in the final analysis, the 
potential for radical action in Heidegger’s framework becomes flattened.  This explains 
Marcuse’s turn towards Hegel, for Hegel’s concrete dialectics fills this gap.   
Marcuse saw Hegel’s dialectics as more applicable to concrete life.  To Marcuse, 
Hegel’s ontology is strongest at the exact point in which Heidegger’s is weak.  It is 
necessary to go back to Heidegger’s Being and Time to clarify my point.  In his 1928 
book, Heidegger attempts to analyze the structures of Being through the use of 
phenomenological ontology.  Ontology, to Heidegger, refers to the philosophical search 
for the meanings of Being, or existence.  Phenomenology, as Heidegger writes in Being 
and Time, means “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in 
which it shows itself from itself.”91  Thus, phenomenology must be understood as an 
unconcealment of Being, and Dasein’s acting upon that which is unconcealed.   
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The concepts of ontology and phenomenology are not assigned equal weight in 
Heidegger’s project.  It is notable that greater emphasis is placed on phenomenology than 
the concept of ontology, for it is only through the phenomenological method that Daesin 
“can have access to what is be the theme of ontology.”92  As Heidegger sees it, “only as 
phenomenology, is ontology possible.”93  To Heidegger, that which presents itself in the 
phenomenological conception of phenomena (or objects-in-the-world) is the Being of 
Daesin.  Inasmuch as ontology is only possible as phenomenology, and that human 
beings are the subject of philosophical inquiry, it becomes evident that ontology is only 
possible as a phenomenology of human existence.  Thus, it is clear that Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology is existential -- that is, the analysis of Being of human 
beings.  Although there is a dialectical presence in Heidegger’s framework, namely 
between that of Daesin (the individual) and Das Man (the “they”, or society) -- it is 
Heidegger’s focus on the phenomenological method that moves Marcuse towards Hegel. 
For Marcuse, dialectics is the method used by some Marxists to conceptualize the 
movement of history.  In his 1928 essay “Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical 
Materialism” Marcuse argues that the dialectical method sees “every developing form in 
the river of movement” and perceives phenomena (that is, the object) as historical.94  
Marcuse cites Engels in an effort to explicate his understanding of dialectics --  
 
The great fundamental thought that the world is not to be conceived as a complex 
of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the seemingly 
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stable things, not less than their images in our heads, the concepts, pass through 
an uninterrupted transformation of becoming and passing away.
95
   
 
He then cites Lenin in a lengthier passage: 
 
Dialectical logic demands that we go further.  In order to really know an object, 
one must grasp and investigate all sides of the object, all its relations and 
“mediations”…Second, dialectical logic requires that the object be taken in its 
development, in its “self-movement”…in its transformation.   Third, the whole of 
human praxis must enter into the “definition” of the object, as well as the critique 
of its truth, since as practical determination the object is bound together with what 
is necessary to man.  Fourth, dialectical logic teaches that “there is no abstract 
truth”, truth is always concrete.96 
 
For Marcuse, dialectical thought is capable of grasping historical movement precisely 
because  it requires attention be paid to how later forms of development are found in the 
earlier situation, and by showing how destruction, that is, a negation of the current social 
order, creates progress, or continued movement.  It also demonstrates, for Marxists, the 
features of any state of affairs that should be negated, and conversely, those that should 
remain -- thus, the dialectical method preserves the unity of theory and praxis.
97
 This line 
of argument is clearly found in the following passage from Contributions: 
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Perhaps already in Hegel, but certainly in Marx’s work, the specific form of 
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis indicates in its very method the need to be true to 
the immanent necessity of historical movement. Rooted in the fundamental 
character of historicity, this immanent necessity of history finds its clearest 
expression in the fact that the causes of historical movement from the status quo 
to that which is to come [vom Bestehenden zum Kommenden] are already fully 
present in the world as it exists in the present and that they develop only out of it. 
It is only by this principle that transcendent, metahistorical, or ahistorical 
impulses or interventions are excluded. However, insofar as this development is 
realized only through the (historical) action of man, that which is to come will 
always take the form of a “negation of the status quo.”98 
 
To be sure, by presenting a “necessity of history” expressed in “that which is to come” 
Marcuse is again injecting an “ought” into the constant unfolding -- into historicity. 
 Marcuse then argues for a fusion of phenomenology and the dialectical method, 
arguing that phenomenology must become dialectical if it wants to adequately understand 
historical change.  In Contributions Marcuse writes: 
 
Phenomenology means: allowing questions and approaches to be guided by the 
objects themselves, bringing the objects fully into view. In being grasped, 
however, the objects always already stand in historicity.  This sphere of historicity 
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already begins, as a concrete historical situation, in the development of the 
question as it seeks the object; it includes the unique individuality of the 
questioner, the direction of his question and the way in which the object first 
appears.
99
 
 
Phenomenology arrives at its questions and attempts to gain access to the object (i.e. the 
subject matter of investigation, the phenomena) and bring it completely-in-view only 
through the things themselves.  A phenomenological analysis correctly perceives the 
equipment in a woodworking shop as greater than physical objects, that is, as tools, each 
with a purpose, that contribute to the overall project of creating and maintaining a vibrant 
carpentry workshop.  A phenomenological analysis, however, can not explain, for 
example, why the more elaborate and expensive tools of the more modern era are 
preferable (or not) to the simpler hand tools of previous carpenters.  These types of 
questions and answers demand we move past a phenomenological analysis.   Marcuse 
demanded that any analysis of historicity reach down to include “historicality,” that is, 
become dialectical.
100
  In Contributions, Marcuse makes explicit his argument that 
Heidegger’s phenomenology cannot, by itself, grasp the entire object: 
 
A failure to situate a given historicity within a phenomenological analysis 
signifies that the investigation has failed to bring its object fully into view. But 
there is more. Phenomenology should never let its investigation end simply with 
the exhibition of the historicity of its object, only subsequently to return it to the 
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sphere of abstraction. Phenomenology must constantly maintain its object in the 
most rigorous concretion. This means that as an examination of a historical object 
-- as an examination grounded in historicity -- phenomenology must allow the 
concrete historical situation, its concrete “material content,” to work its way into 
the analysis. Thus a phenomenology of human Dasein would be lacking in 
necessary richness and clarity if it were to pass over the material content of 
historical Dasein. This… is the case with Heidegger.  If Dasein is historical in its 
very being, then it stands at every moment in a concrete, historical situation -- a 
situation that must first be destroyed before its basic structure can be exhibited.
101
 
 
The “material content of historical Dasein” is precisely its “historicality.”  In other words, 
Marcuse is rejection the phenomenological notion that the web of meaning into which 
Dasein is thrown exists prior to the material conditions.  To Marcuse, they are relational, 
prompting him to argue that all phenomena stands in history, thus requiring 
phenomenology be historicized.  As Kellner argues, this is a radical turn from the 
Husserlian phenomenology utilized by Heidegger, which strives, “through the intuition of 
essences at grasping the atemporal, eternal, unchanging essence.”102  This is not a 
rejection of Heidegger, but it provides a concretized supplement to Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology, which conceived of only universal and essential structures 
of Being.   
Marcuse believes it is necessary for phenomenology to become historicized 
through dialectics, precisely because Heidegger’s framework never leaves the a priori 
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(transcendental) level, thereby rendering it unable to concretely grapple with the past (i.e. 
historical movement) and present (i.e. the concrete state of affairs).     Marcuse fleshes 
out this point in Contributions: 
 
 The achievement of the dialectical method is precisely this last concretion. 
For this is exactly what is at stake in the dialectical method: doing justice at every 
moment to the specific, concrete-historical situation of its object. The petrified 
and free-floating abstracta become concrete again for the dialectical method once 
they are seen reunited with the human existence “that belongs to them.”  
Moreover, the true dialectic can only then fulfill the demand for ultimate 
concretion and (thus) become true to the type of being of human existence when, 
on the basis of knowledge of the concrete historical situation, it also draws correct 
conclusions for the decisive sphere of human existence: the sphere of praxis. At 
the same time, the dialectic extends the line of concretion along one axis to its 
utmost extreme; it does so by forcing the specific human Dasein that it addresses 
in its analyses to take up, with the whole of its existence, a practical position and 
to act in accordance with its historical situation.  The significance of the 
dialectical method consists precisely in the fact that it culminates in a method of 
action in accordance with knowledge.
 103
 
 
 Marcuse concludes this line of argument by reaffirming his claim for the fusion of 
dialectics and phenomenology: 
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 If we therefore demand, on the one hand, that the phenomenology of 
human Dasein initiated by Heidegger forge onward, coming to completion in a 
phenomenology of concrete Dasein and the concrete historical action demanded 
by history in each historical situation, we must, on the other hand, demand that 
the dialectical method of knowing become phenomenological, that it push itself it 
in the opposite direction and thereby learn to incorporate concretion in the full 
comprehension of the object… Only with the unification of both methods -- a 
dialectical phenomenology that represents a method of constant, extreme 
concretion -- is it possible to do justice to the historicity of human Dasein.  With 
what has been said above, the domain of validity of dialectical phenomenology 
has already been broadly charted. It extends, first, to a human existence that is 
historical in its very being -- in its essential structure as well as in its concrete 
forms and configurations.
104
 
 
Marcuse argues that a dialectical phenomenology is able to grasp Dasein in its “essential 
structure” and in its concrete situation, arguing that such an investigation can grasp 
human beings on both an existential and concrete level.
105
  This line of argument posited 
by Marcuse has earned him the label of “phenomenological Marxist,” or “Heideggerian 
Marxist.”106   The implication is that while phenomenology is unable to grasp historical 
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movement, dialectics, by itself, fails to adequately comprehend the universal aspects of 
Being, or human existence.
107
   
 Now that we have a more complete understanding of Marcuse’s interlocution with 
Heidegger (and  it’s complement by Hegel), it is now possible to discuss some final 
Heideggerian influences that remained veiled within the later writings of Marcuse.  As 
discussed above, Marcuse believed Heidegger’s existentialist ontology to represent a 
bulwark against a dogmatic Marxism, an atomizing bourgeoisie philosophy within 
academia, and an inverted social world that, in Marx’s terms, tended towards the 
reduction of human interaction to that of “a relation between things.”108  Marcuse 
considered Heidegger to be an “ontologically veiled critique of reification.”109  This is a 
category that would resurface in various forms throughout Marcuse’s oeuvre. 
 To Marcuse, Heidegger delivered a powerful critique of inauthentic being-in-the-
world -- utilizing the concepts mentioned above -- that represented a necessary 
complement to the discussions of alienation and reification by Marx in Capital and 
Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness.
110
  A passage from Marcuse’s 1929 essay 
entitled “On Concrete Philosophy” expresses that line of reasoning well, while 
encapsulating much of the Marcusean framework: 
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 The world in which this Dasein lives is also evolving to an ever greater degree 
into “business” [Betrieb]. The things encountered in it are viewed from the outset 
as “goods,” as things that one must use, but not in the sense of using them to meet 
the needs of Dasein. Instead, they are used to occupy or to fill an otherwise 
aimless existence, until they actually do become “necessities.” In this way more 
and more existences are consumed simply in order to keep the “business” 
operational. The form of existence of all classes had to hollow itself out in such a 
way that it has become necessary to place existence itself on a new foundation.
111
 
  
The above passage contains much anticipation of later Marcusean themes.  First, in 
Marcuse’s description of things-becoming-necessities, one can find anticipation of the 
Marcusean categories of true and false needs in Eros and Civilization.  Second, an 
inauthentic existence, for Heidegger, tends toward an administered existence, that is, 
one’s relation to self and others is increasingly dominated by external factors, and we 
interact with our self and each other as if we are objects.
112
  All this suggests an 
existential level to the Freudian argument that Marcuse posits, as well as the thrust of the 
argument Marcuse poses in One-Dimensional Man.   To elaborate, the desire to claim 
one’s self in the movement of history, that is, to reject false needs and to maintain 
genuine human relationships and interactions, demands an interior to the self that remains 
after socialization.
113
  Without this realm, all hope would be futile, for there would be no 
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part of the self that is capable of thinking negatively.  The existence of this inner realm 
untouchable by external stimuli suggests an existential level of the self that is not within 
the reach of the external state of affairs.  This not only implies an existential presence in 
the arguments in Marcuse, Freud, and Hegel, but also in philosophy as such.  In fact, an 
interaction between the concrete and existential can be found in Heidegger.  Embedded 
within his categories of authenticity, throwness, and historicity, one can detect the 
argument that inauthenticity did not refer to Dasein’s rejection of any fixed human 
essence, but rather, a reluctance to assert genuine agency in the project of one’s life.114 
Indeed, in One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse describes the original tension between the 
“is” and “ought,” and appearance and essence as “an ontological condition, pertaining to 
the structure of Being itself.”115   Marcuse posits that this “two-dimensional style of 
thought is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes 
to grips with reality.”116    To be sure, Marcuse goes on to argue that this ontological 
concern must transform into a historically grounded dialectic -- and suggests Critical 
Theory as the proper vehicle with which to accomplish this -- but the tension between the 
“is” and “ought” can be conceptualized as an interaction between existential and concrete 
concerns.
117
  
We must maintain a dialectical analysis on every level, which requires us to 
acknowledge that there is an interaction between the existential and concrete, and view 
Marcuse’s fluctuations as dialectical movement -- that is, the new inevitably contains 
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elements of the old.  Marcuse used Heidegger to begin with an analysis of the abstract 
state of reification and meaninglessness, only to concretize and historicize those 
categories, transforming them into his own categories of surplus repression and basic 
repression, one-dimensionality, and repressive desublimation.
118
  It should be 
remembered that Marx’s critique of Hegel -- where the next segment will bring us, is 
based on an ontological investigation of Hegel.
119
 
In the final analysis, Heidegger was important to Marcuse because the former 
attempted to demonstrate how “inauthenticity discloses some of the obstacles to radical 
action by suggesting how society comes to dominate the individual -- an issue that would 
later lead [Marcuse] to appropriate Freud.”120  Heidegger calls for a transformative turn 
inward (called resoluteness) whereby one can make authentic choices.  Arnold Farr 
provides clarification of this point: 
 
The notion that self-transformation is possible through choosing authentic 
possibilities from our heritage is a key ingredient in Marcuse’s thinking, and is the 
key to the relationship between Heidegger, Hegel, Marx, and Freud in Marcuse’s 
critical theory.  That is, although our present social order may be oppressive and 
repressive (inauthentic if you will) the possibilities for a new and non-repressive 
social order are embedded in the past.  Our heritage contains within itself a 
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multiplicity of possibilities waiting to be actualized.  In Hegelian terms, the 
present social reality contains within itself its own negation.
121
 
 
Ultimately, whether the subject is Dasein searching for authenticity, Marx’s laborer 
seeking to overcome alienation, Hegel’s individual subject acting within the universal, or 
Freud’s self yearning for libidinal satisfaction, Marcuse’s concerns remained the same 
throughout -- locating possibilities for individual and collective liberation amidst an 
oppressive and repressive state of affairs.   
 
2.2 – ON TO FRANKFURT SCHOOL – 1932-1941 
What Heidegger had done essentially was to replace Husserl’s transcendental 
categories with his own; such apparently concrete concepts as existence and anxiety, he 
evaporated into bad abstract concepts…Then the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 appeared [in 1932].  That was probably the turning point.  This 
was, in a certain sense, a new … practical and theoretical Marxism.  After that, 
Heidegger versus Marx was no longer a problem for me.” 
 
Herbert Marcuse, Theory and Politics: A Discussion, Fall 1979 
 
We pick up in 1932, one of the most significant years in the professional and 
personal life of Herbert Marcuse.  Simply put, during this year Marcuse broke with 
Heidegger, fled Germany in anticipation of Nazism, and by the following year, just 
before his former teacher embraced the Nazi Party, began work with the Institute for 
Social Research, known more commonly as the “Frankfurt School.”  For those reasons 
alone, 1932 seems like an obvious point of departure in our exploration of Marcuse; 
however, we must remain dialectical in our analysis, thereby requiring an explanation 
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more substantive -- that is, of greater significance than a mere sequence of events.  In 
1932, Marcuse published a review of Karl Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844.  Many scholarly discussions of Marcuse have placed this essay 
within Marcuse’s “Heideggerian phase,” for it is still quite existential.122  To be sure, 
Marcuse still demonstrated an explicit Heideggerian influence in this essay, but to insist it 
belongs in Marcuse’s Heideggerian phase is more appropriate for a positivist analysis 
rather than a dialectical one.   
On a dialectical level, Marcuse’s review of Marx’s Manuscripts represents his 
break, so to speak, with Martin Heidegger: it liberated him from his attempted fusion of 
Heidegger and Marx.
 123
  Marcuse no longer needed to synthesize the two, for Marx, in 
his Manuscripts, had already added an ontological element to Marxism, thereby, in 
Marcuse’s eyes, potentially rescuing Marxism from the crises in which it found itself.  In 
other words, this is ultimately what enabled Marcuse, on a philosophical level, to move 
past Heidegger.    Marcuse’s interaction with the Manuscripts (his review was published 
in 1932 as New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism) is a proper point of 
departure for it is such a watershed moment in the intellectual movement of Marcuse’s 
project (and Marxism as such). Heidegger, and then Marx, helped Marcuse explore how 
humans become inauthentic or alienated on a spiritual and existential level.
124
 This is a 
necessary prolegomena to Marcuse’s later, more concrete, application of those categories, 
for it demonstrates that this can (and likely will) be a tendency among humans living in 
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society.   It must be also be remembered, as discussed earlier, Marcuse never really 
rejected the existentialism of Heidegger (and now Marx) -- that is, it remained throughout 
Marcuse’s later works, albeit on a more tacit level -- and, consequently, this early phase 
of the Marcusean corpus should be viewed as a necessary stage in the formation of the 
Marcusean project.  Thus, it is better to think of Marcuse’s project as just that -- a project 
that was in constant evolution.   In the final analysis, since Marcuse did not really “drop” 
Heidegger, it is not necessary to consider the explicit presence of ontological arguments a 
definitive sign that any particular essay belongs in Marcuse’s “Heideggerian Phase.”  
Indeed, in a 1979 discussion with Jürgen Habermas, Marcuse was questioned about the  
apparent ontological framework evident in his review of the 1844 Manuscripts and 
responded, “Yes, but that wasn’t Heidegger any more.  That was an ontology which I 
believed I could locate in Marx himself.”125 
As mentioned previously, Marcuse was not uncritical of Heidegger’s 
existentialism, and was openly concerned that Heidegger’s ontological framework 
cannot, in the end, be reconciled with the historical concerns of Marxism (i.e. reach the 
ontic level).  Marcuse was troubled by the timeless or universal state of alienation or 
inauthenticity that Heidegger seemed to posit.  In his 1928 essay, “Contributions to a 
Phenomenology of Historical Materialism,” Marcuse states: 
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[W]e therefore demand…that the phenomenology of human Dasein initiated by 
Heidegger forge onward, coming to completion in a phenomenology of concrete 
Dasein and the concrete historical action demanded by history in each historical 
situation.
126
 
 
This concern is understandable, as Marcuse’s early essays clearly argue that capitalism 
was the social organization (i.e. the “is”) responsible for creating the human tendency 
towards inauthenticity. Any project that begins in the abstract ontological world must 
necessarily become concrete.  As Arnold Farr aptly puts it, “A philosophy that deals with 
pure, abstract concepts must return to earth (at some point) if it is to be worth our 
time.”127  It is precisely the publication of Karl Marx’s Manuscripts which enabled 
Marcuse to “forge onward,” or in Farr’s language, to “return to earth.”   
 The publishing of Marx’s Okonomisch-philosophische Manuscripte vom Jahre 
(Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844) was a seminal moment in the 
intellectual movement of Marxism and Marcuse.  He wrote a long review essay that 
appeared in the intellectual Social Democratic journal, Die Gesellschaft (the Society, or 
the Organization), in which he hailed the manuscripts’ discovery as a “crucial event in 
the history of Marxist studies.”128  As stated above, the Manuscripts are what enabled 
Marcuse to move past Heidegger, but more than that, they also vindicated many of 
Marcuse’s suspicions about Marx and the Marxism of the day.  Indeed, Marcuse most 
                                                          
126
 Marcuse, Contributions, 2. 
127
 Marcuse, Critical Theory and Democratic Vision,  15 
128
 Wolin, preface to Heideggerian Marxism, xxiv.   
 60 
likely felt a kinship with the ideas expressed by Marx in his Paris Manuscripts because 
they provided support for his own project, and provided criticism of Orthodox Marxism 
as a distortion.  Indeed, Marcuse’s interpretation of Hegel and Marx had astonishing 
similarities to what Marcuse discovered in the Paris Manuscripts.  Marcuse’s 
interpretation of the Manuscripts also marks the beginning of a tendency among many 
Marxists to re-center Marx’s early humanistic-philosophical years.129 
 For Marcuse, the Manuscripts invalidated the argument standard among Orthodox 
Marxists that the early works of Marx, which are more philosophical than economic, are 
in tension with his later “scientific” work (this is known as the “cleavage thesis”).  A 
close reading of the Paris Manuscripts made it clear to Marcuse that a correct 
interpretation of Marx’s project should stress the continuity of his categories, via the 
“interconnection of philosophy, political economy and revolutionary practice throughout 
Marx’s writings.”130  Marcuse is thus calling for a re-interpretation of Marx on the basis 
of his early writings, and thereby openly declaring Marxism to be in crisis. 
 Marcuse, embedded within his rejection of the “cleavage thesis,” portrays the 
Paris Manuscripts as a philosophical critique of the political economy under capitalism.  
In Marcuse’s own words: 
  
We are dealing with a philosophical critique of political economy, for the basic 
categories of Marx’s theory here arise out of his emphatic confrontation with the 
philosophy of Hegel (e.g., labor, objectification, alienation, sublation, property).  
This does not mean that Hegel’s “method” is transformed and taken over, put into 
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a new context, and brought to life. Rather, Marx goes back to the problems at the 
root of Hegel’s philosophy (which originally determined his method), 
independently appropriates their real content, and thinks the philosophy through 
to a further stage. The great importance of the new manuscripts further lies in the 
fact that they contain the first explicit documentary evidence of Marx’s critical 
reception of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, “the true point of origin and the 
secret of the Hegelian philosophy.”131 
 
In other words, Marx’s dialectical method was developed by thinking through the root 
problems of Hegel’s dialectic, and thus, was not merely an abstraction of Hegel’s 
dialectic.  As Marcuse sees it, Marx’s theory of alienation and its radical abolition is also 
founded on a philosophical notion of a dynamic of human nature, and is a basis for the 
argument that human beings are alienated by a capitalist structure.  Thus: 
 
The very complicated relationship between philosophical and economic theory 
and between this theory and revolutionary praxis, which can only be clarified by 
an analysis of the entire situation in which historical materialism developed, may 
become clear after a full interpretation (which I only want to introduce in this 
essay) of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. A rough formula that 
could be used as a starting point would be that the revolutionary critique of 
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political economy itself has a philosophical foundation, just as, conversely, the 
philosophy underlying it already contains revolutionary praxis.
132
 
 
In the end, Marcuse is arguing that these philosophical and dialectical categories are 
present even in Marx’s later, more strictly scientific and economic writings.  Marcuse is 
also claiming that Marx did not conceive of alienation and devaluation of human life in 
purely economic or quantitative terms, but argues that it involves the human being in its 
entirety -- that is, its essence.  To put it differently, the early Marx is arguing that 
capitalism is not simply an economic system; more than that, it is a hegemonic and 
totalizing system that alienates workers from their essential need to construct an external 
reality (through their labor) that is responsible to their needs and powers.  Under 
capitalism, the human being is alienated from this possibility; moreover, the world of 
possibilities is arrogated by the capitalist and thus, the external reality is turned against 
the human being, distorting its whole existence into an unwinnable struggle.  Not only 
does this provide a powerful rebuke of the Orthodox Marxism present in the Soviet 
Union (Marcuse called it “crude and thoughtless Communism,” with “universal private 
property
133
) for it posits that alienation would (and did) still exist in the Soviet example, 
but it is also injects Marxism -- a theory firmly historical and concrete -- with an 
ontological element. 
 In his Paris Manuscripts, Marx was concerned with taking the philosophical 
concept of alienation (as developed by Hegel) and giving it a concretion by placing it in 
the existing capitalist society.  Marx demonstrated that this alienation contains a political, 
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economic, and an historical-anthropological dimension, for “if we look more closely at 
the description of alienated labor we make a remarkable discovery: what is here 
described is not merely an economic matter.  It is the alienation of man, the devaluation 
of life, the inversion and loss of human reality.”134  Marcuse adds: 
 
Bourgeois political economy has to be basically transformed in the critique for 
this very reason: it fails to recognize man who is its real subject. It disregards the 
essence of man and his history and is thus in the profoundest sense not a “science 
of man” [Wissenschaft vom Menschen] but of inhuman beings [Unmenschen] and 
of an inhuman world of objects and commodities.
135
 
 
Marx is criticizing bourgeois political economy for failing to grasp the human being, who 
is the subject of labor and the foundation of economic activity.  Marcuse thus argues that 
Marx provides both a theory of human nature (or essence) and describes what capitalism 
does to human beings; this alienation transforms humans and society into a world 
dominated by quantitative (economic) categories.   While this does inject Marx with 
existential concerns -- for in Marcuse’s interpretation, the primary fact that justifies 
revolution is the contradiction between one’s essential human needs and the historical 
condition of alienated labor under capitalism -- he is not arguing that alienation is a 
timeless metaphysical condition.  This deflects any accusations of economic reductionism 
or excessive existentialism (as was the case with Heidegger).    In the final analysis, 
Marcuse discovered that the “existential” concerns which had attracted him to Heidegger 
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were shared by Marx, who had also overcome the shortcomings Marcuse noticed in 
Heidegger by bridging the ontological and ontic.  Marcuse’s review of the Paris 
Manuscripts signaled a major movement in the Marcusean project.  To be sure, Marcuse 
would eventually remind us to not overemphasize the early Marx (especially after 
attaining a more mature understanding of the later Marx), but the ideas developed by 
Marcuse via his interpretation of the early more humanistic Marx were to remain a 
significant element of  Marcuse’s thinking throughout the rest of his life.  It is now time 
we turned our attention to another significant event in 1932 (and shortly after) -- the 
publishing of Marcuse’s second dissertation.   
 While working under Heidegger, Marcuse completed his habilitationsschrift (i.e. 
his habilitation, or second dissertation) in 1930.  It was published two years later as 
Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, and Marcuse intended it to grant him the 
venia legendi, which would qualify him for a full teaching professorship in a German 
university.
136
  The circumstances surrounding Marcuse’s failure to habilitate under 
Heidegger are unclear.  Before we delve into the possible scenarios, it is necessary to 
better understand the context.   
In 1932, the situation in Freiburg (and Germany) was becoming increasingly 
threatening for Marcuse.  Socialists and Communists were deeply divided, and the right 
was coalescing around Hitler.  Moreover, Marcuse had abandoned his hopes of becoming 
a university professor in Germany.  As he recalled, “At the end of 1932 it was perfectly 
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clear that I would never be able to qualify for a professorship under the Nazi regime.”137  
Marcuse then appealed to his old teacher Edmund Husserl, who sent the curator of 
Frankfurt University, Kurt Riezler, a letter of recommendation.
138
  Via the mediation of 
Husserl and Riezler, Marcuse established contact with the Institute for Social Research -- 
i.e. the Frankfurt School
139
 -- and was subsequently interviewed.
140
  This led to the 
Institute’s petitioning of the University to accept Marcuse’s second dissertation, which 
was already published as a book, so that he could be appointed a university professor. As 
Leo Löwenthal, a senior research associate with the Frankfurt School, recounts in a 1964 
letter, the Institute then appointed him to a professor position in 1932.
141
  Marcuse, 
however, never actually worked with the Institute in Frankfurt, since Max Horkheimer 
(head of the Institute), anticipating Nazi suppression, had already made plans to transfer 
the Institute’s money and operations to Geneva, to which Marcuse was assigned.142  
Marcuse states “I stayed in Freiburg and worked with Heidegger in 1932, when I left 
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Germany a few days before Hitler’s ascent to power, and that ended the personal 
relationship.”143  
 Horkheimer’s fears proved prescient, as the Nazi party emerged with over a third of 
the vote in the elections of 1933, and consequently, Hitler was named Chancellor on 
January 30, 1933.  The Reichstag building was set ablaze in February of that year, and in 
early March, the Nazi Gestapo seized the Institute’s facilities in Frankfurt, confiscating 
its library.  On March 23, 1933, Hitler, who had blamed the Reichstag fire on Communist 
arson, was granted emergency powers (known as “The Enabling Act of 1933”) by 
Reichstag legislators, thereby facilitating dictatorial powers by enabling Hitler to enact 
decrees without consulting the legislative body.  On April 7, 1933, the Nazis 
implemented the anti-Semitic Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, 
which effectively banned Jews from German academia.  It was shortly after, on May 1, 
1933, that Martin Heidegger, the new rector of Freiburg University (which had already 
been purged of Jews and other political undesirables) officially joined the Nazi Party, and 
began making speeches in his new capacity as intellectual legitimizer of Nazi rule.
 144
  
This was quite a shock to Heidegger’s students.  Their former teacher publicly “idolized” 
Hitler, and was openly characterizing der Fuhrer as “German reality and its law.”145  It 
should be unsurprising that Marcuse, having recently joined the Institute (a group, even 
prior to Heidegger’s affiliation with Nazism, was extremely critical of Heideggerian 
thought), had begun distancing himself from his former teacher.
146
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 As mentioned above, the circumstances surrounding Marcuse’s failure to 
complete his habilitation under the tutelage of Heidegger are unclear.  There appear to be 
two versions of this story, both of which are discussed by Seyla Benhabib in her 
Translator’s Introduction to Marcuse’s Habilitationsschrift: 
 
 According to the Philosophishces Lexicon…Heidegger rejected the work on the 
basis of political differences…According to a second version, which is the one 
more commonly followed by the Anglo-American scholars of Marcuse’s work, 
Marcuse…had seen the writing on the wall by the end of 1932…and thus possibly 
never formally submitted the work to the Philosophical Faculty of the University 
of Freiburg.  Barry Katz cites Marcuse as stating that to the best of his knowledge 
Martin Heidegger had never read the work.
147
  
 
In the end, the events surrounding Hegel’s Ontology, minus any new evidence, will 
remain murky.  Benhabib argues the latter scenario seems more likely because the former 
projects political differences backwards to characterize earlier attitudes.  Indeed, Marcuse 
himself disputes the notion that Heidegger’s Nazi sympathies were present prior to his 
affiliation.  Clouding the issue, Marcuse seems to have told Habermas that Heidegger 
rejected his dissertation,
148
 and in a 1932 letter from Edmund Husserl to University of 
Frankfurt Rector Kurt Riezler (mentioned above), Husserl wrote that Heidegger 
“blocked” Marcuse’s attempt to habilitate.149   
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We are certain Marcuse never formally submitted the habilitation to Heidegger.  
Given the evidence, we may conclude that Marcuse, two years after completing Hegel’s 
Ontology, somehow knew that it would not be accepted, thereby refraining from 
submitting it to avoid the professional shame of having it formally rejected.
150
   Before 
we dismiss the first version, we must ask ourselves why there was “writing on the wall” 
to be seen.  Or rather, if Heidegger had not shown signs of sympathy with Nazism, what, 
precisely, was the “writing on the wall?”151  Robert Sheehan, writing for the New York 
Times in 1988, argues that there is documentary evidence Heidegger began to support 
Hitler and the Nazis, at the latest by the spring of 1932.
152
  This may provide us with an 
explanation of Marcuse’s loss of hope it would be accepted, as well as Marcuse’s 
characterization of Heidegger as never formally reading his habilitation, but informally 
rejecting it.  In the end, absent new documentary evidence, we will not be certain. 
 In 1933, Marcuse moved to Switzerland to oversee the operations of the Geneva 
branch of the Institute for Social Research.  The Institute, made up of Jews and Marxists, 
had escaped the Nazi takeover by depositing their endowment in Holland and by 
establishing a branch office in Geneva, and joining Marcuse later in 1933, shortly after 
Hitler rose to power.
153
  In the ensuing years, the Institute experienced the uncertainties 
of exile, trying to set up centers in Paris, London and then New York. Marcuse went first 
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to Geneva in 1933, then to Paris, and finally arrived in New York in July 1934, where he 
remained for several years in the Institute’s branch located at Columbia University.  
Henceforward, Marcuse, despite significant philosophical, political and geographical
154
 
differences, would be linked with the “Frankfurt School.” 155   
 The Institute was founded at the University of Frankfurt in 1924 as the first 
Marxist research institute in Germany. In 1930, Max Horkheimer became director and 
under his leadership the Institute became well-known for its interdisciplinary approach, 
and its project of developing a critical theory of contemporary society.
156
  Horkheimer 
assembled a remarkably diverse group of theorists including Theodor W. Adorno, Erich 
Fromm, Leo Löwenthal, Franz Neumann, Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Frederick Pollock, 
and others who grappled with the new forms of monopoly state capitalism, advancing 
industrialization, culture formation within the milieu of mass production (i.e. the culture 
industries), and modes of social control that emerged in the era of fascism, communism, 
and state capitalism (i.e. the advanced industrial system).
157
 Marcuse’s attempted fusion 
of Heidegger and Marx was replaced by a version of Hegelian Marxism the Institute was 
in the process of creating.    For the next decade, Marcuse was heavily involved in the 
Institute’s work, so becoming one of its more important members.158   
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Marcuse’s previous analysis of Hegel and Marx prepared him for his time with the 
Institute, which was concerned with developing a dialectical social theory.  Marcuse, 
accepting the Frankfurt School’s thesis that Marxian critique of political economy is the 
foundation for a critical theory of society, moves away from his previous ontological 
analysis to that of developing a radical social theory aimed at diagnosing current social 
problems.  Marcuse also began to tone down his revolutionary language during his 
Frankfurt period for two reasons.  First, the Institute made the decision to euphemize their 
politics (i.e. “critical theory,” more or less, equals Marxism).  Second, in view of Stalinist 
Totalitarianism and the failure of any Western proletariat to rise as a revolutionary agent, 
Marcuse and the other member of the Institute began to question principal features of 
Marxian theory.
159
  
The Frankfurt School was on the forefront of a mid-twentieth-century trend called 
“Western Marxism,” a term referring to a group of Marxist thinkers whose interpretation 
of Marx differed greatly from the version found in the Soviet Union.  The Frankfurt 
School molded its own style of Western Marxism in the 1930s, and called it, as 
mentioned above, “the critical theory of society.”  In a 1937 essay for the Institute’s 
house journal Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (Journal for Social Research) entitled 
“Philosophy and Critical Theory,” Marcuse outlined critical theory as such: 
  
1. “There are two basic elements linking materialism to correct social theory: 
concern with human happiness, and the conviction that it can be attained 
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only through a transformation of the material conditions of existence. The 
actual course of the transformation and the fundamental measures to be 
taken in order to arrive at a rational organization of society are prescribed 
by analysis of economic and political conditions in the given historical 
situation. The subsequent construction of the new society cannot be the 
object of theory, for it is to occur as the free creation of the liberated 
individuals”; (p. 100) 
2. “[Critical thought] compels theory anew to a sharper emphasis on its 
concern with the potentialities of man and with the individual’s freedom, 
happiness, and rights… For the [critical] theory, these are exclusively 
potentialities of the concrete social situation… [H]uman freedom is no 
phantom or arbitrary inwardness that leaves everything in the external 
world as it was.   Rather, freedom here means a real potentiality, a social 
relationship on whose realization human destiny depends”; (p. 105) 
3. “From the beginning it [i.e. critical theory] did more than simply register 
and systematize facts.   Its impulse came from the force with which it 
spoke against the facts and confronted bad facticity with its better 
potentialities. Like philosophy, it opposes making reality into a criterion in 
the manner of complacent positivism. But unlike philosophy, it always 
derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social process. 
Therefore it has no fear of the utopia that the new order is denounced as 
being. When truth cannot be realized within the established social order, it 
always appears to the latter as mere utopia. (pp. 105-106) 
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4. “It only makes explicit what was always the foundation of its categories: 
the demand that through the abolition of previously existing material 
conditions of existence the totality of human relations be liberated,” (p. 
107)
160
 
 
The above passage demonstrates Marcuse’s commitment to the humanistic values that 
critical theory gained form Marx
161
, to the dialectical nature of critical theory, to the 
human and radical need for liberation, and his demand that critical theory must be driven 
by a “utopian spirit.”  This is a term worthy of our attention because it is easily 
misunderstood and the explication of this category will help us understand both Marcuse 
and Critical Theory. 
 The Oxford dictionary defines utopia as “an imagined place or state of things in 
which everything is perfect.  The word was first used in the book Utopia (1516) by 
Thomas More.”162  It is one of the oldest traditions in Western thought, and, for the next 
three hundred years, a plethora of similarly themed books have appeared.  The nature of 
utopian thought changed in the nineteenth century with the rise of industrialization.  Prior 
to then, utopian societies were depicted, more or less, as communal agricultural and 
ethically inspired societies.  These societies were not depicted as what we would label as 
“rich,” but through collective effort, there was no privation.  These societies were simply 
more just, more egalitarian, more humane, and more enlightened.  Industrialization 
changed this in terms of expectations.   For the first time it appeared that society could 
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create all the positive aspects mentioned above, and could provide material gain, while 
also liberating the masses from endless back-breaking labor.  Marx was skeptical of these 
utopian visions, arguing for a more precise understanding of the current society, which 
would enable us to better understand and act upon the need to transcend the current state 
of affairs.  In true dialectical fashion Marx insisted that a clear understanding of how the 
capitalist-industrial system changed its predecessor, how it is organized, and an exact 
understanding of how it interacts with humans, would make it possible to locate the 
possible seeds of liberation within the prevailing society.  Even though Marx was 
skeptical of “ethically inspired” utopian visions, he accepted that a more perfect society 
was entirely possible -- and the potentialities for it were to be found in the current state of 
things.  It is this vision to which the Institute was referencing in their essays on critical 
theory.
163
 
 Marcuse linked this utopian theme to the human capacity for fantasy.  In the 1937 
essay “Philosophy and Critical Theory” Marcuse writes: 
 
What critical theory is engaged in is not the depiction of a future world, although 
the response of phantasy to such a challenge would not perhaps be quite as absurd 
as we are led to believe. If phantasy were set free to answer, with precise 
reference to already existing technical material, the fundamental philosophical 
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questions asked by Kant
164
, all of sociology would be terrified at the utopian 
character of its answers. And yet the answers that phantasy could provide would 
be very close to the truth… [f]or it would determine what man is on the basis of 
what he really can be tomorrow.
165
 
 
It is vital to remember that Marcuse is not referring to some impossibly perfect future, but 
rather, to several notions.  First, it is a reference to how any vision of genuine liberation 
will be perceived as impossibly utopian in the context of the state of affairs that is to be 
transcended.  Hence, it will necessarily seem utopian, but as Marcuse sees it, any vision 
must be dialectical -- that is, grounded plausibly in tendencies found in the current 
societal organization.  Second, in the words of Horkheimer, “there can be no 
corresponding concrete perception of this new reality until it comes about.”166   In other 
words, critical theory is not to craft an explicit outline for the future, but to search for the 
possible agents and modes of liberation within the current society -- with the belief that in 
doing so, living unfree in the current state of affairs will become so untenable, liberation 
becomes a necessity.  The key is that the agents of revolution will not (and cannot) know 
precisely what it will look like until it is happening.  The vision of a more perfect society 
cannot be force-fed to the masses.   As Marcuse sees it, the liberated individual -- armed 
with an a priori need to transcend the current societal organization -- will necessarily act 
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in concert with others, to organize a society in the image of liberation.  In “Philosophy 
and Critical Theory” Marcuse wrote: 
 
In replying to the question, ‘What may I hope?,’ it would point less to eternal 
bliss and inner freedom than to the already possible unfolding and fulfillment of 
needs and wants.  In a situation where such a future is a real possibility, phantasy 
is an important instrument in the task of continually holding the goal up to view.  
Phantasy does not relate to the other cognitive faculties as illusion to truth (which 
in fact, when it plumes itself on being the only truth, can perceive the truth of the 
future only as illusion). Without phantasy, all philosophical knowledge remains in 
the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future, which is the only 
link between philosophy and the real history of mankind.
167
 
 
 
Again, Marcuse is using the term fantasy in a dialectical sense.  Not only does Marcuse 
demand that fantasy (or utopian visions) remain within the realm of historical 
plausibility, but also suggests that the current state of affairs militates against our ability 
to grasp our potentialities.  To suggest that we should think more utopian, is merely to 
suggest that, when gauging our potentialities, we need to transcend the context in which 
we find ourselves, otherwise we will remain unfree.
168
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 Marcuse never abandoned this standpoint.  This is something that clearly sets him 
apart from other principal figures of the Frankfurt School (especially Adorno and 
Horkheimer, both of whom became much more pessimistic after World War II).  Indeed, 
the capacity for utopian thinking or for fantasy is found in Eros and Civilization (1955): 
 
As a fundamental, independent mental process, fantasy has a truth value of its 
own, which corresponds to an experience of its own -- namely, the surmounting 
of the antagonistic human reality.  Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the 
individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason.  
While this harmony has been removed into utopia by the established reality 
principle, fantasy insists that it must and can become real, that behind the illusion 
lies knowledge.
169
 
 
 
Clearly, to Marcuse, the repressed individual needs to imagine potential liberation, which 
in the current context seems utopian.  To Marcuse, utopian thinking is precisely what will 
enable us to imagine a reality other than the current reality principle (i.e. the “is,” or 
demands placed on us by the external world).  These themes will be discussed in greater 
depth later, but for now it is enough to realize that in evaluating the rationality or 
irrationality of the present societal organization, the existing society is to be compared 
with its higher and better potentialities; this requires utopian thinking, and is critical 
theory par excellence..  In Marcuse’s words: 
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The abyss between rational and present reality cannot be bridged by conceptual 
thought. In order to retain what is not yet present as a goal in the present, phantasy 
is required. The essential connection of phantasy with philosophy is evident from 
the function attributed to it by philosophers, especially Aristotle and Kant, under 
the title of ‘imagination’. Owing to its unique capacity to ‘intuit’ an object though 
the latter be not present and to create something new out of given material of 
cognition, imagination denotes a considerable degree of independence from the 
given, of freedom amid a world of unfreedom.   In surpassing what is present, it 
can anticipate the future.
170
  
 
Before we begin exploring Marcuse’s other major publication during his 
Frankfurt period (the 1941 publication of Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of 
Social Theory) we should briefly examine other essays Marcuse published while working 
directly with the Institute.  Marcuse and his Frankfurt colleagues focused a great deal on 
the causes of Fascism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and the complex role played by 
liberalism.  In his 1934 essay “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View 
of the State,” Marcuse (reacting to a speech given by Hitler) argued that the totalitarian 
state (and the ideology behind it) was reacting within a new and advanced era of 
monopoly capitalism.  Marcuse argued that the totalitarian (or rather, fascist) state 
provided a defense of capitalism and was a bulwark against opposition to the capitalist 
system.  In other words, Nazi Germany and Italian Fascism represent a reaction to the 
failure of laissez-faire market style capitalism by the 1930s, with the state serving to 
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protect it from its own weaknesses (e.g. over-permissiveness of the working class 
parties).  To Marcuse then, totalitarianism was not a horrific break with the liberal past; 
rather, Marcuse establishes the continuities between liberalism and fascism.  He argues 
that the liberalism born out of the Enlightenment and its absolute fidelity to the capitalist 
economic system paved the way for the fascist-totalitarian adjustment, and to the 
abolition of liberalism.
171
   To Marcuse, liberalism struggles to maintain the capitalist 
mode of production once political and economic authority flows away from the 
individual entrepreneur and into the hands of a small corporate-political elite.
172
 In this 
interpretation, not just capitalism, but Western Tradition (i.e. devotion to science and 
empirical reason) had failed, for in the Marxist viewpoint, the Enlightenment spawned 
capitalism and its concomitant scientific fetishism and unquestioned devotion to 
empirical reason -- all factors which helped facilitate totalitarianism.
173
   This is 
consistent with the Institute’s critical stance towards the Enlightenment, and their 
common view, at this time, that it was an unfinished project.   
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In other essays from his Frankfurt years, Marcuse examined how and why 
individuals would submit to totalitarian domination.  In his 1936 essay “The Affirmative 
Character of Culture” Marcuse argued that bourgeois culture, in exchange for instinctual 
renunciation, does provide a sphere of individuality where one could find some degree of 
liberation.
174
  In true dialectical fashion, he also posits that bourgeois culture helped pave 
the way for fascism by teaching submission-as-sacrifice.
175
  In Marcuse’s words: “That 
individuals freed for over four hundred years march with so little trouble in the 
communal columns of the authoritarian state is due in no small part to affirmative 
culture.”176  In the end, many of Marcuse’s 1930s essays were focused on the complex 
relations between fascism and liberalism, and to preserve what he believes to be the 
liberating components of bourgeois culture, while criticizing those tendencies within 
bourgeois culture which serve the interests of domination.
177
 
One final essay deserving attention is “On Hedonism,” published in 1938.  It is 
here we first encounter Marcuse’s thoughts on human needs and sensibility.178  Marcuse 
rejects any type of ascetic moral code that would repress needs and passion (i.e. what, in 
the United States, may be called “Victorian Era sensibility”), but also rejects any hedonist 
who would claim that pleasure is solely an individual affair and devoid of any criteria of 
higher and lower, true and false pleasures.  Marcuse also ties happiness to social 
conditions, arguing that under capitalism, happiness is limited to members of certain 
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classes, and is limited to the sphere of consumption.  We also see mention of the 
stultifying quantity and quality of labor that exists under capitalism, which in Marcuse’s 
eyes, serves to not only foster happiness-as-consumption (i.e. the worker is too tired for 
anything else), but also devalues pleasure, so as to make true happiness impossible.
179
  It 
is here we encounter one of the foundational assumptions throughout Marcuse’s entire 
project -- the human body is not meant to be a vessel of alienated work.    
As mentioned above, Marcuse’s “Frankfurt Period” was marked by a devotion to 
a version of Hegelian-Marxism, with 1941’s Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise 
of Social Theory representing its zenith.  Marcuse provides a scholarly analysis of the 
Hegelian and Marxian philosophies, and delivers an historical-theoretical argument for 
the origins of critical theory as deriving from Hegel and Marx.  Marcuse emphasizes the 
critical (or rather, in Marcusean argot -- “negative”) aspects of Hegel that were 
appropriated by Marx, arguing that the Marx is the authentic continuation of Hegel’s 
project, spending the latter portion of the book eviscerating what he calls the philosophy 
of “positivism.”  Moreover, by positioning Hegel’s theory as “negative,” Marcuse 
attempts to demonstrate that Hegel’s philosophy is erroneously associated with fascism 
and authoritarian theories.  There are striking differences between Marcuse’s first book 
on Hegel (Hegel’s Ontology) and Reason and Revolution; this shift provide insights into 
the ways in which his thought changed during the Frankfurt years.
180
   
Hegel’s Ontology focuses on explicating the central categories of Hegel’s 
ontology.  It is a “phenomenological description of society” attempting to explain the 
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“ground of social alienation and change.”181  In Reason and Revolution, Marcuse is 
focused on the “struggle to change an oppressive society and the reactions to the 
emancipatory transformation of society.”182   Douglass Kellner argues that this continues 
Marcuse’s shift from an existential/ontological approach to a more concrete search for a 
critical theory of society.
183
  To be sure, we should not lose sight of an important 
common element.  According to Arnold Farr: 
 
What remains prominently featured in both works is the idea of negation.  In 
Hegel’s Ontology we get a description of how negation works in the historical 
development or movement of society.  In Reason and Revolution we get an 
analysis of the way in which negation should work in the transformation of 
society if it were freed from the social forces of domination.
184
 
 
Indeed, this is expressed in the title of the book.  ‘Reason’ distinguishes between 
existence (the appearance, or “as is”) and essence (the deeper reality, or the “could be”) 
through envisaging latent potentialities embedded within the societal organization, and 
within social practice.  If the “as is” prevents the realization of these potentialities, then 
‘reason’ calls for radical social change (i.e. ‘Revolution’).185  It is precisely Hegel’s 
dialectical approach that leads Marcuse to locate the origins of critical theory in him.  The 
key to understanding how this fits into Marcuse’s corpus, is to realize that Marcuse never 
abandons the Hegelian notion that reason should cut through the knowledge of immediate 
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experience (the appearance, or “as is”) and negate it (realize the potentialities) so that its 
potential can become actual.  That is to say, it can approach its essence.  To Marcuse, this 
is the antithesis of positivism (which is conservative to the extent that it analyzes and 
accepts the immediate experience) and is the true function of philosophy.
186
  In this view, 
critical reason and its concomitant dialectical view of reality as movement is a vehicle for 
liberation.
187
  A scholar of Marcuse would find it very difficult to locate an academic 
writing penned by Marcuse that was not informed by this line of thought.  Indeed, it 
would not be much of an exaggeration to claim this Hegelian-Marxian dialectic can be 
interpreted as a philosophical point of departure for all of Marcuse’s subsequent writings.  
To be sure, Marcuse provided a very friendly interpretation of Hegel.  He chose to 
emphasize only those elements appropriated by Marx and conducive to radical action and 
liberation.  While a sound argument can be made that Marcuse was too uncritical in his 
explication of Hegel, it is undeniable that Reason and Revolution is a seminal study of 
Hegel, and is vital to understanding Marcuse.
188
 
Returning our attention to matters of a somewhat biographical nature, Marcuse’s 
professional work was interrupted for nearly a decade upon the entry of the United States 
into the Second World War.  Marcuse, having published Reason and Revolution in 1941 
with the hopes of getting an academic position, reluctantly abandoned the Institute for 
Social Research in that same year, and along with several Institute colleagues, began 
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work for the U.S. intelligence and information service.
189
  At first glance it may seem 
surprising to learn that Marcuse worked for U.S. intelligence during the war, but it must 
be remembered that, for Marcuse, the fight against fascism was his top priority.   Indeed, 
in Marcuse’s own words in a 1972 interview: “I went to Washington so I could work 
during the war -- that is, speaking plainly, to do everything that was in my power to help 
defeat the Nazi regime.”190 Marcuse first worked for the Office of War Information (OWI 
-- a sort of government propaganda agency) with the goal of helping to formulate 
“suggestions on ‘how to present the enemy to the American people’, in the press, movies, 
propaganda, etc.
191
   The OWI was a tributary of the Office of the Coordination of 
Information (COI),  a peace-time agency created by President Roosevelt in 1941 that was 
to set up an intelligence service that could counter the fascist threat and deal with 
espionage, foreign anti-American propaganda, and domestic isolationist sentiment.
192
  
Subsequently, America’s entry into World War II that same December resulted in the 
formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the government’s first intelligence 
agency, in June 1942.  
In March 1943, Marcuse joined the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the OSS 
as a senior analyst.
193
  The R&A, broadly speaking, was responsible to assemble, 
organize, interpret, and filter the immense flow of intelligence towards Washington D.C.  
In the words of founder Colonel William “Wild Bill” Donovan, as the “Brain Trust” of 
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America’s war machine, it was to function as a “final clearinghouse” of intelligence 
flow.
194
  In Marcuse’s own words (to Habermas): 
 
MARCUSE : My main task was to identify groups in Germany with which one 
could work towards reconstruction after the war; and to identify groups which 
were to be taken to task as Nazis.  There was a major de-Nazification programme 
at the time.  Based on exact research, reports, newspaper reading and whatever, 
lists were made up of those Nazis who were supposed to assume responsibility for 
their activity.  Later it was said that I was a CIA agent.
195
  
HABERMAS: Yes, Yes. 
MARCUSE: Which is ridiculous, since the OSS wasn’t even allowed near the 
CIA.  They fought each other like enemies. 
HABERMAS: My question is aimed, not only at disposing of this absurdity, but 
also at clarifying, politically, what actually came of your suggestions.  Are you of 
the impression that would you did was of any consequence? 
MARCUSE: On the contrary.  Those whom we had listed first as ‘economic war 
criminals’ were very quickly back in the decisive positions of responsibility in the 
German economy.  It would be very easy to name names here.
196
 
 
Indeed, the OSS was quite different in “origin, composition, purpose, and function” from 
that of the CIA.
197
  Not only does the information provided suggest that it is absurd to 
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label Marcuse a “sell out,” but he, and his other Frankfurt colleagues are rather proud of 
their OSS activities.  
Marcuse’s OSS years coincided with a turning point within the Institute for Social 
Research.  The departure of several of the scholars who had helped the Institute become 
well known represent, on one level, the end of the Institute as a theoretically unified 
movement.
198
  The Institute was fearful for its very existence within the milieu of an 
“expanding fascist trend,”199 and was experiencing financial difficulty.  Thus, Marcuse 
reasoned that the economic security that accompanies government employment would be 
justified if his contributions to the OSS were consistent with what the Institute was 
attempting to provide.
200
  Indeed, Marcuse, through his involvement in both historical 
and political research and concrete activity in the struggle against fascism, points to these 
years as an attempt to make the Institute’s Critical Theory a practical tool in the fight 
against fascism.
201
  Marcuse was producing complex and insightful analyses of Nazi 
Germany and articulating reconstruction possibilities that can be interpreted to represent 
a concrete application of Frankfurt School beliefs.
 202
  Meanwhile, it was during this time 
that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer re-located to California, co-authored 
Dialectic of Enlightenment
203
 and were distancing themselves from Marxism and 
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concrete politics.
204
   It should be of no surprise that Marcuse remembers his World War 
II activities as an authentic continuation of the Institute’s Critical Theory. 
 
2.3 – A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MARCUSE’S TURN TO FREUD – 1942-1955 
The program for becoming happy which the pleasure principle presses upon us 
cannot be fulfilled. 
 
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 1929 
  
By the end of the Second World War, Marcuse’s branch of the OSS was transferred 
to the State Department, and after the war, was finally disbanded.  Marcuse, still 
employed by the State Department, remained in Washington, serving as an analyst of 
Communist societies.
205
  It is interesting that Marcuse was a State Department employee 
during the early stages of the Cold War and the McCarthy Era (and drafted numerous 
post-war plans for Germany that permitted democratic socialism
206
), yet has indicated 
that he was never directly subject to a witch-hunt.
207
  This time period was difficult for 
Marcuse.  He did not enjoy being a government bureaucrat (especially after fascism had 
been defeated) but remained in  Washington primarily because his wife was suffering 
from cancer, was feeling pressure from the anti-Communist hysteria, was unable to get a 
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suitable university post, and some of his Institute colleagues had returned to Germany to 
re-establish the Institute.  Thus, Marcuse, perhaps tired of being a government bureaucrat, 
or fearful that his name would eventually be tarred, finally left Washington after the 
death of his wife, Sophie (in 1951), fortunate that a grant from the Rockefeller 
Foundation enabled him to work at the Russia Institute of Columbia University (1952-4) 
and Russian Research Center at Harvard University (1954-5) on a project that would 
eventually be published as Soviet Marxism.
208
   
The German version of Dialectic of Enlightenment, written by Frankfurt 
colleagues Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, was published in Amsterdam in 1947.  
Marcuse participated in the discussion in New York and California in support of the 
book, and described it as “one of the most authentic expressions of critical theory.”209  
The book is an account of their view of the failure of Enlightenment, which to them, has 
degenerated into positivism, science and technology as domination, manufactured 
culture, and the loss of genuine personal autonomy in the face of what they call the 
“administered society.”210  As they see it, the ultimate tragedy is that the Enlightenment 
promised to demystify knowledge, yet “instead of entering into a truly human condition, 
[modern civilization] is sinking into a new kind of barbarism.”211 In other words, the 
Enlightenment created a new mysticism -- that is, a fetishism of science and technology.  
Embedded within their argument, is the claim that Marxism too is part of the ‘Dialectic of 
Enlightenment’ and serves as an instrument of domination.  Many critics view Adorno 
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and Horkheimer’s book, which left little to no room for authenticity in the modern era, as 
an abandonment of Marxism and surrender to extreme pessimism.
212
  This essay is not 
the place to discuss such matters, but it is difficult to deny the pessimism of Adorno and 
Horkheimer.  Marcuse, by contrast, never reached this level of despair.  Indeed, his 
darkest work, One-Dimensional Man, has a very subtle optimism throughout, and even 
ends with a well-known quote from Walter Benjamin about keeping hope alive.
213
  To be 
sure, Marcuse would develop very similar themes, but he refused to capitulate to 
hopelessness.   
In 1954, Marcuse’s personal life took a turn for the better, as he married Inge 
Werner Neumann, the widow of Franz Neumann (a fellow OSS and Frankfurt colleague, 
who had died in a car accident).  That same year, Marcuse accepted a teaching position at 
Brandeis, where he was a very popular and respected teacher (and earned tenure by 
1958).
214
  In the 1950s, Marcuse began seeking new ways to further reconstruct Marxism, 
and found a new foundation for his critical theory in the works of Sigmund Freud.  It was 
in 1955, that Marcuse published his seminal Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical 
Inquiry into Freud. 
 This portion of the essay will be quite brief, for many of the themes and 
categories expressed in Eros and Civilization are to be discussed later.   Prior to moving 
on though, it is important to be aware of the turn taken by Marcuse.  He returns to 
concepts such as art, play, beauty, aesthetics -- that is, ideas he had not expressly written 
about since joining the Institute.  Marcuse does remain concerned with the idea of human 
                                                          
212
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 151. 
213
 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 257. 
214
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 152. 
 89 
liberation.  For example, in his review of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, the concept of 
freedom is approached through the lens of the labor process.  In Eros and Civilization, 
the point of departure is biological -- that is, the theory of human drives.  Broadly 
speaking, Marcuse accepts Freud’s claim that civilization has been built upon the 
renunciation of the individual’s drive for pleasure and immediate satisfaction (i.e. 
libidinal gratification).  Freud calls this the “reality principle,” namely, the external 
universe restricting our sensual satisfaction in order to maintain a modicum of order and 
for the individual to survive.   Marcuse, however, then ups the ante.  He claims that 
modern society demands greater instinctual restraint than is necessary.  The precise terms 
used by Marcuse will be elucidated later, but it is important to realize what Marcuse is 
doing here.  To put it plainly, he asks several far-reaching questions:  How long must this 
repression continue?  Why do we never seem to reach the stage at which we can sit back 
and enjoy what previous generations have sacrificed to build?  Do we still need to 
sacrifice genuine happiness to maintain civilization?  These questions may serve as a 
springboard, of sorts, for the postwar Marcuse, and his answers are at once surprising, 
frustratingly complex, provocative, and satisfying. 
 
 90 
PART III – THINKING LIKE MARCUSE 
 
I am an absolutely incurable and sentimental romantic. 
 
Herbert Marcuse, The End of Utopia, lecture delivered in 1967  
 
The only major publication by Herbert Marcuse in the time period between Reason 
and Revolution (1941) and Eros and Civilization (1955) was a lengthy review of Jean-
Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1948).215  Marcuse begins his review by 
positioning Albert Camus’ existentialist interpretation of Le Mythe di Sisphe (or The 
Myth of Sisyphus) as somewhat of a point of departure for Sartre’s existentialism, and for 
his own project.
216
     As the myth goes, Sisyphus was condemned by the gods to an 
eternity spent rolling a stone up a mountain, only to have it roll back down once he 
reached the top.  Camus is attempting to demonstrate a fundamental conflict between 
what we desire from the external reality and what we find.  As Camus sees it, Sisyphus is 
the embodiment of the “absurd” life -- i.e. his punishment is representative of the human 
condition.  Sisyphus must travel down the mountain and retrieve the stone each time it 
descends, in a perpetual loop with no hope of success.
217
   According to existentialists, 
this is the contradiction we must all face, to find meaning in a universe that offers none.  
Consequently, we are faced with the choice between making a leap of faith (i.e. religion), 
suicide, or -- the option that interested Camus -- acceptance.  To Camus, living with the 
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“absurd” means to face this fundamental contradiction, having become aware of it, and to 
choose to accept it and still live life to its fullest.  After all, Camus depicts Sisyphus as 
happy the moment he turns to retrieve the rock.  Faced with the realization that life, in the 
final analysis, is futile, Camus argues that our only hope is to acknowledge that there is 
no ultimate hope.
218
  To clarify, as long as Sisyphus accepts that there is nothing more to 
life than this “absurd” struggle, than he can find contentment.  Sisyphus has made a 
conscious decision to rise above his fate, attain authenticity, and in the process, realize 
his potential in this life.  It is precisely at this moment -- i.e. the smile -- that Camus’ 
seemingly pessimistic existentialism demonstrates a deep, if limited hope.
219
   
The ability to find hope against such overwhelming odds is a characteristic Camus 
shares with Marcuse, but it is not the only one.  Throughout his project Marcuse insisted 
that we remain mindful of the negative.  In Marcuse’s view, we must always compare 
what is to what could be.  To focus on the negative simply means to critique the current 
state of affairs, and search for plausible ways to reach a greater potential.  For Marcuse, 
dialectical thought could foster this type of “critical” thinking.  A dialectical analysis 
involves seeking out contradictions and tendencies within a given society that may 
indicate possibilities of greater freedom and happiness.  It also presupposes the ability to 
differentiate “existence from essence, fact and potentiality, and appearance and 
reality.”220  For Marcuse, the grasping of potentialities within society enables us to 
“negate” the conditions blocking our full development; that is to say, it empowers us to 
break with the status quo.  Implicit is the realization that society can never achieve 
                                                          
218
 Thomas R. Flynn, Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 
35. 
219
 Flynn, Existentialism, 36. 
220
 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, xiv.  This is part of Douglas Kellner’s introduction. 
 92 
absolute perfection, thus  the negation is always present -- it is a process without a telos.   
In Hegelian terms, this would be to say that there is no Absolute Idea.  Indeed, one can 
argue that the negation, or rather, the inherent possibilities already existing within a given 
society, was the intended meaning of Hegel’s concept of the Absolute Idea.  All societies 
and individuals can demonstrate perfectibility (the ability to improve), but it is impossible 
to fully reconcile “what is” with what “could be.”  Yet we must act as if it is possible.  It 
is important to understand an irreconcilable difference between Marcuse and Camus (and 
Sartre).  For Camus, life is absurd, which is to conclude that life can never be made 
rational -- i.e. there is no telos, or rational purpose, other than what we impose on the 
situation.  As we will see, Marcuse will posit that there is a dialectical movement -- a 
constant unfolding, or becoming -- toward greater rationality, and thus will provide 
“purpose” to pushing the rock.  That is no small feat, and it is perhaps the greatest 
accomplishment of Marcuse’s philosophical project.  Camus and Marcuse both argue that 
we must keep pushing the rock up the hill, and to do otherwise is to fail those who 
sacrificed before us and, perhaps worse, to abdicate our responsibility to those who will 
follow.  We must keep pushing the rock up the mountain, even though we know we can 
never reach the top.  It is the ambition of this essay to explain why Marcuse believed as 
such, and to explain why Marcuse’s Sisyphus was smiling.  Kant once described beauty 
as something that, through its form, appears to have been designed with a purpose, even 
though, in the final analysis, it does not have any apparent final cause.  He called this 
“purposive without purpose.”221  To act on the unmutilated knowledge of our 
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potentialities, in the face of a perpetual “struggle for existence,” is nothing less than to 
expand the meaning of Kant’s phrase beyond the realm of aesthetics.   
In his review of Sartre’s book, Marcuse rejects Sartre’s existentialist individualism on 
much the same grounds that prompted him to move past Martin Heidegger.  To Marcuse, 
Sartre was attempting to develop a philosophy that could explain “being in an absurd 
world.” Marcuse seemed to prefer Camus, whose art rejected any systematic philosophy 
(in favor of accepting and simply living the “absurd” life).   To Marcuse, Sartre is 
attempting to “explain the inexplicable,” and Marcuse is critical of Sartre’s sole reliance 
on philosophy.
222
  He writes: 
  
Sartre’s existential analysis is a strictly philosophical one in the sense that it 
abstracts from the historical factors which constitute the empirical concreteness: 
the latter merely illustrates Sartre’s metaphysical and meta-historical conceptions.  
In so far as Existentialism is a philosophical doctrine, it remains an idealistic 
doctrine: it hypostatizes specific historical conditions of human existence into 
ontological and metaphysical characteristics.  [Sartre’s] Existentialism thus 
becomes part of the very ideology which it attacks, and its radicalism is illusory.  
Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant [Being and Nothingness], the philosophical foundation 
of Existentialism, is an ontological-phenomenological treatise on human freedom 
and could as such come out of under the German occupation (1943).  The 
essential freedom of man, as Sartre sees it, remains the same before, during, and 
after the totalitarian enslavement of man.  For freedom [in Sartre’s existentialism] 
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is the very structure of human being and cannot be annihilated even by the most 
adverse condition: man is free even in the hands of the executioner.
223
 
 
Marcuse was rejecting Sartre’s overly abstract notion of freedom and his narrow focus on 
individual authenticity and liberation.  To Marcuse, that is requisite for liberation, but in 
the Marcusean framework freedom is only possible in solidarity with others.  Sartre did 
attempt to address such a line of criticism in an oft-cited public lecture delivered on 
October 29, 1945.
224
  In front of an overflowing crowd, Sartre argued that one cannot be 
free in any concrete sense unless all are free.  A well-known statement from the lecture is 
“In choosing, I choose for all people.”  Sartre, moving outside the realm of individual 
authenticity, argued that we have a moral responsibility to each other and to society.  
Finally, he posited that in every moral choice we create an image of the kind of being we 
want to become, and of what others should be.  Sartre stated: “For in effect, there is not 
one of our acts that, in creating the man we wish to be, does not at the same time create 
an image of man such as we judge ought to be.”225  These principles may be relevant in 
any moral action guide, but did not seem to follow from the philosophy Sartre had 
posited up to that point.  The inconsistencies of this lecture were ultimately a source of 
embarrassment for Sartre; in fact, this is the only piece he ever openly regretted.
226
  
Interestingly, this speech would have greatly appealed to Marcuse, for what attracted him 
to Camus and Sartre was their insistence on authenticity, freedom, and revolt, and was 
                                                          
223
 Leiss and Feinberg, The Essential Marcuse, 131.  
224
 Obviously, considering this lecture occurred three years prior to the publication of Marcuse’s review, 
Sartre was not responding directly to Marcuse’s critique, but rather to the general objections of his critics 
who argued that his radical existentialism was nothing more than a transfiguration of bourgeois 
individualism and insensitive to the demands of social justice.  See Existentialism, p. 35.  
225
 Flynn, Existentialism, p. 35. 
226
 Flynn, Existentialism, p. 35. 
 95 
critical of, in the situation of Sartre, its narrow individualism -- precisely what those 
remarks refuted.  If the pre-World War II Marcuse was writing in the context of a 
positivist Marxism (which, to be sure, had not gone away), he was writing in the shadow 
of academic pessimism after the war.   
The other major philosophical work of the decade, at least to Marcuse, was Dialectic 
of Enlightenment by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (fellow Frankfurt 
colleagues).  The book focuses on the failure of the Enlightenment.  The authors argue 
that the Western tradition has descended into inescapable positivism, manufactured and 
administered culture, and technology as domination.  The account of our evolution from 
primitive magic to modern-science-as-new-barbarism is perhaps more melancholy than 
Sartre’s work.  To be sure, this work deeply influenced Marcuse, but he never succumbed 
to hopelessness.  In fact, he can be viewed as a negation of the pessimistic postwar 
intellectual context in which he wrote.
227
 
 Upon leaving his work with the United States State Department (during and after 
World War II), Marcuse, now fifty six years old, reluctantly accepted a faculty position at 
Brandeis University in 1954.  Marcuse was hoping to be re-employed with the Institute of 
Social Research, but his colleague and head of the Frankfurt School Max Horkheimer re-
established the Institute at Frankfurt, Germany in 1951, and a firm offer of employment 
never came.
228
  Marcuse had grown apart from his Frankfurt colleagues in more than a 
geographical sense.  They seemed to want nothing to do with his thoughts on the 
absorption and neutering of the working class and his burgeoning ideas for laying out a 
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dialectical theory of liberation and domination.  Marcuse eventually accepted a faculty 
position at the University of California, San Diego, in 1965, where he would spend the 
rest of his academic career.
229
   
 Marcuse’s postwar turn can be characterized as an attempt lift the veil of surface 
prosperity (for some), especially within the United States.
230
   His version of critical 
theory is thus defined by both radical critique of tendencies towards domination and the 
search for possibilities of opposition and liberation. As such, his postwar works should be 
read in conjunction with each other.  This will, for example, help us avoid characterizing 
Eros and Civilization as too optimistic (or the dreaded label of “utopian”) and One 
Dimensional Man (1964) as overly pessimistic.  To be sure, an exegesis of major 
Marcusean categories becomes a difficult task precisely because Marcuse insisted on 
using the dialectical method.  As such, his analysis changed as the political, social, and 
economic conditions changed.  For example, he wrote One Dimensional Man at a time he 
perceived capitalism to be in a golden age of “affluence” and stability.  Conversely, he 
wrote An Essay on Liberation (1969) and Counter-Revolution and Revolt (1972) when 
the advanced industrial system was showing signs of distress (albeit very limited).  
Accordingly, the tendencies he articulated in One Dimensional Man -- largely the result 
of affluence and stability -- were perhaps not as totalizing in the context of his later 
works. Ultimately, an understanding of the concepts and the context in which he wrote 
will help us apply these categories to any societal organization.  In the end, that was 
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Marcuse’s goal -- a union of theory and practice and to make critical theory an instrument 
of liberation.
231
 
 Much of Marcuse’s critique of Marxism stemmed from the reality that the advanced 
industrial system did not behave in the way Marx had predicted.  Namely, the proletariat 
was no longer the living negation of the capitalist system.
232
  To Marcuse, they were 
effectively absorbed by and introjected the values of the advanced industrial system.  
Capitalism had “reorganized itself” to avoid its inevitable destruction as predicted by 
Marx.  This was accomplished in several ways.  First, capital allowed the standard of 
living to rise among the workers, thereby easing tension and providing a market for their 
wares.
233
  In brief, capital emphasized a consumption-as-happiness ethos, and coupled it 
with an ability to “deliver the goods” at an affordable price.  Capitalism also became 
more structurally complex than the original Marxist model. Public ownership of 
corporations via the stock market and the rise of a new class, the technician (brought 
about by an explosion in manufacturing technology), blurred the lines of societal 
stratification.  To further complicate matters, liberal democracies began to manage 
national economies (corporate capitalism), thereby stabilizing the marketplace and 
apparently ending, or softening, the old bust-or-boom business cycle.  Thus, the overtly 
oppressive nature of industrial capitalism seemed to be giving way before a more 
egalitarian consumer society, fueled by an ever rising standard of living. It appeared that 
global capitalism was giving the people what they wanted. Or was it?  What interested 
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Marcuse was the new ways in which the advanced industrial system created the seeds of 
its own destruction.  Marcuse’s “theory of social change” would require him to combine 
philosophy, social theory, Freudian drive theory, and political economy, in an attempt to 
fill gaps he perceived in traditional Marxism, and in critical theory.
234
  We will thus begin 
with a focus on Marcuse’s theory of liberation.  It is then necessary, if we want to have 
an idea of what is prohibiting our liberation, and if we want to gain a precise 
understanding of our unfreedom, to explore Marcuse’s concept of domination.  The final 
segment will focus on how Marcuse thought we could break the chains of repression -- 
namely the “Great Refusal.”   
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3.1 – LIBERATION 
To compare potential freedom with existing freedom, to see the latter in the light 
of the former, presupposes that at the present stage of civilization much of the toil, 
renunciation, and regulation imposed upon men is no longer justified by scarcity, the 
struggle for existence, poverty, and weakness.  Society could afford a high degree of 
instinctual liberation without losing what it has accomplished or putting a stop to its 
progress. 
 
Herbert Marcuse, Freedom and Freud’s Theory of Instincts, 1956 
Eros redefines reason in his own terms.  Reasonable is what sustains the order of 
gratification … Reason and happiness converge. 
 
Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 1955 
More than before, breaking through the administered consciousness is a precondition of 
liberation. Thought in contradiction must be capable of comprehending and expressing 
the new potentialities of a qualitatively different existence. It must be capable of 
surpassing the force of technological repression and of incorporating into its concepts 
the elements of gratification that are suppressed and perverted in this repression. In 
other words, thought in contradiction must become more negative and more utopian in 
opposition to the status quo. 
Herbert Marcuse, Foreword to Negations, 1968 
  
Slovenian dissident-philosopher Slavoj Žižek often uses witty anecdotes to help him 
explain difficult concepts, or to demonstrate, sometimes, how simple some things really 
are.  He seems to have a dizzyingly vast array of these stories, and does not discriminate 
as to the source; he is comfortable citing a classical artist or a cartoon.  There is an old 
Communist-era joke that is a favorite of his that will help us understand Marcuse.   Žižek 
tells it perfectly: 
 
Let me tell you a wonderful, old joke from Communist times.  A guy was sent 
from East Germany to work in Siberia.  He knew his mail would be read by 
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censors, so he told his friends: “Let’s establish a code.  If a letter you get from me 
is written in blue ink, it is true what I say.  If it is written in red ink, it is false.”  
After a month, his friends get the first letter.  Everything is in blue.  It says, this 
letter: “Everything is wonderful here.  Stores are full of good food.  Movie 
theaters show good films from the west.  Apartments are large and luxurious.  The 
only thing you cannot buy is red ink.”  This is how we live.  We have all the 
freedoms we want.  But what we are missing is the red ink: the language to 
articulate our non-freedom.
235
 
 
The red ink is precisely what Marcuse was attempting to provide.  His postwar project, 
which focused on a liberation-domination dialectic, may have been written within a 
world of academic pessimism, but his warnings about our lack of freedom came at a time 
of seeming social and economic stability and prosperity.  To Marcuse, it was this mass 
prosperity that played a major role in creating this unfreedom!
236
  In the end, Marcuse 
was attempting to outline what he called “qualitative socialism” -- an egalitarian 
organization of society that would move past the stale and, according to Marcuse, 
positivist Marxism of the postwar era. 
Marcuse’s theory of liberation required him to turn to Freud’s instinct theory, and to 
investigate the relation between radicalism and change with that of art, fantasy and 
sensibility (i.e. the totality of how our senses perceive phenomena).  Thus, his project 
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resurrects Freudian and Marxian theory to develop a critical theory of society.  He also 
attempts to demonstrate what a non-repressive society would look like.  By the 1950s, 
Marcuse perceived that the advanced industrial society (i.e. with its consumerism, 
planning, and management) had produced now forms of domination and unfreedom.
237
  
This is the immediate context in which he wrote, and his response would result in the 
creation of his own unique version of critical theory. 
Before we begin our discussion of Marcuse’s theory of liberation, it is necessary to 
understand exactly why, according to Marcuse, we are in need of liberation.  That is to 
say, we need to explore our unfreedom.  This is especially necessary because, as we will 
see later, modern society tends to be “flattened,” that is, we most often choose not to 
notice our shackles.
238
  To Marcuse, there are three primary ways in which we are unfree.  
First, the creation of false needs “makes for the perpetuation of the struggle for existence, 
for the increasing necessity to produce and consume the non-necessary.”239  To use a 
colloquialism, our penchant to treat luxuries as needs, keeps us “on the hamster wheel.”  
Second, the advanced industrial society, often through advertising, the media, and its 
concomitant instinctual manipulation, promises a level of gratification and creates needs 
that it ultimately can never fulfill.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, modern society 
demands greater instinctual repression than is necessary to maintain progress and 
civilization.  As we will soon see, Marcuse calls this surplus repression.   
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It seems counterintuitive to argue that we are essentially unfree during a time of 
unheralded prosperity, and within the context of a functioning representative democracy.  
It is easy to make this claim for “the wretched of the earth,” but Marcuse was arguing that 
all of us are, to varying degrees, unfree.  It must be remembered, when Marcuse was 
referring to “the more educated and privileged human objects of control and oppression,” 
he was not referring to a lack of access to material goods.
240
  Indeed, Marcuse describes it 
as “a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic, unfreedom.”241  He writes: 
 
Capital now produces, for the majority of the population …not so much material 
privation as steered satisfaction of material needs, while making the entire human 
being -- intelligence and senses -- into an object of administration, geared to 
produce and to reproduce not only the goals but also the values and promises of 
the system, its ideological heaven.  Behind the technological veil, behind the 
political veil of democracy, appears the reality, the universal servitude, the loss of 
human dignity in a prefabricated freedom of choice.
242
 
 
Marcuse is arguing that the advanced industrial system manipulates our needs (into false 
needs), and as a result, our values increasingly tend to match that of the advanced 
industrial system.  Thus, we tend to not feel unfree because we have introjected the 
values and desires of the administered system in which we exist.  Moreover, our 
interactions with each other and the external world become increasingly defined and 
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judged on the basis of their market value.
243
   By arguing that our “intelligence and 
senses” are being made into an “object of administration,” Marcuse is concretizing this 
unfreedom by placing it on the instinctual (i.e. biological) and neurological level.  We 
become, in Marcusean argot, instrumentalized -- that is, we tend towards being a 
quantifiable cog in a seemingly rational system.
244
  Marcuse summed it up well: 
 
It converts the entire individual -- body and mind -- into an instrument, or even 
part of an instrument: active or passive, productive or receptive, in working time 
and free time, he serves the system…True and false, good and bad, openly 
become categories of the political economy; they define the market value of men 
and things.  The commodity form becomes universal…245 
 
 As our values tend to mirror those of the advanced industrial system, we tend to lose 
sight of the difference between true and false needs (i.e. wants/luxuries become needs on 
an instinctual level).  This alters our instincts, as the “ego” (i.e. the mostly conscious 
“self”) is what “strives for ‘what is useful’…to ‘test’ the reality, to distinguish between 
good and bad, true and false, useful and harmful. Man [in doing so]…becomes a 
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conscious, thinking, subject, geared to a rationality which is imposed upon him from 
outside.”246  Marcuse continues: 
 
False needs are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular 
social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, 
misery, and injustice…The result is then euphoria in happiness.  Most of the 
prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, belong to this category of false needs.  Such 
needs have a societal content and function which are determined by external 
powers over which the individual has no control; the development and satisfaction 
of these needs is heteronomous.   No matter how much such needs may have 
become the individual’s own, reproduced and fortified by the conditions of 
existence; no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself 
in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning -- 
products whose dominant interest demands repression.
247
 
 
Thus, Marcuse injects issues of authenticity into the equation -- that is, by losing sight of 
what is truly a need, we relinquish our authenticity.  Marcuse provides a two prong 
definition of false needs.  First, false needs are those that are above necessities and tend 
to perpetuate our repression, primarily by keep us willing to continue the daily 
“performance” and forego genuine life fulfillment.  It must be remembered that this is 
done, more or less, “behind our backs.”  Consequently, we recognize these needs as our 
own; the individual in the advanced industrial society tends to introject these needs, 
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ultimately living “his repression ‘freely’ as his own life: he desires what he is supposed to 
desire; his gratifications are profitable to him and to others; he is reasonable and often 
even exuberantly happy.”248 Marcuse writes: 
 
This same trend of production and consumption, which makes for the affluence 
and attraction of advanced capitalism, makes for the perpetuation of the struggle 
for existence, for the increasing necessity to produce and consume the non-
necessary: the growth of the so-called “discretionary income” in the United States 
indicates the extent to which income earned is spend on other than “basic needs.”  
Former luxuries become basic needs, a normal development which, under 
corporate capitalism, extends the competitive business of living to newly created 
needs and satisfactions.  The fantastic output of all sorts of things and services 
defies the imagination, while restricting and distorting it in the commodity form, 
through which capitalist production enlarges its hold over human existence.
249
 
 
Marcuse thus, radically, calls into question how genuine (or authentic) happiness is in an 
advanced industrial system. Marcuse sees our “false” needs as the chains that bind us to 
the system. He argues that our apparent freedom is illusory, that we are so blinded by 
“introjected” needs and so busy struggling to attain those needs that we have forgotten 
what it really means to be human.  As Marcuse states: 
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The high standard of living in the domain of the great corporations is restrictive in 
a concrete sociological sense: the goods and services that the individuals buy 
control their needs and petrify their faculties.  In exchange for the commodities 
that enrich their life, the individuals sell not only their labor but also their free 
time.  The better living is offset by the all-pervasive control over living.  People 
dwell in apartment concentrations -- and have private automobiles with which 
they can no longer escape into a different world.  They have huge refrigerators 
filled with frozen foods.  They have dozens of newspapers and magazines that 
espouse the same ideals.  They have innumerable choices, innumerable gadgets 
which are all of the same sort and keep them occupied and divert their attention 
from the real issue -- which is the awareness that they could both work less and 
determine their own needs and satisfactions.
250
 
 
It is precisely the “comfortable” living provided by the advanced industrial system that, 
to Marcuse, serves as compensation for the daily “performance.”  As Marcuse states,  
 
[T]heir benefits are real.  The repressiveness of the whole lies to a high degree in 
its efficacy:  it enhances the scope of the material culture, facilitates the 
procurement of the necessities of life, makes comfort and luxury cheaper, draws 
ever-larger areas into the orbit of industry -- while at the same time sustaining toil 
and destruction.  The individual pays by sacrificing his time, his consciousness, 
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his dreams; civilization pays by sacrificing its own promises of liberty, justice, 
and peace for all.
251
   
 
It is notable that Marcuse argued that this appears as completely rational.  As stated 
above, we do not feel our unfreedom, for “the depth of the preconditioning which shapes 
the instinctual drives and aspirations of the individuals…obscures the difference between 
true and false consciousness.”252  Marcuse asserts: 
 
This is the pure form of servitude: to exist as an instrument, as a thing.  And this 
mode of existence is not abrogated if the thing is animated and chooses its 
material and intellectual food, if it does not feel its being-a-thing, if it is a pretty, 
clean, mobile, thing.
253
 
 
So “pure” is this servitude, Marcuse described it as “totalitarian.”  Marcuse concludes: 
 
By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary 
industrial society tends to be totalitarian.  For “totalitarian” is not only a terroristic 
political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical 
coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs…254 
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 A second level of unfreedom exists because these needs (which it must be 
remembered, are not true needs) cannot, in the final analysis, be provided by the 
advanced industrial system.  In dialectical fashion, to Marcuse, this is a point of 
unfreedom, but also opens up a possible negation.  As mentioned above, the 
commodification of human interaction tends to become universal.  Indeed, Marcuse 
argues that the ability of the advanced industrial system to foster a consumption-as-
happiness ethos and to deliver a high standard of living for many “is the reality behind 
the façade of the consumer society; this reality is the unifying force which integrates, 
behind the back of individuals, the widely different and conflicting classes of the 
underlying population.”255  Marcuse was not referring to any specific “underlying” class 
of peoples, for in his framework, we are all exploited.  Indeed, it is our insatiable desire 
for the wares of the advanced industrial system that serves to mask class conflict.  
Marcuse argues that “capitalism cannot satisfy the needs which it creates.  The rising 
standard of living itself…enforce[s] the constant creation of needs that could be satisfied 
on the market; [but] it is now fostering transcending needs which cannot be satisfied.”256  
The world of advertising promises happiness through the consumption of its products, but 
the needs themselves become a source of intensifying frustration as the growing 
expectations of a commodified paradise are inevitably unfulfilled for the underling 
majority.  In other words, the market delivers (for many) the basic needs, but also 
promises satisfaction beyond that of material gratification -- that is, spiritual and 
existential happiness.  To Marcuse, the more advanced we become the more libidinal 
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energy we invest in the lure of the market that ultimately remains unfulfilled.  Marcuse 
concludes, 
 
The misery of unfulfilled vital needs is abolished for the majority of the 
population; outright poverty is “contained” among a minority of the population.  
Technical progress and the vast output of “luxuries” create and re-create … the 
images of a world of ease, enjoyment, fulfillment, and comfort which no longer 
appears as the exclusive privilege of an elite but rather within the reaches of the 
masses.  The technical achievements of capitalism break into the world of 
frustration, unhappiness, repression.
257
 
 
Marcuse describes this as “the living space of capitalism and its negation.  The 
production of goods and services on an enlarged scale reduces the basis for further 
capitalist development.”258  In the final analysis, it is impossible to attain genuine 
happiness in the scenario described by Marcuse precisely because of the price we pay 
(instinctually) for this material satisfaction.  This leads us to a discussion of a third realm 
of unfreedom within the advanced industrial system. 
 Marcuse argues that the notion of “progress” within our civilization rests upon an 
unnecessary level of repression of the individual’s instinctual striving for fulfillment.  In 
an essay entitled “Freedom and Freud’s Theory of Instincts” (1956) Marcuse describes 
domination, or unfreedom as “whenever the individual’s goals and purposes and the 
means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as 
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something prescribed.”259  To Marcuse, this domination can be “exercised by men, by 
nature, by things -- it can also be internal, exercised by the individual on himself, and 
appear in the form of autonomy.”260  The latter form of unfreedom, according to Freudian 
drive theory occurs when “the superego absorbs the authoritarian models” of the external 
reality.  In this way, the superego becomes the internal manifestation of the restrictions 
put in place by society.  It appears autonomous precisely because the “mastery of drives 
becomes the individual’s own accomplishment.”261   
 If we were to stop here, and Marcuse seems to think Freud did, freedom becomes 
impossible to attain, for there would be nothing that is not prescribed for the individual.  
In the Freudian conception, civilization becomes possible only by repressing our 
instincts.  This will be explored in greater depth later, for now it is enough to know that 
Freud posited that civilization would cease to exist if humans were free to gratify their 
instinctual needs because, simply put, we would, more or less, do nothing but that.  Put 
differently, society demands we divert our instinctual energy into socially productive 
work instead of immediately and directly satisfying our instinctual needs.  Freud argues 
that unimpeded and immediate gratification is incompatible with the discipline needed 
for civilized society to function and for the individual to develop into a human being, and 
thus, renunciation and delay of gratification of instinctual desires becomes a necessity.  
Marcuse writes of the Freudian conception, “Happiness must be subordinated to the 
discipline of work as full-time occupation, to the discipline of monogamic reproduction, 
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to the established system of law and order.”262  Freud refers to this as the reality 
principle. 
 To Marcuse, this was an historical concept, and he thus rejects Freud’s notion that a 
non-repressive society is impossible.  To counter Freud (who argued that the conflict 
between the individual and the external world is eternal -- i.e. ahistorical), Marcuse 
argued that the reality principle, and thus repression, is an historical product of a given 
society.  In Marcuse’s view, every society has its own reality principle and thus needs to 
practice a level of repression of instinctual energy, but it is the specific society 
historically given (with its own set of institutions, societal norms, and possible 
gratifications) that plays the decisive role in determining the level of repression that 
exists within that particular society.  It is the notion that repression is historically 
conditioned that led Marcuse to introduce the concepts of basic repression, surplus 
repression and performance principle. 
 In dialectical fashion, Marcuse argues that because the ahistorical “character of 
Freudian concepts…contains the elements of its opposite…their historical substance must 
be recaptured, not by adding some sociological factors, but by unfolding their own 
content.”263  Thus, Marcuse argues that Freud’s own project suggests that repression is 
historically conditioned, and therefore subject to transformation.  Marcuse then argues 
that this “hidden trend in psychoanalysis” suggests that a non-repressive civilization is 
possible.  It must be remembered, according to Freud, it is the existence of scarcity (often 
referred to as Ananke) that necessitates we devote our energy to hard labor to ensure 
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survival -- that is, which necessitates what Marcuse calls basic repression.   Marcuse 
characterized Freud’s argument as follows: 
 
Behind the reality principle lies the fundamental fact of Ananke or scarcity, which 
means that the struggle for existence takes place in a world too poor for the 
satisfaction of human needs without constant restraint, renunciation, delay.  In 
other words, whatever satisfaction is possible necessitates work, more or less 
painful arrangements and undertakings for the procurement of the means for 
satisfying needs.  For the duration of work, which occupies practically the entire 
existence of the mature individual, pleasure is suspended and pain prevails.
264
   
 
Marcuse argues that this is “fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute fact of scarcity 
what actually is the consequence of a specific organization of scarcity, and of a specific 
existential attitude enforced by this organization.”265  Marcuse is arguing that scarcity is 
not inevitable, but rather a result of a specific societal organization.  Marcuse believes 
that enough wealth and resources are available to enable scarcity to be overcome.  He 
posits that when one takes into account the technical potential of the current society, 
scarcity becomes a man-made phenomenon -- that is, it no longer must exist.  Marcuse 
referred to this as the “conquest of scarcity.”266  Suddenly it becomes purposeful to gauge 
the level of repression in our society.   
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 Marcuse adheres to the Freudian idea that some level of repression is needed to 
maintain civilization.  Marcuse referred to this as basic repression.  As Gad Horowitz 
states, this argument “amounts to nothing more than the observation that co-operation 
among human beings requires self-control, a limitation of desires and gratifications and 
the endurance of some pain, for the common good.”267  Put simply, in Freudian terms, 
becoming a civilized adult human being requires a basic repression of the drives.  
According to Horowitz, Freud argued that relative to primitive society, modern society 
demands an ever greater level of instinctual renunciation.
268
   As Marcuse states: 
 
[W]hile any form of the reality principle demands a considerable degree and 
scope of repressive control over the instincts, the specific historical institutions of 
the reality principle and the specific interests of domination introduce additional 
controls over and above those indispensible for civilized human association.  
These additional controls arising from the specific institutions of domination are 
what we denote as surplus-repression.
269
 
 
Marcuse goes on to provide examples of surplus repression: “the modifications and 
deflections of instinctual energy necessitated by the perpetuation of the monogamic-
patriarchal family, or by a hierarchal division of labor, or by public control over the 
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individual’s private existence.”270  Marcuse also suggests that the reality principle 
(society) ensures conformity to the demands of the labor system by “desexualizing” the 
erotic zones of the body.  In essence, society demands we work, and thus limits our 
pleasure zone to the genitalia, and subsequently, our body becomes a medium of toil 
instead of a receptacle of pleasure (i.e. erotic, life affirming).  Marcuse historicizes the 
current reality principle by calling it the performance principle -- that is, “the prevailing 
historical form of the reality principle.”271  Indeed, Marcuse argued that under the 
performance principle “society is stratified according to the competitive economic 
performances of its members.”272  Marcuse argues that the “unrepressed development [of 
the erotogenic zones of the body] would counteract the desexualization of the organism 
required by its social utilization as an intstrument of labor.”273  In doing so, Marcuse 
provides a preview of what will become his theory of liberation. 
 The thesis that there is an additional and unnecessary level of instinctual renunciation 
demanded by the performance principle implies the existence of “objective criteria for 
gauging the degree of instinctual repression at a given stage of civilization.”274  To 
Marcuse, the difference between basic repression and surplus-repression equals the 
amount of instinctual repression that is unnecessary.  The difficulty arises when we 
consider that the “repression is largely unconscious and automatic” -- we do not 
necessarily feel it.
275
  The problem of objectively judging the difference between basic 
and surplus repression remains, and Marcuse initially provides a vague, somewhat 
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circular statement: “surplus-repression is that portion which is the result of specific 
societal conditions sustained in the specific interests of domination.”276  This statement 
may provide a clarification between the categories of unfreedom and domination (i.e. 
somewhat analogous to basic and surplus repression, respectively), but does not address 
the problem of calculating (or rather, approximating) the amount of unnecessary 
repression.  calcu 
 Marcuse cites the three Freudian “sources of human suffering” as “the superior force 
of nature, the disposition to decay of our bodies, and the inadequacy of our methods of 
regulating human relations in the family, the community and the state.”277   To Marcuse, 
it is vital to remember that the first and last sources are historical, and thus: 
 
[T]he necessity of repression, and of the suffering derived from it, varies with the 
maturity of civilization, with the extent of the achieved rational mastery of nature 
and of society.  Objectively, the need for instinctual inhibition and restraint 
depends on the need for toil and delayed satisfaction…Scope and intensity of 
instinctual repression obtain their full significance only in relation to the 
historically possible extent of freedom.”278   
 
Marcuse insists we view the current society with a view towards finding a greater 
potential of freedom (i.e. negatively).  As such, Marcuse argues that the advanced 
industrial system has created its own negation by conquering nature (the first source of 
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suffering) and, at least potentially, by conquering scarcity, and by approaching the 
subjugation of the realm of necessity through advancements in technology and 
automation (the third source of suffering).  Suddenly, the demand for instinctual 
repression can and should decrease.  To be sure, Marcuse’s argument has been criticized 
for being too vague to calculate, but it does seem possible to determine the amount of 
socially necessary labor time and to subtract that from actual time laboring, and hence to 
provide an estimate of the current level of surplus repression.
279
  It is also important to be 
able to conceptualize repression -- i.e. to gauge external phenomena in terms of a loss or 
gain or repression.  It seems a little “non-Marcusean” to get “lost” in quantifying 
something that, in the end, is a qualitative judgment.  In the final analysis, Marcuse 
conceived of life (and history) as a constant unfolding -- a becoming -- and as such, it 
was vital for society to be moving towards greater freedom rather than increased 
repression.  This is what Marcuse meant by claiming life can be made rational.
280
  
 Now that we have a better understanding of our unfreedom, we can delve into 
Marcuse’s theory of liberation.  Marcuse’s framework is grounded in Freud’s theory of 
the instincts; it thus becomes necessary to briefly discuss Freud’s drive theory.  To Freud, 
the human psyche or “self” is divided into three parts -- the id (or “it”), the ego (or I, 
me”), and the superego (or “above I”).281  According to Freud, the id comprises the 
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unorganized part of our personality structure and is wholly unconscious.  It consists of 
our basic drives, namely Eros (the life drive) and Thanatos (the death drive).  To Freud, 
the mind of a newborn child is regarded as completely "id-ridden," in the sense that it is a 
mass of instinctive drives and impulses, and needs immediate satisfaction.  The id is 
guided by what Freud called the pleasure principle.  The child must learn that the world 
will not and can not immediately gratify every need, for a newborn makes no distinction 
between the “self’ and the outside world.  The first recognition of the outside world is 
when instant gratification is withheld but appears periodically.  At some point in the 
process of development the newborn begins to realize that, for example, the breast (or the 
bottle) will appear every so often (i.e. not instantaneously), there begins to be a 
distinction made between the internal world and the external world.  This is our first 
encounter with the reality principle, and we then begin to develop the ego. 
 The ego is mostly conscious, and is not present at birth, but rather develops out of the 
“self” once there is a realization made that an outside world exists.  This distinction 
between inside and outside world is a crucial part of the process of psychological 
development, allowing the ego to recognize a "reality" separate from itself.  As the child 
realizes there are external demands placed on the “self,” the ego becomes necessary 
inasmuch as it attempts to please the id’s desires in realistic and socially acceptable ways 
that will benefit in the long term rather than bringing grief. As such, Freud posited that 
the ego acts as a mediator between the reality principle (i.e. the outside world) and the 
pleasure principle (i.e. the id).   
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 The superego eventually develops out of the ego, is only partly conscious, and 
harbors the conscience and, beyond that, unconscious feelings of guilt.  The superego is 
self-created out of inner needs and outer pressures, and thus, represents the 
internalization, or introjection, of the demands of society -- and it can be very punishing.  
As young children, our guardians serve as our conscience.  Thus, if we think of doing 
something inappropriate and do not actually act on those feelings or if we do it without 
getting caught, we escape the external authority and all feelings of guilt.  Unfortunately, 
we are unable to escape the prying eyes of a developed superego.  The superego knows 
we had the inappropriate thought, and even if we do not commit the act, the mere thought 
is punished by the superego in the form of, often unconscious, feelings of guilt and 
shame.  In an internal conflict, the superego (the internalization of the reality principle) is 
often pitted against the id (acts according to the pleasure principle) with the ego serving 
as the mediator between the two.  By way of summary, the ego, in its role as mediator 
between the pleasure principle and reality principle, is thus utilized in our conflicts with 
the outside world, and in our internal conflicts to try and help us achieve happiness 
(which, in one of Freud’s definitions, is the absence of pain). 
 Freud also hypothesized that “the organism develops through the activity of two 
original basic instincts: the life instinct (sexuality, which Freud for the most part calls 
Eros) and the death instinct -- the destructive instinct.”282  The death instinct is often 
referred to as Thanatos.  Marcuse writes: 
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While the former strives for the binding of living substance into ever larger and 
more permanent units, the death instinct desires regression to the condition before 
birth, without needs and thus without pain.  It strives for the annihilation of life, 
for reversion to inorganic matter.  The organism equipped with such an 
antagonistic instinctual structure finds itself in an environment which is too poor 
and too hostile for the immediate gratification of the life instincts.  Eros desires 
life under the pleasure principle, but the environment stands in the way of this 
goal.  Thus as soon as the life instinct has subjected the death instinct to itself the 
environment compels a decisive modification of the instincts.”283 
 
A deconstruction of that paragraph will provide us with a better understanding of several 
Freudian categories.  Eros strives for life affirming activities and is largely responsible 
for the advent of group relations among humans.  It is important to remember that Freud 
eventually conceived of Eros as, more or less, our drive for sexuality (i.e. obtaining 
pleasure form the body), self-preservation, and life-affirming gratification (that is, 
happiness and pleasure).
284
  Freud described Eros-as-self-preservation as functioning “to 
assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible 
ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the 
organism itself.”285   Put another way, our instinct for self-preservation is charged with 
ensuring that we take the “long detour” to death -- that is, to die of natural causes in old 
age.  The death drive can be conceived as the antithesis, but it is important to realize that 
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Thanatos cannot simply be conceived as an inexplicable wish for the “annihilation of 
life.”  Marcuse states “the death instinct is destructiveness not for its own sake, but for 
the relief of tension.”286  Marcuse points out that “the death instinct presses for the 
annihilation of life because life is the predominance of displeasure.”287  Freud called this 
a “universal attribute of the instincts” -- that is, the desire to “restore an earlier state of 
things which the living entity has been obligated to abandon under the pressure of 
external distributing forces.”288  Indeed, since we find ourselves “in an environment 
which is too poor and too hostile for the immediate gratification of the life instincts,” and 
we desire a “freedom from excitation,” we yearn to return to a state of equilibrium or lack 
of internal tension -- that is, prior to birth.  For Marcuse, the instincts are now “drawn 
into the orbit of death.”289  Freud calls this the Nirvana Principle.   
 We now understand why, to Freud and Marcuse, the boundaries between Eros and 
Thanatos are blurry.  Marcuse referred to this as the “terrifying convergence of pleasure 
and death.”290  The Nirvana Principle, which strives for the annihilation of life, “would 
be a form of the pleasure principle, and the death instinct would be dangerously close to 
Eros.”291  This is true inasmuch as “the pleasure principle stands for the unlimited 
unfolding of the life instinct, and the Nirvana principle for regression into the painless 
condition before birth.”292  To make matters more complicated, Eros seems to approach 
Thanatos in two ways.  First, in ensuring the “long detour” to death, Eros is helping us 
exist in an external world that is “hostile to life,” in which we perpetually forego “a 
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pleasurable equilibrium.”  Moreover, an unfettered Eros would ultimately lead to our 
individual and collective demise.  A terrified Freud rejected this thought, maintaining the 
duality between the two drives, ultimately arguing that the death instinct is forced into the 
service of the life instinct, inasmuch as aggression, as Marcuse states, is “diverted from 
the organism itself and directed toward the outside world in the form of socially useful 
aggression -- toward nature and sanctioned enemies -- or, in the form of conscience, of 
morality, it is used by the superego for the socially useful mastery of one’s own 
drives.”293    
 Finally, in describing the instincts as capable of “a decisive modification” as 
demanded by the reality principle, Marcuse is introducing us to two important ideas.  
First, the instincts now become alterable, and this becomes vital because Marcuse’s 
theory of liberation (which talks of a liberation of Eros through a transformation of the 
instincts) is impossible without a “plasticity” of the instincts.  Moreover, we are 
introduced to the idea of sublimation -- a delayed gratification of the instincts through an 
activity deemed socially acceptable.  In short, it is the channeling of primal energy 
(original instincts) into other physical or psychological activities that is allowed by our 
external reality and provides a less intense instinctual gratification, but pleasure 
nonetheless.  This will become important in our discussion of Marcuse’s theory of 
liberation and domination. 
 A final category with which we need to become familiar and another realm in which 
humans are subject to surplus repression is alienated labor.  This is the realm in which 
Marcuse argues the performance principle inflicts its greatest damage.  Marcuse ties the 
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performance principle to that of an increasingly rationalized unfreedom, primarily 
through the way in which social labor is organized.  To be sure, Marcuse does concede 
that the advanced industrial system goes “a long way” toward fulfilling “the needs and 
faculties of the individuals.”294  Marcuse continues: 
 
For the vast majority of the population, the scope and mode of satisfaction are 
determined by their own labor; but their labor is work for an apparatus which 
they do not control, which operates as an independent power to which 
individuals must submit if they want to live…Men do not live their own lives but 
perform pre-established functions.  While they work they do not fulfill their own 
needs and faculties but work in alienation… [L]abor time, which [under the 
performance principle] is the largest part of the individual’s life time, is painful 
time, for alienated labor is absence of gratification, negation of the pleasure 
principle.  Libido is diverted for socially useful performances in which the 
individual works for himself only in so far as he works for the apparatus, 
engaged in activities that mostly do not coincide with his own faculties and 
desires.
295
 
 
It is important to note that Marcuse was not arguing that labor -- that is, the realm of 
necessity -- can be transformed entirely into the realm of freedom.  This will be discussed 
in greater depth later, but for now it is enough to know that, to Marcuse, our labor is 
alienated inasmuch as it is prescribed to us, is instinctually unsatisfying, and is such an 
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overwhelming portion of our lives that it affects our lives outside of our labor -- i.e. the 
realm of freedom, or leisure.  Marcuse describes alienated labor in Marxian and Freudian 
terms.  On the one hand, he stresses the inhumanity and exploitation to be found in the 
realm of labor, but also stresses its restrictions on erotic (life-affirming) energies and the 
absence of instinctual gratification.   This becomes important inasmuch as Marcuse will 
argue that a liberated ego will refuse to spend its life performing alienated labor, and it 
demonstrates that alienated labor, demanded by the performance principle is an 
important component of surplus repression.
296
  To Marcuse, this “work ethic” becomes a 
personal duty willingly performed, since the individual has introjected external demands 
that require this labor be performed and gratifications be renounced, thus subjecting the 
individual to pressures internal and external.  The labor ethos is so quantitatively and 
qualitatively dominant, and it must, for the sake of the performance principle, be stronger 
than the pleasure principle (which desires gratification) that it even manipulates one’s 
free time.  As Douglass Kellner states, “if the individuals are allowed to experience too 
much pleasure outside work, or have too much time to question their alienated existence, 
they might perhaps revolt and cause trouble, or drop out of the system.”297  To help 
prevent such a circumstance, the superego is extremely willing to punish any individual 
who does not perform according to the cultural norms of behavior. 
 Now that we have an understanding of some important Freudian and Marcusean 
categories we can dig deeper into Marcuse’s theory of liberation.  He was especially 
interested in the expansion of the subversive and liberating potential of sexual desire.  As 
we will see, Marcuse was referring to more than what we commonly conceptualize as 
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sexuality.  In Marcuse’s framework, freedom is conceived as a “liberation of Eros,” 
which includes an expansion of life affirming activities and the expansion of the pleasure 
zones of the body.  Put simply, it is an expansion of the life instinct; the awakening of a 
biological need for one’s body to be a receptacle of pleasure rather than labor.  To be 
sure, the expansion of Eros involves the expansion of sexuality itself, and while Marcuse 
argued that “Eros signifies a quantitative and qualitative aggrandizement of sexuality,” it 
is important to understand that Marcuse was not advocating some type of hedonistic 
society.
298
  Indeed, he argued that our current perversions and taboos and their 
concomitant sublimations exist largely because they are operating under a repressive 
reality principle.  Marcuse posited that a liberation of Eros, and therefore sexuality itself, 
would create a “self-sublimation” of sexuality.   
 The preceding pages discussed Marcuse’s argument that the level of repression 
needed within any given society is historical.  We can now focus on Marcuse’s argument 
that our socialization is also historically specific.  To Marcuse, considering that our 
instincts can change, so can the need for society to require coercive laws and harsh social 
taboos that are intended to keep our destructive and aggressive tendencies in line.  We 
have already focused on the process by which society represses the individual (and why 
Marcuse considers it to now be unnecessary), and to be sure, Freud characterized this as 
the price we must pay for civilization, but also asked if it was worth it -- and his answer 
was in the affirmative.  Marcuse simply changed the question -- Do we need to give up so 
much to live in a civilized society?  His response was very different, and the subsequent 
paragraphs will outline his vision for a non-surplus-repressive society.   
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 Marcuse argued that the “hidden trend in psychoanalysis” also revealed that there is a 
nature among humans to oppose the domination of our lives and bodies by that of 
alienated labor and instinctual renunciation.  Marcuse calls this the desire for “absence of 
want and repression,” a reconciliation of sorts, between the external and internal, between 
happiness and freedom.
299
  Marcuse points to memory as containing cognitive traces of 
our past freedom.   In Freudian psychoanalysis, memory is something that the patient 
attempts to overcome, for it is usually a recollection of something traumatic or 
unpleasant.  Marcuse, on the other hand, stresses the liberating potentialities of memory, 
specifically a recollection of pleasurable and life affirming experiences.  Marcuse writes: 
 
Its truth value lies in the specific function of memory to preserve promises and 
potentialities which are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, civilized 
individual, but which had once been fulfilled in his dim past and which are never 
entirely forgotten.  The reality principle restrains the cognitive function of 
memory… [But] as cognition gives way to re-cognition, the forbidden images 
and impulses of childhood begin to tell the truth…Regression assumes a 
progressive function.  The rediscovered past yields critical standards which are 
tabooed by the present.
300
   
 
Marcuse thus reconstructs Freud to suggest that remembrance of past experiences of 
freedom (as in childhood, or earlier stages of infancy) could put the painful performances 
of adulthood into question.  As Marcuse sees it, the reality principle militates, or 
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“restrains” our ability to remember those emancipatory experiences, primarily through 
devaluing experiences largely guided by the pleasure principle.  To Marcuse, this 
memory is intimately connected with fantasy.  Marcuse writes, “the restoration of 
memory is accompanied by the restoration of the cognitive content of fantasy.”301     
 To Marcuse, fantasy is vital because it is untouched by the reality principle and 
argues that it links our unconscious and conscious self, while communicating ungratified 
wishes of the pleasure principle.  Marcuse stated “fantasy…links the deepest layers of 
the unconscious with the highest products of consciousness (art), the dream with the 
reality; it preserves…the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual 
memory the tabooed images of freedom.”302  To Marcuse, fantasy preserves the memory, 
or image of “the immediate unity between the universal and the particular under the rule 
of the pleasure principle.”303  Conversely, the organization of man by the reality principle 
is characterized by the destruction of this original unity (i.e. a reconciliation, or 
harmonious relationship, between the self and the external world).  It is under these 
demands that we become socially atomized.
304
    It is in our fantasies that we hope for a 
better life and embody our instinctual and unconscious desires of increased freedom and 
gratification.  This is significant to Marcuse precisely because he accepts Freud’s 
argument that our unconscious contains the memory of peak experiences of gratification -
- that is, in the womb, during childhood, or the archaic memories of a historical past 
without surplus repression.
305
  In the Marcusean framework, fantasy and imagination are 
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synonymous.  Marcuse laments that the reality principle has relegated fantasy and 
imagination to the realm of utopia (i.e. deemed useless, impossible).  Marcuse argues for 
its restoration: 
 
Freud’s metapsychology here restores imagination to its rights.  As a 
fundamental, independent mental process, fantasy has a truth value of its own -- 
namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality.  Imagination 
envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with 
realization, of happiness with reason.  While this harmony has been removed into 
utopia by the established reality principle, fantasy insists that it must and can 
become the real, that behind the illusion lies knowledge.
306
 
 
To be sure, Marcuse is not suggesting we become a society of pipe dreamers.  It must be 
remembered, dialectical thought demands that the possibilities we imagine retain 
plausibility within the context of the current state of affairs.  Marcuse is simply arguing 
that the “universe of perception” created by fantasy and imagination will lead to what 
Marcuse calls multi-dimensional thinking.  We will discuss this concept in greater depth 
during our discussion of domination, but for now it is enough to know that Marcuse is 
arguing that imagination and fantasy will enable us to recognize our potentialities for 
greater freedom and happiness that already exist within our current society.  Inasmuch as 
we are able to envision greater potentialities, fantasy and imagination will also help us in 
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our quest for a reconciliation with our external world (nature, and each other), and our 
internal world (our “self”).   
 To help us preserve (or awaken) the memory and fantasy of emancipation, Marcuse 
suggests the imaginative potential of great art.  Marcuse stresses the liberating features of 
art precisely because it embodies the emancipatory contents of fantasy by producing 
images, sounds, and thoughts of happiness.  To be sure, Marcuse stressed that the 
freedom expressed in great art is “symbolic,” but it nevertheless taps into the memory of 
a freer existence.  Moreover, Marcuse is using the term “art” quite broadly.  He is not 
referring to only a wide range of what is commonly conceived as the “fine arts” (for 
example: music, literature, poetry, painting, or writing plays), but also to anything whose 
form is beautiful enough to move the subject (i.e. the person experiencing the aesthetic) 
to “an unreal world other than the established one.”307   Marcuse elaborates: 
 
Talking of a beautiful girl, a beautiful landscape, a beautiful picture, I certainly 
have very different things in mind.  What is common to all of them -- “beauty” -- 
is neither a mysterious entity, nor a mysterious world.  On the contrary, nothing 
is perhaps more directly and clearly experienced than the appearance of “beauty” 
in various beautiful objects.  The boy friend and the philosopher, the artist and 
the mortician may “define” it in very different ways, but they all define the same 
specific state or condition -- some quality or qualities which make the beautiful 
contrast with other objects.  In this vagueness and directness, beauty is 
experienced in the beautiful -- that is, it is seen, heard, smelled, touched, felt, 
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comprehended.  It is experienced almost as a shock, perhaps due to the contrast-
character of beauty, which breaks the circle of everyday experience and opens 
(for a short moment) another reality. 
 
Indeed, an experienced object that achieves such perfect form and hence, beauty, 
Marcuse argues, can move us to the “music of another reality.”308  Marcuse suggests that 
music, specifically because there is a few seconds of silence immediately prior to the 
eruption of form and beauty, clearly demonstrates the ability to transfigure the subject to 
another reality.  To Marcuse, it’s quite literally the silence before the perfect storm.  At 
any rate, it is important to remain mindful that this type of aesthetic experience can be the 
result of interaction with a beautiful landscape (in reality, or on canvas, or in photograph) 
a Bob Dylan song, or a beautiful over the shoulder catch by a center fielder in the World 
Series.
309
  To be sure, we must be careful not to interpret Marcuse’s aesthetic theory too 
loosely; most things, especially in the advanced industrial society, do not contain the 
aesthetic form (and hence, the beauty) requisite to qualify as art in Marcuse’s estimation. 
In the Marcusean project, something must contradict the given reality if it is to be 
considered art.  Indeed, Marcuse once wrote, “Permanent aesthetic subversion -- this is 
the way of art.”310 
 The contradiction of the given reality achieved by great art -- form-as-beauty -- 
Marcuse argues, must appeal to us on the instinctual level.  That is to say, our experience 
with art is not an intellectual endeavor.  Marcuse posits that beauty symbolizes the realm 
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of freedom “in so far as it demonstrates intuitively the reality of freedom…The basic 
experience in this dimension is sensuous rather than conceptual; the aesthetic perception 
is essentially intuition, not notion.”311   To use a colloquialism, we must “feel it.”  To 
Marcuse, “the nature of sensuousness is ‘receptivity,’ cognition through being affected by 
given objects.”312  To be sure, Marcuse is not arguing that the aesthetic experience is 
devoid of intellect, but rather that it is not primarily a cognitive experience.  Indeed, 
Marcuse often argues that we must merge our sensuousness (that is, through the senses, 
the conduit through which we can achieve instinctual gratification) and our intellect.
313
  It 
should not be surprising that Marcuse placed such an emphasis on art and its ability to 
appeal to our senses, for the struggle for existence, Marcuse argued, is fought on the 
instinctual level.  Thus, our discussion of the emancipatory potential of art will continue, 
but will be within the immediate context of Marcuse’s theory of liberation.314 
 Marcuse builds his project around the conclusion that our instincts -- our very nature -
- contain the potential for revolutionary possibility.  To Marcuse, we must return to 
Freud’s theory of human nature precisely because it demonstrates that there is an innate 
mechanism within humans that strives for happiness and liberation.  As such, Marcuse 
believes that Freud’s drive theory reveals the emancipatory power of the instinctual 
energy of human beings.  This is what Marcuse is referring to as Eros, that is, the 
component of our self which strives for life-affirming and social activities.  This 
“liberation of Eros” enables Marcuse’s project to move past the individualism of his 
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earlier project (in which he attempted to utilize the project of Heidegger).  Marcuse 
argued a freed Eros would release energies that would produce a new sensibility among 
humans, which would in turn lead to a new reality principle, and in the process would 
expand the quantity and quality of human relations and creativity.
315
  A released Eros 
would desire a more erotic (i.e. life affirming) and aesthetic (i.e. beautiful) environment 
that would require a restructuring of our social, political, and economic world.  As 
Marcuse sees it, only by confronting our unfreedom without self-deception does 
liberation become necessary, and subsequently, collective action becomes possible.  
Freud demonstrated for us the price we paid upon becoming civilized, and it is in the 
seeming abyss of this suffering that Marcuse finds new hope.   Indeed, Marcuse’s project 
was a bulwark against the pessimism and conformity rampant in intellectual circles 
following World War II, for he finds hope of in the very things argued to be enslaving us 
-- nature and technology.
316
   
 Marcuse begins sketching his theory of liberation by describing the subject in the 
current reality principle of Western civilization.  In Marcuse’s view, the performance 
principle presumes a tension between the universal (society) and the particular 
(individual), and between reason (intellect) and the passions (instincts).
317
  This is what 
we call the “struggle for existence,” or the realization that there is an external world 
(reality principle), and it is not in harmony with our internal self (pleasure principle). 
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This, according to Marcuse, is how we now experience nature, that is, as something to be 
dominated or overpowered.  Marcuse writes, “Nature (its own as well as the external 
world) were “given” to the ego as something that had to be fought, conquered, and even 
violated.”318  Marcuse uses the word “nature” to refer to our internal “self,” and the 
external world.   Thus, the ego, or the individual “self” is positioned as an “aggressive, 
offensive subject” struggling to conquer the resistant internal and external world.  As 
such, our raison d'etre becomes one of domination over one’s self, and the external 
world.  This logic of domination appears as what has been referred to as the performance 
principle, which Marcuse argued, is antagonistic to the senses, and thus militates against 
instinctual gratification.   Put another way, the domination over our external nature 
perpetuates, or is simultaneous with, domination over our internal nature.  Moreover, in 
this scenario, there is a significant tension between our self and the external world 
because external nature is viewed as an irrational force in need of rationalization.  The 
Enlightenment, and the idea of a rational ego, was supposed to be able to rationalize 
nature to conform to the needs of humans.  Marcuse is arguing that promise has not been 
fulfilled.
319
  Indeed, to Marcuse, there is no short cut option available with which to 
achieve a non-surplus-repressive society; we must, if we are to attain liberation, challenge 
the hegemony of the performance principle, and make the “long march” to that of a new 
reality principle.   
 Marcuse believes that a new reality principle would combine, or reconcile, the 
antagonistic realms of human existence.  This means that it would overcome the conflict 
between the pleasure principle and reality principle by creating a harmonious relation 
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between the instincts and reason, between the external nature and man, and within the 
very nature of man -- i.e. the instincts.   To Marcuse, the gratification that would be 
attainable under a new reality principle and its logic of gratification would reduce our 
internal conflicts.
320
  To be sure, to Marcuse, the “irreconcilable conflict is not between 
work (reality principle) and Eros (pleasure principle), but between alienated labor 
(performance principle) and Eros.”321  Thus, the new reality principle will not eliminate, 
but will reduce non-libidinal work to a minimum.  As Marcuse sees it, these antagonisms 
are the controllable causes of human suffering and misery that can be eliminated by a 
society organized around a logic of gratification; the new reality principle would serve 
the interests of individual gratification and sensuous fulfillment, rather than surplus 
repression and domination.
322
  This is precisely why fantasy, art, and imagination play 
such an important role in the Marcusean framework, because, as mentioned above, they 
“speak the language of the pleasure principle.”   To Marcuse, they all contain “the 
negation of the unfreedom,” and thus articulate a demand for liberation.  To Marcuse, 
they cannot provide us with red ink, but can move us to realize we are in need of a red 
pen.
323
  The potential of fantasy, art, and imagination to evoke past memories of freedom 
and happiness, while also moving us to realize the potentialities of the future thus makes 
these human endeavors into conduits of the Great Refusal.  This concept will be 
discussed in greater detail later; until then we shall be introduced to it by Marcuse: “This 
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Great Refusal is the protest against unnecessary repression, the struggle for the ultimate 
form of freedom -- to live without anxiety.”324 
 Embedded within the new reality principle is the creation of a societal structure 
organized around the demand for instinctual gratification.  Thus, society would 
demonstrate what Marcuse describes as a merger of technology and art (sensuous 
beauty), creating an aesthetic ethos, or an aestheticized environment.  In Marcuse’s view, 
the societal emphasis of Eros (life affirming, gratifying activities) would create a 
reduction of Thanatos (aggression).  Marcuse defends his “utopian” argument that a non-
surplus-repressive society is possible by reminding us that the reasons for our surplus 
repression are become increasingly obsolete.  Marcuse elucidates this argument as 
follows: 
 
The relegation of real possibilities to the no-man’s land of utopia is itself an 
essential element of the ideology of the performance principle.  If the 
construction of a non-repressive instinctual development is oriented, not on the 
subhistorical past, but on the historical present and mature civilization, the very 
notion of utopia loses its meaning.  The negation of the performance principle 
emerges not against but with the progress of conscious rationality; it presupposes 
the highest maturity of civilization.  The very achievements of the performance 
principle have intensified the discrepancy between the archaic unconscious and 
conscious processes of man, on the one hand, and his actual potentialities, on the 
other.  The history of mankind seems to tend toward another turning point in the 
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vicissitudes of the instincts… [and this] turning point would be located at the 
highest attained level of civilization. 
 
To Marcuse, a “turning point” is upon us, in which the accomplishments of the past make 
it possible for the modern human species to, for the first time, overcome scarcity, reduce 
repression and minimize alienated labor.  Thus, the scenario described above, which 
Marcuse argues is the state of things, suggests that the advanced industrial system has 
created the potential for its own obsolescence.   
 Marcuse reminds us of the oft-used argument that no society can possibly provide for 
all: “there is some validity in the argument that, despite all progress, scarcity and 
immaturity remain great enough to prevent the realization of the principle ‘to each 
according to his needs.’”325  He responds by reminding us that the conquest of scarcity 
requires us to maintain, or even augment, our levels of production, but simultaneously 
will require some to sacrifice a level of material comfort.  Marcuse writes: 
 
The reconciliation between pleasure and reality principle does not depend on the 
existence of abundance for all.  The only pertinent question is whether a state of 
civilization can be reasonably envisaged in which human needs are fulfilled in 
such a manner and to such an extent that surplus repression can be eliminated.
326
 
 
As we will see, for a new reality principle to emerge, a radical change must occur a 
priori in the consciousness of the individual.  That is to say, one must want the freedom 
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prior to being capable, or willing, to act to gain it.  In this scenario, the human species, 
having become conscious of the full effect of false needs, is no longer libidinaly tied to 
an irrational consumption-as-happiness ethos, and thus will not perceive this as a 
reduction in happiness.   
 Marcuse posits that such a non-surplus-repressive society can be achieved with a 
“rational organization of fully developed industrial society after the conquest of 
scarcity.”327  This society would: 
 
reflect the prevalent satisfaction of the basic human needs, sexual as well as 
social: food, housing, clothing, leisure.  This satisfaction would be (and this is 
the important point) without toil -- that is, without the rule of alienated labor over 
the human existence. Under primitive conditions, alienation has not yet arisen 
because of the primitive character of the needs themselves, the rudimentary 
character of the division of labor, and the absence of an institutionalized 
hierarchical specialization of functions.  Under the “ideal” conditions of mature 
industrial civilization, alienation would be completed by general automatization 
of labor, reduction of labor time to a minimum, and exchangeability of 
functions.
328
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Marcuse is arguing that the primitive human was free to the extent that primitive needs 
were met.  To be sure, this happiness was limited by nature -- that is, primitive man was 
limited by a lack of mastery over the external world.  That is what Marcuse means when 
he describes the conditions existing within the advanced industrial society as “ideal.”  
Indeed, to Marcuse, scarcity and nature have been mastered to the extent that it is now 
possible to organize a society around gratifying our instinctual needs.  Technology, and 
specifically automation, is what will enable society to reduce the amount of time spent 
laboring in non-libidinal work.  Marcuse thus concludes that the very technological-
industrial conditions that helped create alienated work have developed, in its advanced 
state, the forces of production which could potentially enable the human species to 
overcome alienated labor and surplus repression.
329
  This is dialectical thinking par 
excellence. 
 This process begins when the length of the work day is reduced.  The realization of 
this Marxian notion would technically mean the reduction of standard of living for some, 
but it must be remembered that the criteria for living well would have become other than 
what it was under the performance principle.  Indeed, Marcuse writes: 
 
But the regression to a lower standard of living, which the collapse of the 
performance principle would bring about, does not militate against progress in 
freedom.  The argument that makes liberation conditional upon an ever higher 
standard of living all too easily serves to justify the perpetuation of the 
repression.  The definition of the standard of living in terms of automobiles, 
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television sets, airplanes, and tractors is that of the performance principle itself.  
Beyond the rule of this principle, the level of living would be measured by other 
criteria: the universal gratification of the basic human needs, and the freedom 
from guilt and fear -- internalized as well as external, instinctual as well as 
“rational.” 
   
Put simply, we would incorporate a different conception of freedom and happiness.  No 
longer would we gauge our liberty in terms of the material wealth we can accumulate, but 
we would reject that very conception because it prohibits us from creating a society based 
on the free play of human faculties.  We would, instead, define happiness in terms of the 
level of instinctual gratification possible within that society.  As mentioned above, this 
also demands, to a much greater extent, the external reality (reality principle) be in 
harmony with our internal self (pleasure principle).
330
  Marcuse argues that in a society 
that is rationally organized around a logic of gratification, a minimum of time and energy 
would be spent performing necessary but unsatisfying labor, and the quantity of free time 
would be expanded, enabling more time and libidinal energy to be devoted to human 
needs: Eros.  Marcuse writes: 
 
In this case, the quantum of instinctual energy still to be diverted into necessary 
labor (in turn completely mechanized and rationalized) would be so small that a 
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large area of repressive constraints and modifications, no longer sustained by 
external forces, would collapse.   Consequently, the antagonistic relation 
between pleasure principle and reality principle would be altered in favor of the 
former.  Eros, the life instincts, would be released to an unprecedented degree. 
 
Marcuse is making a Hegelian argument, inasmuch as he is claiming that a quantitative 
change (reduction of painful labor) will lead to a qualitative change (liberation of Eros).  
Marcuse is conceding that non-libidinal labor is inevitable, but argues that it can be 
minimized to the extent that it enables the unused libidinal energy to be diverted to life 
affirming activities.  Marcuse quotes Charles Baudelaire: “True civilization does not lie 
in gas, nor in steam, nor in turntables.  It lies in the reduction of the traces of original 
sin.”331  Marcuse is attempting to make the point that “True civilization,” that is, a society 
guided by the logic of gratification, lies in the reduction of guilt brought about by a harsh 
superego, which we must remember, is the internal manifestation of the external world.  
In the current state of affairs, the superego represents the demands of the performance 
principle and thereby requires an unnecessary level of instinctual renunciation (i.e. 
surplus repression).  In Marcuse’s framework, the superego -- a “powerful, but tolerant 
father”332 -- punishes the individual with guilt when the performance principle is 
transgressed.
333
  Under a new reality principle, in a society structured around a logic of 
gratification, the superego will not need to punish precisely because our pleasure 
                                                          
331
 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 153.  The “original sin” is referring to our harsh superego and feelings 
of guilt if we do not comply with the performance principle. 
332
 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, 9. 
333
 To be sure, Marcuse also argued that the “relaxation of taboos” of modern society provides an 
alleviation of the sense of guilt, and “binds the ‘free’ individuals libidinaly to the institutionalized fathers.   
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principle is, to a great extent, in harmony with the reality principle.  This would reduce 
the feelings of guilt and anxiety and divert instinctual energy back to life affirming 
activities because the superego would not require such performance in the realm of 
necessity and the realm of freedom.  To put it colloquially, we could get off “the hamster 
wheel.”  Thus, Marcuse concludes that in a non-surplus-repressive society humans would 
be capable of harmonious relations with others, be more willing to defer gratification in 
the interests of more intense pleasure later on, and because the liberated Eros would have 
found its way into the realm of necessity, alienated labor would not be so stultifying.
 334
  
At any rate, it has been mentioned above that Marcuse’s new reality principle depends on 
the elimination of surplus-repression.  As stated above, this would not eliminate labor, 
but rather: 
 
the organization of labor of the human existence into an instrument of labor.  If 
this is true, the emergence of a non-repressive reality principle would alter rather 
than destroy the social organization of labor: the liberation of Eros could create 
new and durable work relations.
335
 
 
In the final analysis, the human body would no longer be primarily a receptacle of labor, 
but would be dominated by the play of our faculties.  In brief, we would have the time 
and energy to finally do those things that make us happy.
336
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 Concomitant with these new “work relations” is a new erotic reality, inasmuch as the 
needs of the external world (i.e. societal structure) tend to no longer militate against the 
pleasure principle.  It must be remembered, the way in which we have organized our 
labor (i.e. division of labor, rationalization of production) has been for the utility of “the 
established productive apparatus rather than for the individuals.”337  In Marcuse’s view, 
this tended to contradict the pleasure principle to the extent that the social need (rapid 
production, production of useless wares) deviated from the individual need (instinctual 
gratification, life affirming activities).  In this scenario, labor and productivity tend to 
become an end-in-itself, which, to Marcuse, is the “taming of the instincts by exploitative 
reason.  Efficiency and repression converge...”338    In the Marcusean framework, under 
the new reality principle, the tension between the external world and internally within our 
tripartite psyche would be drastically alleviated because society would be organized 
around a logic of gratification of our individual (instinctual) needs rather than that of the 
advanced industrial system. 
 To be sure, it is not simply a matter or reorganizing of social labor -- to Marcuse, that 
would be quantitative rather than a qualitative.  Put differently,  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
thereby removing gratification from the labor process.  To Marcuse, “the more external to the individual 
the necessary labor becomes, the less does it involve him in the realm of necessity.”   The implication is 
that automation relieves us of the requirements of domination, our libidinal investment in the process is 
minimal (thereby so is the libidinal energy spent), and we thus experience a quantitative reduction in labor 
time which leads to a qualitative change in human existence; “free” time, rather than “labor” time, 
determines the content of our “life.” This expanding realm of freedom liberates the various faculties: “Thus 
liberated, they will in turn generate new forms of realization and of discovering the world, which in turn 
will reshape the realm of necessity, the struggle for existence.” (Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 223). 
337
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No matter how justly and rationally the material production may be organized, it 
can never be a realm of freedom and gratification; but it can release time and 
energy for the free play of human faculties outside the realm of alienated labor 
… It is the sphere outside labor which defines freedom and fulfillment, and it is 
the definition of the human existence in terms of this sphere which constitutes 
the negation of the performance principle.
339
 
 
Marcuse is arguing that the human species subjected to the performance principle has 
organized their internal and external world in reverse.  We have organized our lives 
around the realm of necessity (labor) and we have increasingly allowed our realm of 
freedom (leisure) to be violated by this domination.  Today’s reality principle demands 
such rapid productivity, hard work, efficiency, rationality and competitive performances 
that the working day dominates both our life and leisure.  Ultimately, we are so mentally 
and/or physically fatigued by the daily performance that we have no libidinal energy left 
for genuine fulfillment -- thus we defer to whatever particular vapid entertainments 
provided by the advanced industrial system.  This dynamic helps us appreciate the 
significance Marcuse places on the reduction of the realm of necessity and to understand 
how he can claim that a quantitative change can become qualitative.  To be sure, Marcuse 
argued that this is not a simple matter of subtraction equals addition. 
 Marcuse argues that this can only take place in a society whose members experience a 
transformation of values and consciousness.  Put another way, for any political, social, 
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and economic revolution to be authentic, it must be happen after a change in the 
consciousness of its subjects.  To be sure, any revolution that would simultaneously alter 
work and social relations, would involve a new and gratifying experience of the external 
world based on a new reality principle, but there needs to be a change in the 
consciousness of the individual that moves one into praxis -- that is, revolutionary action.  
Marcuse makes this argument, with help from Marx, in the following passage: 
 
To be sure, Marx held that the organization and direction of the productive 
apparatus by the “immediate producer” would introduce a qualitative change in 
the technical continuity: namely, production toward the satisfaction of freely 
developing individual needs.  However, to the degree to which the established 
technical apparatus engulfs the public and private existence in all spheres of 
society -- that is, becomes the medium of control and cohesion in a political 
universe which incorporates the laboring classes -- to that degree would the 
qualitative change involve a change in the technological structure itself.  And 
such change would presuppose that the laboring classes are alienated from this 
universe in their very existence, that their consciousness is that of the total 
impossibility to continue to exist in this universe, so that the need for qualitative 
change is a matter of life and death.  Thus, the negation exists prior to the change 
itself…340 
 
Marcuse is borrowing from Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.  He continues: 
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The dialectical logic insists, against the language of brute facts and ideology, that 
the slaves must be free for their liberation before they can become free, and that 
the end must be operative in the means to attain it.  Marx’s proposition that the 
liberation of the working class must be the action of the working class itself 
states this a priori.  Socialism must become reality with the first act of the 
revolution because it must already be in the consciousness and action of those 
who carried the revolution.
341
 
 
Marcuse is arguing that the very first revolutionary act presupposes a radical 
consciousness -- that is, the individual unable to exist under the status quo.
342
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There are two points that need to be made.  First, Marcuse is directly referring to a working class 
consciousness in the quote, but it must be remembered that Marcuse did not think the working class has any 
consciousness of liberation.  Indeed, this is an impetus behind his entire project t -- namely, to find possible 
revolutionary actors in the absence of a radical working class.  My purpose in using the quote was simply 
to demonstrate Marcuse’s argument that consciousness precedes praxis. Second, there is some ambivalence 
as to Marcuse’s argument.  Marcuse seems to muddy the waters in the following passages: “[T]he rupture 
with the self-propelling conservative continuum of needs must precede the revolution which is to usher in a 
free society, but such rupture itself can be envisaged only in a revolution -- a revolution which would be 
driven by the vital need to be freed from the administered comforts and the destructive productivity of the 
exploitative society.”  
 
Elsewhere he argues: “The social agents of revolution … are formed only in the process of transformation 
itself, and one cannot count on a situation in which the revolutionary forces are there ready-made, so to 
speak, when the revolutionary moment begins” (Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation , 64). 
 
I do not find these lines of thought to be arguing that the revolutionary act produces the revolutionary agent 
simply because if that were the case, Marcuse seems to be arguing that revolutionary action is impossible -- 
but that is antithetical to his entire project.  He was making reference to the near totalizing effect of false 
needs, and thus, our inability, or unwillingness, to desire our own liberation.  It is also a reference to our 
inability to see the potentialities in our own society.  Marcuse referred to this as a “vicious circle” that must 
be broken.   To be sure, this is to argue that any revolutionary movement must begin with a group of people 
who are moved to action by a radical consciousness.  The first act may inspire others to join, but it still 
requires a change in consciousness prior to any act.  Put another way, some individuals may not be willing 
to break dependence on false needs until they witness others do so.  Marcuse is also arguing that a change 
in consciousness needs to accompany any change in societal structure for it to be a qualitative change 
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We must now return to the idea that the new reality principle is derived from the 
reduction of the realm of necessity, thus allowing the release of “time and energy for the 
free play of human faculties outside the realm of alienated labor.” 
 The preceding paragraphs have discussed Marcuse’s argument that a shortening of 
the work day and a drastic reduction of alienated labor would release erotic (life 
affirming) energies.  This liberation of Eros would result in the obsolescence of the social 
and internal restrictions on sexuality.  Since the body would no longer be a receptacle of 
toil, it could be “resexualized.”  Marcuse argues that under the performance principle: 
 
The full force of civilized morality was mobilized against the use of the body as 
mere object, means, instrument of pleasure; such reification was tabooed and 
remained the ill-reputed privilege of whores, degenerates, and perverts.  
Precisely in his gratification, and especially in his sexual gratification, man was 
to be a higher being, committed to higher values; sexuality was to be dignified 
by love. With the emergence of a non-repressive reality principle, with the 
abolition of the surplus-repression necessitated by the performance principle, this 
process would be reversed. 
 
The performance principle demands that the human body be de-eroticized to the extent 
that we can use that energy to perform labor, thereby utilizing our body as vessels of 
labor rather than pleasure.  That is to say, society, as we have organized it, demands our 
sexuality be reduced to monogamous relationships and makes the additional demand that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(rather than merely quantitative).  Indeed, soon after the above passage is the following statement: “radical 
change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing social existence.”  
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our pleasure zones be reduced to our genitalia (that is, actual acts of coitus).   There is 
also a societal demand that sexuality is most appropriate when in the service of 
reproduction.    Marcuse is also arguing that the social taboo on sexuality is a holdover 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which the bourgeoisie positioned the 
private sphere in opposition -- that is, as a safe haven -- from the heartless and 
commodified world (the capitalist public sphere).  As such, one’s private life was viewed 
as a realm in which interactions were not to be structured around market exchange values 
and men and women were not to be reified -- hence the restriction of using the “body as 
mere object.”  At any rate, Marcuse argues that this process would be reversed if Eros 
was to be liberated. 
 Marcuse points to the infant to help make this argument.  In Freud’s view, prior to 
socialization (that is, learning society’s demands of sexual restriction) the infant 
progresses through a series of psychosexual stages in which different parts of the body 
provide erotic (life affirming) satisfaction.
343
  Freud referred to this as “pre-genital” 
sexuality, while Marcuse used the term “polymorphous sexuality.”  It is vital to 
remember that this is not “sexual” in the same way that the adult within the performance 
principle is “sexual.”  In this context, it simply means that different parts of the body are 
providing the infant with instinctual gratification.   Put simply, the body of the infant, 
which we must remember is id driven (pleasure principle), is a receptacle of pleasure.  To 
Freud and Marcuse, it is the process of socialization that de-eroticizes, or de-sexualizes 
the body.    Marcuse is calling for this process to be reversed; that is, for the human body 
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 147 
(i.e. not just the genitals) to once again become a vessel of pleasure.  This line of thought 
needs to be clarified because it has led to much misunderstanding. 
 In Marcuse’s view, a liberation of Eros would: 
 
first manifest itself in a reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in 
a resurgence of pregenital polymorphous supremacy and in a decline in genital 
supremacy.  The body in its entirety would become an object of cathexis 
[libidinal, or instinctual, investment of energy], a thing to be enjoyed -- an 
instrument of pleasure.
344
 
 
Marcuse argues that such an “instinctual liberation” would not lead to “a society of sex 
maniacs,” but to “a transformation of the libido: from sexuality under genital supremacy 
to erotization of the entire personality.”345  A common misconception, to put it 
colloquially, is that Marcuse is advocating a society replete with orgies and bestiality, in 
which we spend all day fondling ourselves and each other.  Indeed, that is hedonistic 
narcissism (among other things), and very far from what Marcuse is arguing.  He stresses 
that this transformation of sexuality would be a result of radical social change and would 
lead to a self-sublimation of sexuality rather than an explosion of acts of coitus, precisely 
because we would get erotic pleasure elsewhere.  Marcuse argues that in a non-surplus 
repressive society, sexuality would take forms other than sexual intercourse.  In 
Marcuse’s view, under the performance principle sublimation (instinctual deflection, and 
delayed gratification) deflects sexual energy into non-sexual ends (i.e. inhibits its aim), 
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but in a liberated society, sublimation could be a non-repressive activity that could 
eroticize one’s social interactions and work relations.346  Indeed, Marcuse argued 
“Spiritual ‘procreation’ is just as much the work of Eros as is corporeal procreation.”347  
Within the sexual repression of the pleasure principle, a sudden release of suppressed 
sexuality might lead to some sort of sex mania.  Marcuse counters this by arguing that in 
a non-surplus-repressive society, in which a transformed consciousness is presupposed, 
sexual energy could be channeled into creating “eroticized personalities.”  In such a 
scenario, men and women who view their body -- that is, their “self” (physical and 
mental) -- as instruments of pleasure would reject the instrumentalization of the body.  
Sexuality is now interpreted as instinctual energy that seeks life affirming pleasure -- it is 
transformed into Eros.   
 To be sure, Marcuse argues that this can only truly happen in a transformed society 
and must by “supraindividual,” that is, not merely an isolated individual act.  Indeed, to 
Marcuse, polymorphic sexuality, if done for simply individualistic pleasure serves to 
strengthen the existing repressive society.  Thus, Marcuse proposes liberating Eros only 
in a non-repressive society in which Eros (or erotic energy) would exist within a non-
antagonistic “continuum of sexual gratification, affectionate interpersonal relationships, 
play and creative work.”348   
 In a non-surplus-repressive civilization, the tension between the intellect (reason, 
reality principle) and the senses (instincts, pleasure principle) that has existed in the 
Western tradition since the Enlightenment would be overcome. Marcuse refers to this as a 
                                                          
346
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 183. 
347
 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 211. 
348
 Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 184. 
 149 
“libidinal rationality.”  It is a sensualization of reason, so that work and social relations 
become eroticized and man can become polymorphous again.  This presupposes a new 
sensibility among humans, and it is precisely this new mode of sensuousness that would 
make the refusal to continue living an alienated existence into a biological need. 
 In Marcuse’s view, a non-surplus-repressive culture “aims at a new relation between 
instincts and the reason.”349  Marcuse proposes a new concept of reason that is not 
repressive of the senses but acts in harmony with them.  This is possible because under a 
new reality principle, the external world would not militate against our internal self 
because society would be guided by a logic of gratification.  In Marcuse’s view, in any 
society that is organized on the basis of satisfying our needs (rather than its own demands 
of profit, rapid production, consumption), reason and happiness would converge, creating 
their own new divisions of labor, their own priorities, their own hierarchy, all within an 
aestheticized environment.  Marcuse suggests the connection between many of the 
concepts discussed above:  
 
The altered relation between … [the realm of necessity and realm of freedom] 
alters the relation between what is desirable and what is reasonable, between 
instinct and reason.  With the transformation from sexuality into Eros, the life 
instincts evolve their sensuous order, while reason becomes sensuous to the 
degree to which it comprehends and organizes necessity in terms of protecting 
and enriching the life instincts.  The roots of the aesthetic experience re-emerge -
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- not merely in an artistic culture but in the struggle for existence itself.  It 
assumes a new rationality.
350
 
  
To Marcuse, men and women operating with and under this new rationality will alter 
progress -- i.e. division and quantity of labor, the purpose of science, the utilization of 
technology -- to serve the interests of human gratification.
351
 
 Marcuse suggests that the “new human” within a new reality principle, would exhibit 
a new sensibility, that is, humans have the potential to adopt an aesthetic interpretation of 
reality that will resonate so strongly within the “self” to generate a “biological” need for 
freedom.
352
   In Marcuse’s view, it is important to develop this “radical nonconformist 
sensibility” because the advanced industrial system reaches into the instinctual level of 
humans; thus, this must be where resistance and rebellion operates.  This “radical 
sensibility” stresses the active role of the senses in shaping reason -- that is, in shaping 
one’s worldview and the logical organization of that worldview.  We must remember that 
the senses are not passive; that is, they synthesize the data of experience and are guided 
by empiricism (i.e. our material and historical experience).  Thus, our world emerges not 
only in the pure forms of time and space, but also, and simultaneously, as a totality of 
                                                          
350
 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 223. 
351
 It’s important to note two things: First, we can not forget that society needs our aggression to hold itself 
together and to protect against the enemy.  Our collective and individual guilt is turned inward but also 
directed outward toward an “other.”  This “other,” or enemy, seems to always exist -- i.e. Soviet Union, 
terrorism, Black nationalists).  The point is that liberation of Eros implies a concomitant liberation of our 
aggression as well.  Second, Marcuse is not arguing that technology is a bad thing.  In fact, as we have 
seen, it contains the seeds of our liberation.  To Marcuse, what matters is how we apply technology (and 
science). 
352
 Marcuse wrote about the “new sensibility” in the context of the New Left and counterculture movements 
of the late 1960s, and thus may have been a little “giddy” while writing (An Essay on Liberation, 1969).  
To be sure, he never did argue that those groups were revolutionary, only that they may be a “catalyst” 
towards a revolutionary movement.  On the other, he did argue that they were a manifestation of a “new 
sensibility.” At any rate, the term “new sensibility” is an attempt to provide temporality (historical 
concretion) to his argument. 
 151 
sensuous qualities -- objects not only of the eye but of all the senses (gearing, smelling, 
toughing, tasting).  Marcuse would refer to this as “polymorphous.”  In Marcuse’s view, 
it is this sensuous experience of the world that must change if social change is to be 
radical and qualitative -- that is, authentic. 
 Our discussion of the new sensibility will require us to preview some of Marcuse’s 
thoughts on domination.  In short, Marcuse argues that the advanced industrial system 
gives people what it wants them to want, thereby generating needs supportive of mass 
consumption rather than stimulating creative human development.
353
  In arguing this, 
Marcuse avoids the criticism that his argument is teleological.    It is important to be 
mindful that Marcuse was not arguing that this was something done to us, but rather it 
was something done by us.  As such, he was not making a teleological argument, 
inasmuch as he was not claiming that things like technology, advertising, and 
entertainment were autonomous entities imposing their will on a duped society.  Marcuse 
writes: 
 
Not the automobile is repressive, not the television set is repressive, but the 
household gadgets which, produced in accordance with the requirements of 
profitable exchange, have become part and parcel of the people’s own existence, 
own “actualization.”  Thus they have to buy part of their own existence on the 
market; this existence is the realization of capital.  The naked class interest builds 
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 It is important to be mindful that Marcuse was not arguing that this was something done to us, but rather 
it was something done by us.  Put another way, he was not making a teleological argument, inasmuch as he 
was not claiming that things like technology, advertising, and entertainment were imposing their will on a 
duped society.  Indeed, Marcuse argues that we created and applied these systems, and we are doing it to 
ourselves.  To be sure, he recognized that there is an elite who, to an extent, exercise their will on the 
masses [hence, have more input than do the masses], but he also argues that even they have rules to follow.   
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the unsafe and obsolescent automobiles, and through them promotes destructive 
energy; the class interest employs the mass media for the advertising of violence 
and stupidity, for the creation of captive audiences.  In doing so, the masters only 
obey the demand of the public, of the masses; the famous law of supply and 
demand establishes the harmony between the rulers and the ruled … Self-
determination, the autonomy of the individual, asserts itself in the right to race 
his automobile, to handle his power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass 
audiences his opinion, no matter how ignorant, how aggressive, it may be.
354
 
 
Indeed, Marcuse argues that we are responsible for the creation and application of the 
advanced industrial system and thus, we are doing it to ourselves.  To be sure, he 
recognized that there is an elite who, to an extent, exercise their will on the masses 
[hence, have more input], but he also argues that even they have rules to follow.  
 As Marcuse sees it, the advanced industrial system is irrational, in part, because it is 
based upon a degree of production that can only be maintained through enormous mass 
consumption and a terrific degree of waste.  It must therefore train its citizens to “need” 
the things it produces.  We are inured to want the newest models and the latest 
innovations in an endless stream of widgetry.   It’s not sufficient that we buy 
smartphones; we are conditioned to want (or need) a new generation of smartphone every 
one to two years.
355
 To Marcuse, we thus begin to conflate our personal worth, our self-
esteem, with the quality and the quantity of the material objects we consume. This 
conditioning is achieved through an incessant barrage of instinctually manipulative 
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 --or when our wireless plan allows. 
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advertising and the creation of the social trope that consumption is synonymous with a 
meaningful, joyful existence.  Finally, we must remember two things: First, under the 
performance principle, this is what we want.  Put another way, we instinctually need 
material items to achieve some level of gratification of our socially conditioned needs
356
.  
Additionally, it is in this way that false needs are created, which, to Marcuse, are the 
chains that bind us to the system.
357
  
 To combat this, Marcuse describes the development of  a “new sensibility” -- of an 
aesthetic sense of taste for freedom that, once refined, creates what he calls a “biological” 
(instinctual) need for freedom.   Marcuse constantly reminded us that we are libidinally 
tied to the advanced industrial system, and argued that this new sensibility suggests a 
reaffirmation of what it means to be human.  Marcuse writes: “the masters have created 
the public which asks for their wares, and asks for them more insistently if it can release, 
in and through the wares, its frustration and the aggressiveness resulting from this 
frustration.”358   So, paradoxically, the sublimated frustration channeled into consumption 
sustains the need for productive work. We need to perform labor in order to afford the 
wares that allow us to release the frustration caused by our work.   To Marcuse, it’s a 
vicious cycle of domination.  We even feel guilty in the event we feel too much pleasure 
(or too much rest); that is, after a weekend of release we return compliantly to our work 
stations.  In this scenario, we “sin” for pleasure and work for redemption, all within the 
parameters of what is considered acceptable, and what our energy will allow.  If we 
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 Remember, this gratification is repressive inasmuch as they are not our own, and it demands we remain 
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 This raises the question of just who it is that knows what our “real” needs are.  In Marcuse’s case, he 
does not try to tell us what our “real” needs are; in fact, he says it is impossible to know with any certainty 
what those needs are until we develop the “new sensibility” that will allow us to begin constructing a truly 
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 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, 12. 
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violate the boundaries of what is acceptable, our “father” (i.e. superego) weighs us down 
with guilt; but as mentioned above, the relaxation of taboos alleviates our sense of guilt 
and further binds the “free” individuals libidinally to the advanced industrial system.  It is 
quite a pickle -- it is easy to see how many view Marcuse as very pessimistic.   
 In articulating this psychoanalytic paradigm of consumer society, Marcuse borrows 
heavily from Freud. He utilizes the Freudian concept of the “internalization of authority” 
to explain how our instinctual erotic (life affirming) drives are transformed until the work 
ethic and current reality principle (i.e. performance principle) have become second 
nature: “biological.” It is on this same instinctual level that the “new sensibility” must 
originate if we are to foster, or rather, to maintain, a qualitative change.  
     The new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of Eros over Thanatos, is what 
Marcuse describes existing among those who living within a new reality principle.    
Marcuse writes: 
 
The new sensibility, which expresses the ascent of the life instincts over 
aggressiveness and guilt, would foster, on a social scale, the vital need for the 
abolition of injustice and misery and would shape the further evolution of the 
“standard of living.”  The life instincts would find rational expression 
(sublimation) in planning the distribution of the social necessary labor time 
within and among the various branches of production, thus setting priorities of 
goals and choices: not only what to produce but also the “form” of the product.  
The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a science and 
technology free to discover and realize the possibilities of things and men in the 
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protection and gratification of life, playing with the potentialities of form and 
matter for the attainment of this goal.  Technique would then tend to become art, 
and art tend to form reality: the opposition between imagination and reason, 
higher and lower faculties, poetic and scientific thought, would be invalidated.  
Emergence of a new Reality Principle; under which a new sensibility and a 
desublimated scientific intelligence would combine in the creation of an 
aesthetic ethos.
359
 
 
In this scenario, the “liberated consciousness” is presupposed, which may, in the event 
the quantity of those “liberated” begins to swell, foster a liberation of Eros, which would 
indicate the ascension of the life instincts over aggressiveness and guilt, thereby signaling 
the presence of a new sensibility -- or mode of perception that militates against surplus 
repression.  The “desublimation of scientific intelligence” and “the development of a 
science and technology free to discover the possibilities of things and men” indicates that 
our application of science and technology would have been repurposed to serve the 
interests of human gratification.  This would be accomplished through the societal 
imperative that science and technology become sensuous.   
 The awareness, or liberation, articulated by Marcuse, is to come not through the 
rational interpretation of history but through the aesthetic.  Marcuse believes that the 
repressive nature of modern consumer society has driven any aesthetic quest for freedom 
into the avant-garde artistic movement. Liberation occurs when aesthetic sensibilities 
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escape the insulated world of the artist and find expression in popular movements.
360
        
Marcuse’s ideal is a society in which art becomes so fully integrated into the productive 
and administrative modes of existence that it is impossible to determine where one begins 
and the other ends.   
 Marcuse’s notion that man has the potential to adopt an aesthetic interpretation of 
reality that will resonate so strongly within him as to generate a “biological” need for 
freedom is utterly optimistic, but an important question remains. If unfreedom is part and 
parcel of our mental ecology, can civilization freely generate freedom — and how?   
Moreover, who can establish, and who is entitled to enforce “objective” standards?  
Marcuse suggests that from Plato to Rousseau, an educational dictatorship has been 
advanced as the only honest answer. The dictatorship is to be exercised by those 
supposed to have acquired knowledge of true Good.  In Marcuse’s view, this answer, for 
better or for worse, has become obsolete: “knowledge of the available means for creating 
a human existence for all is no longer confined to a privileged elite.” The facts, argues 
Marcuse, are in fact all too open: “individual consciousness would safely arrive at them 
only if it were not methodically arrested and diverted.”   We have here an important 
political principle which Marcuse wishes to adhere to: that people can (learn to) tell the 
difference between “normal” and “excessive” repression. While they cannot make these 
sorts of judgments now, it does not mean they cannot do so once given the opportunity. 
This is a somewhat condescending argument, but is not unfounded.  “Utopias” are built 
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 At the time of the writing of Essay on Liberation, Marcuse saw the aesthetic, sexual, and playful 
lifestyle of the counterculture and the Black Power movement as thriving subcultures. In Marcuse’s view, 
both of these movements had developed a culture of their own (music, language, values, etc.) that acted as 
a barrier between them and the mass culture of consumer society. This creates a space for the free play of 
the creative imagination, and it is there that Marcuse is hoping for the birth of a new aesthetically oriented 
society. 
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from unrealistic blueprints -- the conditions for a free society are not, but are in fact a 
matter of reason.  
 Throughout much of Marcuse’s professional life, he maintained that the potential 
negation, or revolutionary agency, existed primarily in non-integrated outsiders (by virtue 
of their being non-beneficiaries of the advanced industrial system) and, to a somewhat 
lesser extent, by radical students and intellectuals (i.e. the New Left, Counterculture).  
Some scholars have argued that Marcuse does not adequately present a dialectical 
negation of the advanced industrial system because his forces of negation are located 
outside the system.
361
  To be sure, prior to the “Sixties” radicalism and the “crisis 
tendencies” emerging in the advanced industrial system in the late 1960s and early 1970s,  
Marcuse emphasized the stabilizing and totalizing tendency of the advanced industrial 
system to swallow up virtually all dissent (i.e. negation).  That is to say, he argued that 
potential negation within the system was nearly impossible. This argument was 
contingent on the ability of the advanced industrial system to “deliver the goods” and to 
appear inviolable while doing so.  The various movements of the Sixties (feminist, Native 
American, Black Power, environmental…to name a few) coupled with the worsening 
economic performance of the 1970s prompted Marcuse to alter his analysis of possible 
social transformation.  He eventually perceived a greatly expanded base for possible 
revolutionary agency that was to be found within the advanced industrial system (thus, 
rendering the above mentioned criticisms obsolete).
362
  It was during the early 1970s in 
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 There were many vicissitudes in Marcuse’s project.  I present his argument in the subsequent paragraphs 
as the” current” Marcusean argument because the advanced industrial system is still in crisis (perhaps more 
so, than at the time of Marcuse’s writings -- early 1970s). 
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which Marcuse began to more forcefully argue that the ranks of the exploited and the font 
of dissatisfaction was expanding to include the majority of the underlying population.   
To be sure, Marcuse was always arguing that we are all unfree (thus, exploited to varying 
degrees) in the advanced industrial system, but he was now arguing that the 
contradictions were, at least potentially, becoming more noticeable.
363
   
 The greatly expanded base for possible negation, which existed at least in theory, 
allowed Marcuse to argue for what he called a “united front” strategy.  This represents a 
mild attempt by Marcuse to suggest something approaching a concrete roadmap to 
achieving liberation.  He posits that if the entire society is oppressed and the people are 
ready for change (and that’s the vital ingredient), there is a potential base for a “united 
front” to strategize and organize.  In this scenario, there is an emphasis on political 
education and activist organization within the milieu of increasing tendencies towards 
disintegration within advanced capitalist society.  To be sure, Marcuse was not 
suggesting that liberation was likely or that society was even moving in a revolutionary 
direction.  He was merely arguing that the advanced industrial system of the early 1970s 
was not as stable as it once was, and thus there now existed some space for opposition.  
                                                          
363
 There were several factors for Marcuse’s analysis.  First, as mentioned earlier, the advanced industrial 
system made promises of gratification (self-worth) that it could not deliver.  Second, Marcuse began to 
argue that mental exploitation (e.g. the stultifying experience of working in a cubicle) was a source of 
unhappiness much the same as Marx had argued for physical exploitation of the proletariat.  Moreover, the 
overwhelming majority of the population were subjected to the rule of capital, thus losing control over the 
their labor and the means of production -- that is exploitation par excellence.  Third, the advanced industrial 
system demanded an “intellectualization of labor” which ‘accumulates an increasing quantity of general 
ability, skills, knowledge.”  (See Marcuse, “Reification of the Proletariat”, p. 21).  Put simply, Marcuse 
argued that a consciousness other than that demanded by the performance principle may emerge inasmuch 
as the masses realize the obsolescence of their own toil.  This analysis was greatly influenced by East 
German dissident Rudolf Bahro.  Both called it “surplus consciousness” and argued it was the product of 
expanded education, scientific and technical development, and improvements of the labor process.  Put 
another way, the advanced industrial system was demanding higher levels of intelligence to produce an 
increasing amount of waste, and that is quite noticeable.  At one point, Marcuse called it “intelligence in 
opposition.”  See Kellner, Crisis of Marxism, 307-313. 
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We must remember that this was in the context of the spectacular struggles of the Sixties 
that had realized, by the early 1970s that it was going to be a protracted and arduous 
struggle to renovate the existing society.  This is precisely what Marcuse meant by the 
term “long march.”  Certainly, Marcuse was rejecting the notion, common among 
orthodox Marxists and many revolutionaries, that revolution would be a quick 
“catastrophic upheaval.” 
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3.2 – DOMINATION 
The people that once bestowed commands, consulships, legions, and all else, now 
concerns itself no more, and longs eagerly for just two things: bread and circuses!" 
   
Juvenal, Satires (10), ca. AD 100 
The freedom of men is not achieved by the complacency of its ideological recognition, but 
by knowledge of the laws of their slavery. 
 
Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, 1971 
 
We know that the economic evolution of the contemporary world refutes a certain 
number of the postulates of Marx. If the revolution is to occur at the end of two parallel 
movements, the unlimited shrinking of capital and the unlimited expansion of the 
proletariat, it will not occur or ought not to have occurred. Capital and proletariat have 
both been equally unfaithful to Marx.  
 
Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, 1956        
 
The capabilities (intellectual and material) of contemporary society are immeasurably 
greater than ever before -- which means that the scope of society’s domination over the 
individual is immeasurably greater than ever before.  Our society distinguishes itself by 
conquering the centrifugal forces with Technology rather than Terror, on the dual basis 
of an overwhelming efficiency and an increasing standard of living. 
 
Herbert Marcuse, Introduction to the First Edition of One Dimensional Man, 1964 
 
 Throughout Marcuse’s project he insisted that there was still hope for the 
Enlightenment and its promise of liberation.  To that end, much of Marcuse’s writings are 
spent searching for a revolutionary subject, and thus  he continuously searched for 
contradictions and weaknesses within the advanced industrial system -- disintegrating 
tendencies -- out of which revolutionary action may arise.  To Marcuse, our unfreedom 
was rooted at the instinctual level, but it was to be a political and social struggle.  Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic -- in which the slave realizes he is the freer individual in that 
relationship because the master is dependent on his labor -- provided Marcuse the 
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philosophical rationalization for his insistence that the individual can become a 
revolutionary agent.  Marcuse was also very aware that the slave who realizes that it is he 
who is truly free, in a concrete sense, is still a slave.  We must remember, to Hegel, the 
enslavement is also psychological; i.e. the master needs the slave to think the master 
should be master.  Hence, to be free, the slave (like the master originally) needs to be 
willing to risk death rather than remain enslaved.  Thus, individuals still would need to 
act on their conscious desire for freedom.  The subsequent pages will discuss the factors 
within the current state of affairs that simultaneously prohibit our realization that we are 
in need of liberation, while also blocking any notions we may entertain, whether 
conscious or not, that we desire freedom.   
 Marcuse was ultimately concerned with how we can arrive at what he called 
“qualitative socialism,” -- a sort of humanistic and gratifying society (largely described in 
the preceding section) organized around a cooperative ethos, in which surplus repression 
is not necessary.  He was also convinced that the advanced industrial system was, in the 
final analysis, utterly unsustainable.  To be sure, it had fostered significant enhancements, 
but its irrationality -- its “construction through destruction” -- would lead to its own 
demise.  In Marcus’s view, the advanced industrial system has its own internal conflict 
between Eros and Thanatos, and in the end, the latter will win.  To Marcuse, the 
destruction of the advanced industrial system will not necessarily lead to “qualitative 
socialism” (and Marcuse sometimes suggested that the societal pendulum may swing the 
other way - fascism), thus necessitating a revolutionary agent.  Moreover, not only has 
the proletariat been “unfaithful to Marx,” (as mentioned above) but the homogenizing 
capabilities of the advanced industrial system, the ability of capital to integrate the 
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working class into its sphere and adapt to its own disintegrating tendencies, serves to 
threaten even the existence of revolutionary ideas. 
 Historically speaking, Marcuse was referring to major adjustments and responses by 
the advanced industrial system to its own emergencies.  These adaptations were efforts to 
either “soften” the rough edges of modern industry, or to save it from downright collapse.  
An example of the former would be the reformist response of the Progressive Era to both 
the “human waste” produced by the rise of big business, and the Progressives’ self-
anointed role as mediator between capital and labor.
364
  In this way, the Progressives, by 
and large, served to stabilize the system.  Put another way, to save it from its own rough 
edges.  A second example would be the New Deal, which more or less was a rebirth of 
the Progressives following World War I, in which the advanced industrial system was 
saved from collapse, in part, by creating a safety net for the masses.  A third example -- 
and this was the direct context in which Marcuse began his career in the United States -- 
would be the augmentation of production and consumption (coupled with the 
mainstreaming of unions) following World War II.
365
  Put simply, the postwar advanced 
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 See Shelton Stromquist, Re-inventing ‘The People” The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and 
the Origins of Modern Liberalism (Urbana and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).   To be sure, 
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discussion of this topic. 
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 The stabilization of the advanced industrial system due to this consumerist ethos is the context in which 
much of Marcuse’s thoughts on domination were written. 
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industrial system fostered a symbiotic relationship between our insatiable desire for the 
wares it produces, while also creating the ability to “deliver the goods.”   Finally, the 
ability of the advanced industrial system to absorb the dissent and dissatisfaction of the 
Sixties Era, to incorporate it into its own marketing and consumption ethos, and to alter 
its own demands to appear to match that of the counterculture and New Left, signify a 
remarkable response to perhaps the greatest qualitative challenge it has ever faced.
366
    
 In the shadow of these adaptations, Marcuse saw that the advanced industrial society, 
by the postwar era, had developed the ability to effectively dissolve the negations present 
within its structure and reduce individuals into acquiescence or complicity.   The result is 
an inauthentic and conformist society dominated by its own social system.  In such a 
situation, the subject cannot see past what “is” (i.e. the status quo).  That is to say, the 
individual cannot, or will not, perceive the potentialities (i.e. the “could be”) or potential 
negations within society.  This is what Marcuse means by the "one-dimensionality” of 
society.  Dialectical thinking presupposes that no society can reach a state of perfection, 
thus every society must necessarily be a "multi-dimensional" society” -- a society in 
which the “is” and the “could be” stand in conflict with each other.  It is that conflict, in 
Marcuse's view, which fosters change, or progress (in a good sense).  But in a “one-
dimensional” society such as the advanced industrial society, Marcuse argues, that 
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 I argue it may be the greatest challenge faced by the advanced industrial system because it was, at least 
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Cool (1998).  For a synthesis of these ideas see Ted Morgan’s What Really Happened to the 1960s. 
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second dimension -- the utopian dimension, or the potentialities -- is increasingly 
unimaginable.  Thus, a “one-dimensional” society is one in which a state of affairs tends 
greatly to conform to existing modes of thought and behavior, and there is a lack of 
critical thought capable of comprehending any alternatives and potentialities that could 
transcend the given society.  To be sure, Marcuse does not argue that this “one-
dimensionality” is totalizing -- that is, one that eliminates all contradictions, negations, 
opposition and individuality.  He tends to use the term “one-dimensionality,” applying 
the term as an adjective to describe deficient conditions within the current state of 
affairs.
367
  In short, “one-dimensional” describes a society where the subject (individual) 
is assimilated into the object (society) and thus tends to follow the dictates of the external 
world, thus losing ability to discern more liberating possibilities.  Conversely, a “multi-
dimensional” society presupposes antagonism between the subject and object, thus 
enabling the subject to perceive possibilities in the world that do not yet exist but can be 
achieved through human endeavor.  It is important to remember that, to Marcuse, one-
dimensionality was a tendency that was certainly intensifying, but it was not totalizing.   
 Before we can begin our discussion of the different categories of domination 
articulated by Marcuse, we need a general sense of how he used the concept.  Marcuse 
defines the term: 
 
Domination is in effect whenever the individual’s goals and purposes and the 
means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed.  Domination can be 
exercised by men, by nature, by things -- it can also be internal, exercised by the 
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individual on himself, and appear in the form of autonomy … the superego 
absorbs the authoritarian models … and makes their commands and prohibitions 
its own laws, the individual’s conscience.  Mastery of drives becomes the 
individual’s own accomplishment -- autonomy.368 
 
This is consistent with Marcuse’s argument that the second dimension (i.e. the 
potentialities) is increasingly hidden from view.  In this scenario, the individual has little 
to no recognition that his self-imposed prohibitions and renunciations are not internal in 
origin, but rather, an introjection of the external demands (i.e. the performance principle, 
surplus repression).  Domination, in this sense, is a society which comes to control and 
establish the individual on its own terms, taking both internal and external forms.   In 
Marcuse’s view, domination is a new and improved mode of social control, in which the 
individuals carry out prescribed patterns of thought and behavior.
 369 
 Thus, domination is 
present when human beings assimilate prescribed thoughts, values, and modes of 
behavior in which they conduct themselves mentally and physically in ways demanded 
by external powers and institutions.  In a very general sense, the category of surplus 
repression is synonymous with domination, but that does not help us understand how we 
come to be dominated.  To that end, the discussion will focus on several different types of 
domination. 
 One way of understanding domination as articulated by Marcuse is as a loss of 
authenticity.  We find ourselves returning to the idea of introjection of external demands 
and assimilation of prescribed thoughts and behavior.  Marcuse’s concept of authenticity 
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is rooted in Hegel’s concept of subject and object.  In Hegel’s framework, the subject has 
the power of reflection, freedom, knowledge, transcendence, and action.  The individual 
subject contains the power to objectify nature, that is, to appropriate it to meet a need.  
Hegel calls this “being-for-itself,” and it is a state of being conscious, or authentic -- that 
is, the subject can also form ideas, choose behavior, and create its own institutions.  
Essential to the idea of freedom and authenticity is the awareness of one’s own 
independence from the object.  That is to say, the individual maintains awareness that 
there is a tension between the subject and object - they are not one.  A “free” and 
“authentic” subject dominates the object, but if the object controls the subject, a condition 
of unfreedom exists.
370
  In Marcuse’s view, this is precisely the situation in a “one-
dimensional” society in which the object (society and the wares it produces) exercise a 
concerning level of control and domination over the subject (individual).  The tension 
between the subject and object, which would remain in a “multi-dimensional” society, 
appears to dissolve.  The subject assimilates into the object (e.g. car, television, computer 
brand), forfeits it powers of self-determination and ability to determine self-development.  
In Marcuse’s project, “one-dimensional” man is losing individuality and the ability to 
genuinely control one’s own purpose.  In such a scenario, “one-dimensional” man 
relinquishes freedom inasmuch as it does know its true needs because they are not its 
own, but are heteronomous.  The individual is thus unable to resist domination, nor to act 
autonomously because it quite literally identifies with normative behaviors and values.  
The subject has become an object of domination. 
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 A second way of understanding domination as articulated by Marcuse is domination-
as-technological-rationality.  It is important to note that Marcuse recognizes technology 
both as a contrivance used to mass produce goods, and as a social process which 
accelerates control and domination by the existing society over the individual.   In “Some 
Social Implications of Modern Technology,” Marcuse defines technology as: 
 
a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances 
which characterize the machine age and is thus at the same time a mode of 
organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of 
prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and 
domination.
371
 
 
Technology-as-contrivance appears as merely a means of material production enabling 
society to obtain basic needs, and (at least theoretically) in the promotion of a convenient 
and pleasurable existence.  Technology-as-social-process refers to the organization and 
utilization of the technological apparatus (which includes the social organization of our 
labor), as well as to the ways in which it influences our modes of knowledge, skills, 
behaviors, and values.  To be sure, the boundary between the two concepts of technology 
is blurry, but we can say that the latter was of much greater concern to Marcuse.  The 
concept of technology-as-social-process refers to the ways in which we have introjected 
the demands and values of our technological apparatus.  Marcuse refers to this as a 
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“technological rationality.”  In this way, Marcuse views technology under the advanced 
industrial system as a tool for social control and domination, for it tends to demand near 
total submission to the prevailing social order and which reduces the subject into 
corporeal machines that respond to the technical processes in life.  Life, more or less, 
becomes about the quantity of things, rather than the quality -- and we conflate the two. 
 Marcuse argues that technology is “value-neutral,” that is, neither good nor bad.  This 
“neutral” technology has a tendency to become either good or bad (liberating or 
dominating) in the way in which we apply it.  Marcuse writes: 
 
In the face of the totalitarian features of this society, the traditional notion of the 
“neutrality” of technology can no longer be maintained.  Technology as such 
cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; the technological society is a 
system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of 
techniques.
372
 
 
So the value of technology in the Marcusean framework is dependent upon, but cannot be 
separated from, the motive of the user, which in this scenario would be all of us.  To be 
sure, Marcuse argued that technology is dominating, in part, because it is organized by 
the administrators of this society to serve their own interests.  In that sense, technological 
rationality becomes a political rationality.  On the other hand, we must remember that 
Marcuse argued that even our “institutional fathers” have rules.  Marcuse writes: 
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The way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an initial 
choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the inherited 
level of the material and intellectual culture.  The choice itself results from the 
play of the dominant interests.  It anticipates specific modes of transforming and 
utilizing man and nature and rejects other modes.  It is one “project” of 
realization among others.
373
 
 
Marcuse is maintaining a dialectical view of historical change inasmuch as he claims that 
any society organizes itself by choosing among plausible alternatives.  He is also 
avoiding vulnerability to the criticism that he is an historical determinist, for the term 
“project” implies freedom of choice among historically determined options.  The vital 
point here is that we choose our societal framework.  Marcuse continues: 
 
As early as the pre-school level, gangs, radio, and television set the pattern for 
conformity and rebellion; deviations from the pattern are punished not so much 
within the family as outside the family.  The experts of the mass media transmit 
the required values; they offer the perfect training in efficiency, toughness, 
personality, dream, and romance.  With this education, the family can no longer 
compete.  In the struggle between the generations, the sides seem to be shifted: 
the son knows better; he represents the mature reality principle against its 
obsolescent paternal forms.  The father … [now] appears as a rather 
inappropriate target of aggression.  His authority as transmitter of wealth, skills, 
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experiences is greatly reduced; he has less to offer, and therefore less to prohibit 
… Still, the prohibitions continue to prevail, the repressive control of the 
instincts persists, and so does the aggressive impulse.  Who are the father-
substitutes against which it is primarily directed? … [The father has] disappeared 
behind the institutions.  With the rationalization of the productive apparatus, with 
the multiplication of functions, all domination assumes the form of 
administration.
374
 
 
Marcuse is suggesting that the way in which we have currently organized our society (i.e. 
the advanced industrial system) has, by invading the private sphere, deflated the authority 
and role of the family in the socialization process of children.  As such, the aggression 
that children formerly directed against their parental authority is now focused outside the 
family structure.  Unfortunately, to Marcuse we do now know who to hold responsible -- 
for a “world [that] tends to become the stuff of administration … [even] absorbs the 
administrators.”375  Indeed, Marcuse argues that “the masters, like the servants, submit to 
limitations on their instinctual gratification, on pleasure.”376  Alas, we perceive the 
current state of affairs as inevitable, thus we redirect those feelings of anger inwards, only 
to manifest as inexplicable feeling of guilt, shame, and anxiety. 
 The mode of production (i.e. technology) within the advanced industrial system has 
thus been successfully introjected by its subjects, creating what Marcuse called 
“technological rationality.”  For Marcuse, this concept refers primarily to the assigning of 
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intellectual and instinctual energy to the apparatus that tends to demand unconditional 
compliance.
377
  Marcuse writes: 
 
Everything cooperates to turn human instincts, desires and thoughts into 
channels that feed the apparatus. Dominant economic and social organizations 
“do not maintain their power by force… They do it by identifying themselves 
with the faiths and loyalties of the people,” and the people have been trained to 
identify their faiths and loyalties with them. The relationships among men are 
increasingly mediated by the machine process. But the mechanical contrivances 
which facilitate intercourse among individuals also intercept and absorb their 
libido, thereby diverting it from the all too dangerous realm in which the 
individual is free of society. The average man hardly cares for any living being 
with the intensity and persistence he shows for his automobile. The machine that 
is adored is no longer dead matter but becomes something like a human being. 
And it gives back to man what it possesses: the life of the social apparatus to 
which it belongs. Human behavior is outfitted with the rationality of the machine 
process, and this rationality has a definite social content. The machine process 
operates according to the laws of physical science, but it likewise operates 
according to the laws of mass production. Expediency in terms of technological 
reason is, at the same time, expediency in terms of profitable efficiency, and 
rationalization is, at the same time, monopolistic standardization and 
concentration. The more rationally the individual behaves and the more lovingly 
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he attends to his rationalized work, the more he succumbs to the frustrating 
aspects of this rationality … The machine process requires a “consistent training 
in the mechanical apprehension of things, and this training, in turn, promotes 
“conformity to the schedule of living,” a “degree of trained insight and a facile 
strategy in all manner of quantitative adjustments and adaptations…”  The 
“mechanics of conformity” spread from the technological to the social order; 
they govern performance not only in the factories and shops, but also in the 
offices, schools, assemblies and, finally, in the realm of relaxation and 
entertainment.
378
 
 
Put simply, technological rationality refers to the subordination of thoughts and behaviors 
to the “machine process” so that the individual no longer directs the machine, but rather 
is tending to be controlled by the machine.  In this scenario of introjection of the demands 
of technological rationality, reason has lost its true function because the thoughts, 
behaviors, and feeling are shaped by the technical requirements of the apparatus.  Thus, 
the “self” (psyche) has become a bundle of biological impulses, effectively transformed 
into one of mostly compliant adjustment to the process of production.  Marcuse writes: 
 
The idea of compliant efficiency perfectly illustrates the structure of 
technological rationality. Rationality is being transformed from a critical force 
into one of adjustment and compliance. Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in 
the same measure as the thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the 
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technical requirements of the apparatus which they have themselves created. 
Reason has found its resting place in the system of standardized control, 
production and consumption. There it reigns through the laws and mechanisms 
which insure the efficiency, expediency and coherence of this system.
379
 
 
 Under this technological rationality, there is no longer any mental or physical place 
for genuine thought -- and this is vital to Marcuse because the private realm of reflection 
is the source of critical thinking -- since the individual is only given (and is willing to 
receive) tasks to perform in synchronization with the dictates of the technological 
apparatus.  To Marcuse, this is largely done though the creation of false needs, and is 
linked to our insatiable consumer appetite.    It transforms social needs into those of the 
individual, thus fostering compliance, for there no longer seems to be any tension 
between subject and object.  In the end, we willingly comply because our needs match 
the needs of the technological apparatus. 
 Domination-as-technological-reality fosters another kind of social control, and it may 
be called domination-as-consumption.  As mentioned above, it is born out of our 
seemingly unending desire to consume (what the technological apparatus, more or less, 
wants us to want), which is thus born out of our false needs. In Marcuse’s view, through 
the application of technology and its concomitant mass consumption, individual subjects 
find exactly what is desired, that is, the prescribed need imposed on them by the 
technological apparatus (which appears, in this scenario, as the consumerist culture it 
creates).  To be sure, we choose which particular products to purchase (albeit from a 
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limited menu of options), thereby providing the sense of freedom, but we very often wind 
up purchasing things we do not need (and did not want).
380
  How does this happen?  To 
Marcuse, the system of mass production, mass dissemination, and mass consumption to 
suit the needs, or desires, of the multitudes (both those who can afford, and those who 
cannot) is completed through an aggressive onslaught of advertising.  Put another way, 
advertising persuades the masses to desire things they do not really need, thereby creating 
a harmonious relationship between mass production and mass consumption.  Scholars in 
various fields have suggested that advertising is persuasive precisely because it creates a 
void in one’s “self” -- a feeling of lack of fulfillment -- and promises that happiness will 
arrive with the purchase of the product.   This may be correct, but Marcuse drills down 
deeper into our psyche.    
 Particularly concerning to Marcuse is the reality that we know that our appetite for 
consumption is largely manipulated, yet we continue to comply with the demands.  Any 
thinking person may have taken note of the advice of President Bush following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 that we continue shopping lest the terrorists win; or the 
way in which many advertisements now satirize their own manipulative ways; yet we, for 
example, continue to measure the success of the holiday season in terms of sales 
numbers.  Thanksgiving provides us with an illuminating example.  It is during this 
holiday in which we are literally to gather as a family and be thankful for what we 
already have, that we are barraged with advertisements for “Black Friday.”381  Many 
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complain how the “shopping season” is invading Thanksgiving and indeed, many 
individuals who work in retail are forced to prematurely leave their families for the 
sanitized world of malls and big-box stores.
382
   Yet, many of us voluntarily follow our 
Thanksgiving dinner with hours of rushing from store to store.  We know we can live 
otherwise, but we want the best deals -- and the advanced industrial system delivers.  
This invasion of our private sphere -- to Marcuse, the realm of reflection and critical 
thought -- means our privacy no longer exists.  To be sure, Marcuse would be concerned 
with the eavesdropping of the United States National Security Agency, but would be 
horrified by the uber-expansion of the consumptive ethos into the private sphere -- that is, 
the expansion of the mall -- that is unique to our society in the internet age.  One does not 
need to leave the comfort of home to purchase a piece of pie or a peep show.   We can 
literally consume while in our boxers and attain a quality of life that is contingent on the 
(literal and existential) delivery capabilities of the advanced industrial system.  In this 
scenario, the qualitative has been dissolved into the quantitative.  From our point of view, 
the distinction no longer exists. This brings us another form of domination: domination-
as-manipulation-of-instincts. 
 Perhaps the primary way in which the advanced industrial system procures 
acceptance of surplus repression and compliance to its performance principle is through 
the manipulation of instincts.  That is to say, individuals eventually arrive to feel 
libidinally tied to the wares they consume.  Marcuse refers to this as repressive 
desublimation.  In this scenario, the polymorphous sexuality that was enjoyed as infants 
but is tabooed for adults is, via repressive desublimation, allowed to achieve a level of 
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gratification.  Thus, the demands of Eros appear to meet fewer taboos and “liberated” 
instincts wind up redirected toward socially permissible goals and activities.  This 
gratification, because it is towards productive goals rather than gratification for its own 
sake, does not truly benefit the individual.  This “liberation,” which appears to the 
individual as a libidinal gratification, in fact fosters greater subservience to the prevailing 
order.  In this scenario, we begin to find affirmations of life (i.e. eroticization) in 
inanimate objects such as cars, clothing, cell phones, and other items we consume.  
Domination exists within apparent liberation.  
 Gad Horowitz defines repressive desublimation as: “Marcuse’s formulation of the 
idea that erotic strivings which threaten to explode the structure of surplus repressive 
civilization are afforded partial satisfaction in distorted forms in order to sustain that very 
structure.”383   Horowitz argues that repressive desublimation allows sexual release but 
denounces as repressive: 
 
the “liberation” of a truncated sexual pleasure under the aegis of the authoritative 
media into a commodity for conspicuous consumption by atomized individuals.  
Repressive desublimation “liberates” sexuality on condition that psyche and 
body, love and sensuality, are separated, a separation inconceivable apart from 
surplus repression, the de-erotization of the body, reduction to mere body rather 
than the sensuous aspect of the psychosomatic person, the I.  Love as pure spirit, 
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sex as pure body, are opposite and complementary expressions of the same 
surplus-repressive reality principle.
384
 
 
In this scenario, Eros is reduced to a physical act.  Repressive desublimation reverses the 
process of sublimation described by Freud, and offers the immediate gratification of 
instinctual desires rather than their mediated or deferred gratification.  Whereas 
sublimation produces, for example, true works of art, repressive desublimation generates 
the pornography that offer only a hollow semblance of freedom and liberation. Horowitz 
refers to this as “palliatives for normal and neurotic discontent, mechanisms of escape 
from anxiety and guilt which persists in the unconscious.”385  Freud refers to them as 
“cheap enjoyments.”  In this way, the pleasure principle dissolves into the reality 
principle, and sexuality, for example, is ‘liberated’ through forms of atomized sexual 
activity that promote social cohesion and conformity. Put another, way, once again the 
subject perceives less tension between the internal (subject) and external (object).  We 
form a libidinal attachment to the wares produces by the advanced industrial system that 
appear to liberate, but actually serve to make us subservient to the apparatus precisely 
because it is delivering the goods.  For Marcuse, this is terrifying because forms of 
sexuality which should have a liberating dimension are actually transformed into a new 
form of social conformism.  Adorno and Horkheimer articulated the paradox as such: 
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“Everyone can be happy if only he will capitulate fully and sacrifice his claim 
happiness.”386 
 Another way of understanding this concept is to realize that we give over our personal 
sovereignty to the advanced industrial system in favor of vulgar material and physically 
sensual gratifications.  Marcuse reverses the usual usage of the term desublimation.  In 
the Freudian framework, desublimation refers to the absence of repression; that is, a free 
and unfettered gratification of desire.  It can be conceptualized as the pure and immediate 
satisfaction of an instinctual desire, and it is what our id demands.  Thus, to Freud, 
desublimation is a good thing inasmuch as it indicates pure satisfaction.  Unfortunately, 
for the sake of civilization, we need to forego this freedom and renounce our pure 
satisfactions in favor of socially acceptable and delayed gratifications.  By attaching the 
modifier “repressive” to it Marcuse challenges us to come to terms with the potentially 
oppressive effects of desublimation.  In his view, when the immediate material and 
physically sensual needs become the dominant concern of individuals, then the ideals of 
freedom and liberation have no chance.”387 
 We must remember that Marcuse first wrote of this term in One-Dimensional Man, 
and in the midst of what appeared to be the most democratic and wealthiest society in the 
world.  Where is the repression in a society in which the works of “Plato and Hegel, 
Shelley and Baudelaire, Marx and Freud in the drugstore?”388  Marcuse responds: 
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True, but coming to life as classics, they come to life as other than themselves; 
they are deprived of their antagonistic force, of the estrangement which was the 
very dimension of their truth.  The intent and function of these works have thus 
fundamentally changed.  If they once stood in contradiction to the status quo, this 
contradiction is now flattened out.
389
 
 
The subversive qualities of Plato, Marx, or Shelly are ignored because they appear to our 
intellect and consciousness to be from another age, and thus inapplicable to our current 
state of affairs.  Marcuse argues that we must not presume that the presence of rational 
texts coupled with a lack of rational opposition suggests that there is mass contentment 
and therefore no reason to think we are dominated.  To Marcuse, this confuses happiness 
with freedom.  By allowing, or even encouraging, certain forms of desublimation the 
advanced industrial system distracts our attention from the repressive character of the 
current state of affairs.  More alarming to Marcuse is the realization that we are less liable 
to respond to our domination precisely because Plato is in the drugstore.    The ubiquity 
of “Plato in the drugstore” actually serves to undermine taking a critical stand against the 
state of affairs because the fact of our “immediate contentment” precludes the possibility 
of taking Plato, or Marx, or Shelley seriously.  Christopher Pedersen uses the fictional 
character Babbit as an example: 
 
Consider, Babbit, on some strange whim, picks up and actually reads a copy of 
Plato's Republic - or better still, of the new anniversary edition of Marx's 
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Communist Manifesto. What does he conclude upon reading it?  Does he run off 
and join the local chapter of the communist Party?  Not a bit of it, for he is fat 
and happy.  On the whole, the logic of his wallet overcomes his rational 
judgment.  Maybe he even said to himself, at some moment or other, while 
reading, "yes, I see that: it's true," giving rational assent to the analysis there 
before him; or "yes, that would be nice," investing the image of an ideal society 
with the affirmation of his own desire.  But as he closes the book and returns 
fully to the comfortable envelope of his own world, these minor revelations 
vanish like a puff of smoke.  The immediate reality of his satisfaction and 
contentment (courtesy of bread and circuses) overwhelms his own capacity for 
rational judgment.  "These are pretty pipe dreams," he concludes; "but this is the 
best of all the worlds that are; so it must be the best of all possible worlds." 
390
 
 
 Perhaps the most alarming aspect of Marcuse’s concept of domination is that “one 
knows one can live otherwise,” yet we continue the performance. Marcuse writes: 
 
If the worker and his boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same 
resort places, if the typist is as attractively made up as the daughter of her 
employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then 
this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of classes, but the extent to 
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which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment 
are shared by the underlying population.
391
 
 
To Marcuse, our collective acquiescence has enabled our language, thoughts, science, 
politics, and philosophy to be reduced to an uncritical positivism.  To put it another way, 
the terms we use indicate the extent to which we cannot think critically.
392
  Thus, it is not 
surprising that our application of the term “critical thinking” is not really critical.393  Our 
philosophy tends to be a logic concerned with the “is,” rather than the “ought.”   Marcuse 
provides us with the hypothetical situation of purchasing an automobile that may serve as 
a summary of our domination: 
 
I ride in a new automobile.  I experience its beauty, shininess, power, 
convenience -- but then I become aware of the fact that in a relatively short time 
it will deteriorate and need repair; that its beauty and surface are cheap, its power 
unnecessary, its size idiotic; and that I will not find a parking place.  I come to 
think of my car as a product of one of the Big Three automobile corporations.  
The latter determine the appearance of my car and make its beauty as well as its 
cheapness, its power as well as its shakiness, its working as well as its 
obsolescence.  In a way, I feel cheated.  I believe that the car is not what it could 
be, that better cars could be made for less money.  But the other guy has to live, 
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too.  Wages and taxes are too high; turnover is necessary; we have it much better 
that before.  The tension between appearance and reality melts away and both 
merge in one rather pleasant feeling.
394
 
 
The individual winds up thinking, “Oh well, I suppose it has to be.”  After all, we need 
the wares produced by the advanced industrial system -- to Marcuse, it is compensation 
for our performance.   
 By way of summary, the culture industry and its acquisitive ethos has replaced brute 
force as the instrument of social control.  Marcuse argues that culture once existed within 
a potentially subversive aesthetic-erotic realm (i.e. by containing the desires and truths 
not realized in the existing society), but now is being dissolved into the one-dimensional 
society -- that is, culture has become a “culture industry” and is now “a cog in the culture 
machine.”  To Marcuse, it has become mass produced and commodified background 
music.  We are inundated with cheap reproductions that are intended to be consumed 
rather than experienced, thus a “flattening out of the antagonisms between cultural and 
social reality through the obliteration of the oppositional, alien, and transcendent 
elements in the higher culture by virtue of which it constitutes another dimension of 
reality.”395  Marcuse refers to this as the “conquest of the unhappy consciousness.”  He 
borrowed the term from Hegel, who argued that the “unhappy consciousness” of the 
individual is torn between “what could be” and its dissatisfaction with “what is.”396  In a 
flattened society, the “unhappy consciousness” finds its gratifications in consumption of 
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mass culture and a loosening of the sexual taboos.  Indeed, Marcuse pointed to the ability 
of the advanced industrial system to use sexuality to make us libidinaly dependent on the 
wares it produces as a devastating victory for social control because it effectively 
flattened what Marcuse believed to be the most explosive and subversive contradiction -- 
that is, our aesthetic-erotic impulses.
397
  In the end, we are content to accept our 
domination, even though we may know we can live otherwise.  In the words of Marcuse: 
 
Just as people know or feel that advertisements and political platforms must not 
be necessarily true of right, and yet hear and read them and even let themselves 
be guided by them, so they accept the traditional values and make them part of 
their mental equipment.  It mass communications blend together harmoniously, 
and often unnoticeably, art, politics, religion, and philosophy with commercials, 
they bring these realms of culture to their common denominator -- the 
commodity form.  The music of the soul is also the music of salesmanship.  
Exchange value, not truth value counts.
398
 
  
 It is difficult to overstate the terrifying nature of Marcuse’s description of domination.  
In a society in which one-dimensional thought is so ubiquitous, domination -- which will 
eventually lead to our destruction -- appears to be entirely rational and inevitable.  
Marcuse called this the “irrationality of the whole,” and often described the destructive 
tendencies of the advanced industrial system as “construction though destruction,” which 
is a catch-all phrase that refers to such things as the overuse of the natural environment, 
                                                          
397
 See section of Liberation for a discussion on the importance of sexuality (i.e. Eros) in Marcuse’s project. 
398
 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 57. 
 184 
global military buildup and its concomitant threat of nuclear holocaust and perpetual 
warfare, and an unnecessary level of demanded renunciation of human gratification 
within a society organized around the profit motive (which considers human happiness a 
by-product as opposed to a central component).  On the whole, Marcuse was referring to 
the tendency of society to increase repression rather than moving towards greater 
freedom.  To Marcuse, this tendency towards ever-increasing repression is irrational in 
the face of the “conquest of scarcity,” and will probably lead to the eventual destruction 
of our society.  In Marcuse’s view, inasmuch as the advanced industrial system contains 
the seeds of its own eventual demise, it is saddled with the same conflict as humans -- i.e. 
between Eros and Thanatos.  This suggests modern advanced industrial society has its 
own death drive, and, to Marcuse, it was winning.  Even in the face of these odds, 
Marcuse dedicated his life to the proposition that things can change.  This sentiment can 
be encapsulated by a single statement that he borrowed from Ernst Bloch -- “that which is 
cannot be true.”399 
 Marcuse thought Bloch’s words were powerful enough to close a chapter (and begin 
the next) in his seminal work One-Dimensional Man.  Marcuse paired this quote with the 
Hegelian phrase “what is real is rational,”400 which together are intended to argue that 
society ought to move toward greater freedom (what is rational), even though ultimate 
freedom can never be achieved.  To elaborate, even though dialectical theory insists that 
the negation is always present, and thus, no society can ever be perfect, we must attempt 
to move in a rational direction.
401
  Marcuse described rational movement as follows: 
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(1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real possibilities open at 
the attained level of the material and intellectual culture. 
(2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the established totality, must 
demonstrate its own higher rationality in the threefold sense that 
(a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the productive 
achievements of civilization; 
(b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic tendencies, 
and relations; 
(c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of existence, 
within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance for 
the free development of human needs and faculties.
402
 
 
To Marcuse, this “greater chance for the pacification of existence” is precisely where we 
find his claim that we ought to move towards greater freedom (and thus, rationality).  
Marcuse was aware that this involved a value judgment, and embraced this notion.  In 
Marcuse’s words: “I believe that the very concept of Reason originates in this value 
judgment, and that the concept of truth cannot be divorced from the value of Reason.”403  
There is, or ought to be, a dialectical movement towards greater rationality, and thus we 
ought to refuse to continue to exist and to be moved in the opposite direction. 
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3.3 – THE GREAT REFUSAL 
Believe me, for certain men at least, not taking what one doesn't desire is the hardest 
thing in the world.   
 
Albert Camus, The Fall, 1956 
 
A living man can be enslaved and reduced to the historic condition of an object. But if he 
dies in refusing to be enslaved, he reaffirms the existence of another kind of human 
nature which refuses to be classified as an object. 
 
Albert Camus, The Failing of Prophecy, 1966 
 
There is only one difference between a madman and me. I am not mad.  And adds: "There 
is more to the nightmarish world than people think." 
 
Salvador Dali, The American Magazine, 1956 
 
[The] alternative is not so much a different road to socialism as an emergence of 
different goals and values, different aspirations in the men and women who resist and 
deny the massive exploitative power of corporate capitalism even in its most comfortable 
and liberal realizations.  The Great Refusal takes a variety of forms. 
 
Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, 1969 
 
 Marcuse believed that there was a “hidden trend in psychoanalysis” which reveals 
aspects of human nature that oppose, or refuse, the dominance of labor and instinctual 
renunciation.  In the context of Marcuse’s project, that would be a natural refusal of the 
performance principle.  To be sure, Marcuse conceived of this as part of Eros (our life 
affirming drive), and as a biological opposition to surplus repression -- that is, repression 
above the level necessary for civilization to exist.  He argued that Freud’s drive theory 
discloses that we, in part, instinctually strive for a condition in which freedom and 
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happiness converge -- a society in which we may achieve libidinal gratification.  To 
Marcuse, Freud’s drive theory “upholds the tabooed aspirations of humanity: the claim 
for a state where freedom and necessity coincide.”404  In such a society, the conflict 
between the individual and external world would be reduced precisely because both 
wanted the same thing -- human gratification.  Marcuse called this the “pacification of 
existence.”   This type of society would necessarily be structured around a logic of 
gratification inasmuch as it allows the” free play of human faculties.”405  Marcuse 
referred to this mostly untapped characteristic of Eros as The Great Refusal.   
 As Marcuse stated in the epigraph, the Great Refusal manifests itself in a variety of 
ways, and we will discuss those realms of opposition below, but, at least initially, needs 
to be described in a general sense.  Marcuse initially defined it as a “refusal to play the 
game of the affluents,” but we find that description lacking because even the “affluents” 
are not really free.  Marcuse elaborates by describing the Great Refusal as a “defense of 
life,” that is “the refusal to speak the dead language of affluence, to wear the clean 
clothes, to enjoy gadgets of affluence, to go through the education for affluence.”406  By 
moving from a concrete noun (“affluents”) to an abstract noun (“affluence”) Marcuse 
broadens the notion of refusal to target not just individuals, but the entire advanced 
industrial system.  To be sure, Marcuse argues that our current state affairs appear as 
inevitable and completely rational, “to the point where even individual protest is affected 
at its roots.  The intellectual and emotional refusal ‘to go along’ appears neurotic and 
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impotent.”407  Indeed, we must remember that Marcuse, being a dialectical thinker, 
demands that we differentiate between existence (appearance, the “is”) and essence 
(reality, the “can be”).  That is to say, we must become mindful of the potentialities.  But 
can we refuse?  Marcuse writes: 
 
Today, in the prosperous warfare and welfare state, the human qualities of a 
pacified existence seem asocial and unpatriotic -- qualities such as the refusal of 
all toughness, togetherness, and brutality; disobedience to the tyranny of the 
majority; profession of fear and weakness (the most rational reaction to this 
society!); a sensitive intelligence sickened by that which is being perpetrated; the 
commitment to the feeble and ridiculed actions of protest and refusal.  These 
expressions of humanity, too, will be marred by necessary compromise -- by the 
need to cover oneself, to be capable of cheating the cheaters, and to live and 
think in spite of them.
408
 
 
Indeed, Marcuse described it as “only a chance,” and the odds are not good.   
 In Marcuse’s view, the existence of any type of individual and collective Great 
Refusal presupposes a radical change in consciousness that would mean a refusal of the 
false needs that keep us bound to the advanced industrial system.  Put simply, this would 
mean different ways of perceiving and experiencing the world (internal and external).  
Marcuse referred to this as a New Sensibility -- a fusion of intellect and reason.  Marcuse 
borrows heavily from Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which Marcuse 
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perceives to be among the most radically socialist of Marx’s writings.  As Marx argued, it 
is in the “emancipation of all human senses” we can transcend private property.  Marcuse 
points out that this implies the emergence of a new type of subject, different from the 
capitalist subject, giving rise to improved relations between man and man, man and 
things, and man and nature.
409
  Consequently, a new sensibility would provide not only a 
perception of the given, but simultaneously through its own "practice" the means for 
discovering "new (more gratifying) possibilities and capabilities.”410  The emancipated 
senses would repel the rationality of the destructive logic of capitalism while preserving 
and developing themselves and nature.  This would be achieved in two ways: (1) 
negatively – the Ego, the other, and the object world would no longer be experienced in 
the context of acquisition, competition, and defensive possession; and (2) positively – 
through the transformation of nature into an environment for the human being as “species 
being”; free to develop their creative and aesthetic abilities -- to consistently behave in a 
life affirming way.
411
   This emancipation of the senses would make freedom “a sensuous 
need, an objective of the Life Instincts.
412
 Indeed, Marcuse argued that our true interests 
are: 
 
not hard to identify, and the war against them does not require missiles, bombs, 
and napalm.  But it does require something that is much harder to produce -- the 
spread of uncensored and unmanipulated knowledge, consciousness, and above 
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all, the organized refusal to continue to work on the material and intellectual 
instruments which are now being used against man.
413
 
 
The “organized refusal’ evokes a level of collective action and praxis (action), and 
notions of “the Long March,” which Marcuse used to refer to the long, painstaking 
process of refusal.  On a similar note, Marcuse argued: 
 
Critical analysis must dissociate itself from that which it strives to comprehend; 
the philosophic terms must be other than the ordinary ones in order to elucidate 
the full meaning of the latter.  For the established universe of discourse bears 
throughout the marks of the specific modes of domination, organization, and 
manipulation to which the members of a society are subjected.  People depend 
for their  living on bosses and politicians and jobs and neighbors who make them 
speak and mean as they do; they are compelled, by societal necessity, to identify 
the “thing” with its functions.414 
 
Marcuse is arguing that we cannot negate the existing society using the same mutilated 
thoughts and language that serve to hide its contradictions.
415
  Marcuse writes: 
 
In contrast, a philosophy that does not work as the handmaiden of repression 
responds to the fact of death with the Great Refusal … death can become a token 
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of freedom.  The necessity of death does not refute the possibility of final 
liberation.  Like the other necessities, it can be made rational -- painless.  Men 
can die without anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery 
and oblivion.  After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves to die -- at a 
moment of their own choosing.
416
 
 
Put simply, to live and die in happiness presupposes a refusal “to be classified as an 
object.” 
 Marcuse’s search for a revolutionary agent changed with the historical circumstances, 
but, on the whole, he argued that any revolution -- that is, genuine collective refusal -- 
needs to begin with a coalition of three groups.  First, a radical intelligentsia needed to 
emerge from within the ranks of privilege.  To be sure, this helps us understand 
Marcuse’s affinity for the New Left and counterculture.  Moreover, he viewed such a 
group as vital precisely because it was a potential negation from within the system, and 
this helps us comprehend the reasons Marcuse was (constructively) critical of the various 
movements of the Sixties.  This group had (and has) the potential to provide a devastating 
critique of the advanced industrial society precisely because they have access to 
privilege, and are choosing to reject it on purely qualitative grounds.
417
  Marcuse also 
never dropped his belief that the working class was a necessary component to any radical 
movement.  Indeed, Marcuse expanded his notion of the exploited class to include white 
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collar workers (a sort of mental exploitation) and perceived them as perhaps the key 
factor in any contemporary revolutionary movement.  At the same time, in Marcuse’s 
view, this group was perhaps the most one-dimensional.  Finally, the struggles of the 
“wretched of the Earth” -- that is, those who are not among the privileged -- are a third 
realm of possible negation.  These types of movements, to be found among various Third 
World nations and the Civil Rights and Black Nationalism movements, were radical by 
virtue of their very status as “others,” that is, as individuals not integrated into the 
advanced industrial society.  Marcuse argued that a radical coalition among these three 
types of groups may lead to qualitative social change: “The chance is that, in this period, 
the historical extremes may meet again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity 
and its most exploited force.  It is nothing but a chance.”418  Putting aside the pessimism 
of such a statement, the implication is that, for the first two groups, this will require a 
radical change in consciousness that occurs initially on the individual level.
419
  
 In Marcuse’s view, the Great Refusal begins within the individual.  Douglass Kellner 
argues that behind the Great Refusal is the notion of radical individualism.  He describes 
it as an “individualistic revolt,” or as a “stoical and defiant individualism.”  Kellner 
writes: 
 
It is the notion of individualistic refusal and revolt that characterizes Marcuse’s 
political conception in One-Dimensional Man rather than … concepts of mutual 
aid, revolutionary mass upheaval or collective self-government … in my view 
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his emphasis on an individual revolt and self-transformation constitute a vital 
component of his revolutionary theory which maintains that there can be no 
meaningful talk about social change unless the individuals themselves are 
liberated from capitalist needs and consciousness and possess “radical needs” for 
thoroughgoing social change.   
 
Kellner correctly argues that liberation must become a need in the consciousness of the 
individual (and false needs must be rejected) prior to any movement to attain liberation, 
but stops short of elucidating the entire concept.  To be sure, Marcuse was pushing back 
against the orthodox (and positivistic) Marxian notion of proletarian revolution in an era 
when only bureaucratic socialism (i.e. Soviet Style -- which was also one-dimensional) 
was opposing capitalism.
420
  Yet still, Kellner’s description, perhaps inadvertently, seems 
to render the notion of the Great Refusal vulnerable to criticisms that it is highbrow 
narcissism.
421
  We must remember Marcuse’s notion of a “radical act” as both a change 
in consciousness within the individual and a desire to change the status quo.  Indeed, 
Marcuse was aware of this vulnerability and responded: 
 
The striking paradox that narcissism, usually understood as egotistic withdrawal 
from reality, here is connected with oneness with the universe, reveals the new 
depth of the conception: beyond all immature autoeroticism, narcissism denotes 
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a fundamental relatedness to reality which may generate a comprehensive 
existential order.  In other words, narcissism may contain the germ of a different 
reality principle: the libidinal cathexis of the ego (one’s own body) may become 
the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the objective world -- 
transforming this world into a new mode of being.
422
 
 
To Marcuse, there is no radical act without concern for the external world, and to desire 
liberation for one self, is to realize that it is contingent on the liberation of others.
423
  
Indeed, Marcuse argues that “Narcissistic images are those of the Great Refusal” 
inasmuch as the ego is extended to the object (i.e. external world, society) and thus, the 
self aims at a harmonious relationship between the internal and external.  Marcuse refers 
to this as a “non-repressive mode of sublimation” that begins as narcissism and 
“somehow overflows and extends to its objects.”424  Marcuse concludes that the Great 
Refusal is not simply to refuse social performance or: 
 
by dropping out and living one’s own style of life.  To be sure, no revolution 
without individual liberation, but also no individual liberation without the 
liberation of society … The tension between the personal and social reality 
persists … This means that, from the beginning, the personal and particular 
liberation, refusal, withdrawal, must proceed within the political context, defined 
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by the situation in which the radical opposition finds itself, and must continue, in 
theory and practice, the radical critique of the Establishment; in other words, the 
individual liberation (refusal) must incorporate the universal in the particular 
protest, and the images and values of a future free society must appear in the 
personal relationships within the unfree society.
425
 
 
In other words, our individual liberation is illusory if it does not create a social reality in 
which that freedom can exist.  In Marcuse’s view, the advanced industrial society has 
invaded every sphere of our existence.  Thus, it is virtually impossible to live within our 
own bubble of individual liberation without a “return to the forest” and risking the same 
limitations on our happiness as that of the primitive man.  Individual liberation is 
contingent on the creation of a society structured around a logic of gratification, making 
the liberation of others a necessary component.  Marcuse has provided concretion to 
Sartre’s abstract statement: “In choosing, I choose for all people.”426   Moreover, this line 
of thought reveals another layer of the Great Refusal -- that is, to create the necessary 
conditions requires one (and others) to refuse in the political realm.   
 Marcuse argued that only through radical political refusal can society hope to achieve 
a qualitative social change.  The Great Refusal would necessitate an ability to see past the 
violent and exploitative status quo, and would require a demand for new political 
structures that would enable individuals to realize their freedom.  Marcuse referred to this 
as a determinate negation, that is, an alteration of the status quo that remains dialectical 
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(i.e. contains elements of the old) but is radical enough to be considered a “break” with 
the existing society.  Marcuse writes: 
 
For the world of human freedom cannot be built by the established societies, no 
matter how much they may streamline and rationalize their dominion.  Their 
class structure, and the perfected controls required to sustain it, generate needs, 
satisfactions, and values which reproduce the servitude of the human existence.  
This “voluntary” servitude (voluntary inasmuch as it is introjected into the 
individuals), which justifies the benevolent masters, can be broken through a 
political practice which reaches the roots of containment and contentment in the 
infrastructure of man, a political practice of methodical disengagement from and 
refusal of the Establishment, aiming at a radical transvaluation of values.  Such a 
practice involves a break with the familiar, the routine ways of seeing, feeling, 
understanding things so that the organism may become receptive to the potential 
forms of a nonaggressive, nonexploitative world.
427
 
 
Marcuse is describing the political arena as the concrete manifestation of the liberated 
consciousness.  It is in the political realm where theory becomes praxis -- that is, the 
abstract becomes concrete. Put another way, the political arena is the space in which the 
liberated individual, working with others, can work to create a society around a logic of 
gratification.  To work toward this goal presupposes a liberated consciousness that would 
refuse both the introjected values and false needs of the advanced industrial system and 
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refuse to be appeased by surface reforms.  To be sure, Marcuse is not arguing that we 
“drop out” of the political arena, but rather is advocating a more active state of radical 
political opposition.  It is in that sense Marcuse is advocating a “methodical 
disengagement” from the political status quo.  Marcuse often argued that those who are in 
opposition to the existing society must present some sort of vision for future 
development, and the realm of politics is precisely where liberated individuals can begin 
to imagine and create new societal institutions.  Indeed, Marcuse argued that the Great 
Refusal, in the final analysis, “is not a matter of psychology or ethics but of politics … 
the practice in which the basic societal institutions are developed, defined, sustained, and 
changed.”428 
 Marcuse used a broad conception of the political realm, often arguing that 
“intellectual skills and capabilities [have] become political factors.”429   He is arguing that 
our intellect and skills have been co-opted by the advanced industrial system to such an 
extent that to assert personal autonomy (via intelligence and skill) would be a political 
act.   Consequently, Marcuse conceives of an intellectual refusal as a component of the 
political refusal (and thus, the Great Refusal).   Broadly speaking, an intellectual refusal 
would mean an unwillingness to continue viewing the external world through the prism 
of positivism.  For example, Marcuse calls for scholars and professionals of various types 
(e.g. scientists, mathematicians, engineers) to reject their façade of scientific neutrality.  
Marcuse writes: 
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the scientific approach to the vexing problem of mutual annihilation -- the 
mathematicians and calculations of kill and over-kill, the measurement of 
spreading or not-quite-so spreading fallout, the experiments of endurance in 
abnormal situations -- is mystifying to the extent to which it promotes (and even 
demands) behavior which accepts the insanity.  It thus counteracts a truly 
rational behavior -- namely, the refusal to go along, and the effort to do away 
with the conditions which produce the insanity.
430
 
 
In Marcuse’s view, scholars within the advanced industrial system, in their empirical zeal 
to understand the “is,” tend to obfuscate the perception of the possible alternatives (i.e. 
the “could be,” or the “ought), thereby perpetuating one-dimensionality.  For example, 
planning a war using mathematical probabilities and quantitative analysis (as in the 
Vietnam War), tends to create a false dichotomy in which the only options seem to be to 
accept greater or lesser death.
431
  Moreover, this tends to make a rejection of the 
“insanity” to appear as the irrational act.  Marcuse continues: 
 
Against this new mystification, which turns rationality into its opposite, the 
distinction must be upheld.  The rational is not irrational, and the difference 
between an exact recognition and analysis of the facts, and a vague and 
emotional speculation is as essential as before.  The trouble is that the statistics, 
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measurements, and field studies of empirical sociology and political science are 
not rational enough.  They become mystifying to the extent to which they are 
isolated from the truly concrete context which makes the facts and determines 
the function.
432
 
 
Marcuse refers to this “truly concrete context” as the “meta-context” of society.  This is 
to point out that the context of any scholarly analysis (or, for that matter, any observation 
of the existing society) is more than the immediate conditions being studied (e.g. a 
factory being analyzed).  In Marcuse’s view, one cannot separate the immediate 
conditions from the wider societal and historical context that determine their function.   
To Marcuse, this “meta-analysis” must be “capable of identifying the structure that holds 
together the parts and processes of society that determines their interrelation.”433 Put 
simply, this wider context is the reality, and the “analysis can overcome it only by 
recognizing it and by comprehending its scope and its causes.”434 
 In Marcuse’s view, an intellectual refusal would mean a “refusal to cooperate … 
[among] the scientists, mathematicians, technicians, industrial psychologists and public 
opinion pollsters.”435  He argued that advancements in science and technology make it 
possible for technicians to begin assigning a purpose to their intellectual endeavors.  
Marcuse referred to this as “final causes.”  In Marcuse’s view, the flip side of dropping 
the façade of neutrality is to realize that scientific and technical knowledge can be guided 
by a goal -- that of organizing a society around a logic of gratification rather than a 
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twisted logic of mutually assured destruction.  Marcuse is arguing that formerly “neutral” 
scholars need to refuse to be bound by the intellectual norms of positivism, and must 
become political.  He writes: 
 
Industrial civilization has reached the point where, with respect to the aspirations 
of man for a human existence, the scientific abstraction from final causes 
becomes obsolete in science’s own terms.  Science itself has rendered it possible 
to make final causes the proper domain of science.
436
 
 
To be sure, Marcuse conceives of “science” as an intellectual endeavor that utilizes the 
scientific method and thus remains mired in the faux neutrality of positivism.  
Conversely, he advocates a “metaphysical” conception of science in which a purpose is 
assigned to both practitioner and the process.  Marcuse continues: 
 
“neutral” scientific method and technology become the science and technology 
of a historical phase which is being surpassed by its own achievements -- which 
has reached its determinate negation.  Instead of being separated from science 
and scientific method …formerly metaphysical ideas of liberation may become 
the proper object of science.  But this development confronts science with the 
unpleasant task of becoming political -- of recognizing scientific consciousness 
as political consciousness, and the scientific enterprise as political enterprise.  
For the transformation of values into needs, of final causes into technical 
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possibilities is a new stage in the conquest of oppressive, unmastered forces in 
society as well as in nature.  It is an act of liberation.
437
 
  
In this way, to take control over the purpose of science and technology is an act of the 
Great Refusal.  Indeed, Marcuse argued that the rebellion “will have become a political 
force only when it is accompanied by the rebellion of reason: the absolute refusal of the 
intellect (and the intelligentsia) to lend their support to the Establishment, and the 
mobilization of the power of … reason for the work of change.”438 
 Marcuse then asks several vital questions:  “how can the administered individuals -- 
who have made their mutilation into their own liberties and satisfactions, and thus 
reproduce it on an enlarged scale -- liberate themselves from themselves as well as from 
their masters?  How is it even thinkable that the vicious cycle be broken?”439  Marcuse is 
not optimistic, but provides a possible answer by asking additional questions.  He writes: 
 
What is now at stake are the needs themselves.  At this stage, the question is no 
longer: how can the individual satisfy his own needs without hurting others, but 
rather: how can he satisfy his needs without hurting himself, without 
reproducing, through his aspirations and satisfactions, his dependence on an 
exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his needs, perpetuates his 
servitude?
440
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The desire to refuse, or break “the vicious cycle” involves a rejection of the false needs 
created by and for the individual, and by framing the question in terms of a refusal to 
continue hurting one self, Marcuse places the desire to refuse squarely on the instinctual, 
or biological level.  Marcuse writes: 
 
Such a change would constitute the instinctual basis for freedom which the long 
history of class society has blocked.  Freedom would become the environment of 
an organism which is no longer capable of adapting to the competitive 
performances required for well-being under domination, no longer capable of 
tolerating the aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness of the established way of 
life.  The rebellion would then have taken root in the very nature, the “biology” 
of the individual; and on these new grounds, the rebels would redefine the 
objectives and the strategy of the political struggle, in which along the concrete 
goals of liberation can be determined.
441
 
 
Once again Marcuse argues that such a change is made possible by the technical progress 
of the advanced industrial system that “has reached a stage in which reality no longer 
need be defined by the debilitating competition for social survival and advancement.”442  
Marcuse refers to this instinctual refusal of unfreedom as a “second nature” that would 
reject aggressiveness, violence, and the painful performance required by the advanced 
industrial system.  Additionally, this instinctual opposition to the performance principle 
would foster solidarity among individuals (formerly atomized by the demands of the 
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existing society) that may lead to praxis.  In brief, the individual would introject a new set 
of values that run counter to those expected by the existing state of affairs.  In Marcuse’s 
view, in this scenario: 
 
The organism receives and reacts to certain stimuli and “ignores” and repels 
others in accord with the introjected morality … In this way, a society constantly 
re-creates, this side of consciousness and ideology, patterns of behavior and 
aspiration as part of the “nature” of its people, and unless the revolt reaches into 
this “second” nature, into these ingrown patterns, social change will remain 
“incomplete,” even self-defeating. 
 
Marcuse is suggesting that any particular society introjects its values and norms into its 
subjects, thus reaching into their “second nature,” that is, their instincts.  As such, in 
Marcuse’s view, any meaningful opposition to the status quo must be accompanied by an 
instinctual refusal of the demands (and false needs) of the advanced industrial system.  
Marcuse continues: 
 
The so-called consumer economy and the politics of corporate capitalism have 
created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the 
commodity form.  The need for possessing, consuming, handling, and constantly 
renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines, offered to and imposed 
upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one’s own 
destruction, has become a “biological” need in the sense just defined.  The 
 204 
second nature of man thus militates against any change that would disrupt and 
perhaps even abolish this dependence of man on a market ever more densely 
filled with merchandise -- abolish his existence as a consumer consuming 
himself in buying and selling.
443
 
 
Marcuse argued that the Great Refusal needs to reach into our “second nature” precisely 
because it is where we have introjected the values and norms of the advanced industrial 
system to the extent that they have become organic, biological needs.  To be sure, 
Marcuse positioned his argument as a corrective to orthodox Marxism.  He continues: 
 
It follows that the radical change which is to transform the existing society into a 
free society must reach into a dimension of the human existence hardly 
considered in Marxian theory -- the “biological” dimension in which the vital, 
imperative needs and satisfactions of man assert themselves.  Inasmuch as these 
needs and satisfactions reproduce a life in servitude, liberation presupposes 
changes in this biological dimension, that is to say, different instinctual needs, 
different reactions of the body as well as the mind.
444
 
 
It is in this way that the need to refuse becomes a biological need.  Marcuse describes the 
Great Refusal of the rebels as a political, moral, and instinctual rebellion and attempts to 
give us some insight of the refusal through the eyes of the rebels: 
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the entire sphere and atmosphere [of the existing society], with all its power, is 
invalidated; nothing that any of these politicians, representatives, or candidates 
declares is of any relevance to the rebels; they cannot take it seriously although 
they know very well that it may mean to them getting beaten, going to jail, losing 
a job.  They are not professional martyrs: they prefer not to be beaten, not to go 
to jail, not to lose their job.  But for them, this is not a question of choice; the 
protest and refusal are parts of their metabolism.
445
 
 
In short, if our “second nature” -- our instincts -- desire liberation, the Great Refusal is 
not a matter of choice, but of necessity.   
 Marcuse also argued that the Great Refusal can be found in the aesthetic dimension.  
In Marcuse’s view, the perception (or experience) of beauty is “sensuous rather than 
conceptual.”446  In Marcuse’s words, “the aesthetic perception is essentially intuition, not 
notion.”447  He also asserts that beauty evokes memories of “the realm of freedom.”448   
Beauty, at least potentially, arouses our individual memories of happiness (i.e. infancy, 
childhood), which can be sensual, and our collective memory of our archaic past in which 
there was a greater instinctual freedom (i.e. our primitive and ancient past).  Marcuse 
concedes that the claim that beauty symbolizes freedom is a “strange analogy.”  Thus, to 
enhance our understanding of this concept, we need discuss the process by which 
Marcuse believed one should experience art.   
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 Marcuse posits that authentic art depicts “the reconciliation of man and nature … 
where order is beauty and work is play.”449  It is important to remember that is how 
Marcuse described a society organized around a logic of gratification -- that is, one in 
which the individual is in harmony with the external reality (reality principle).  Put 
another way, beauty is a symbolic representation of liberation that is capable of reaching 
into our “second nature” via our intellect and our senses -- that is, our intuition.   
 The individual experience of the aesthetic is accompanied by feelings of pleasure.  
This pleasure derives from the perception of the aesthetic form (e.g. a beautiful song, 
perfectly painted bowl of fruit).  To be sure, Marcuse argues that art is only authentic if 
the form is such that the beauty of the object is perceived by “any perceiving subject.”  
Marcuse writes: 
 
An object represented in its pure form is “beautiful.”  Such representation is the 
work (or rather the play) of imagination.  As imagination, the aesthetic 
perception is both sensuousness and at the same time more than sensuousness: it 
gives pleasure and is therefore essentially subjective; but in so far as this 
pleasure is constituted by the pure form of the object itself, it accompanies the 
aesthetic perception universally and necessarily.
450
 
 
Marcuse uses Kant’s theory of aesthetics inasmuch as he argues that an object is 
authentic art to the extent that the form is beautiful, and the object exhibits 
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“purposiveness without purpose.”  Marcuse writes (and this is how he believes one 
should experience art): 
 
Whatever the object may be (thing or flower, animal or man), it is represented 
and judged not in terms of its usefulness, not according to any purpose it may 
possible serve, and also not in view of its “internal” finality and completeness.  
In the aesthetic imagination, the object is rather represented as free from all such 
relations and properties, as freely being itself.  The experience in which the 
object is thus “given” is totally different from the every-day as well as scientific 
experience … This experience, which releases the object into its “free” being, is 
the work of the free play of imagination … Its “pure form” suggests … an accord 
of movements and relations which operates under its own laws -- the pure 
manifestation of its “being-there,” its existence.451   
 
A work of authentic art, to Marcuse, is a perfect snapshot of the here and now -- of being, 
and yet, still of becoming.  In authentic art, there is no tension between what something is 
and what it can be in the object being experienced; and yet, this artistic experience needs 
to cause the human subject to question why the rest of reality can not be this way and 
attempt to change reality so that increasing amounts of it become what ought to be.  
Imagine a painting of a flower -- there is no purpose for the painting (i.e. it is not real, 
thus not in the process of, or movement towards dying) other than for visual pleasure.  To 
Marcuse, the pleasure is intended to be felt -- perceived by a third realm located between 
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intellect and sensuousness.  We may remember Marcuse arguing that the fusion of these 
two seeming opposites is requisite for a new and radical sensibility.  In Marcuse’s view, 
authentic art is not only the aesthetic manifestation of fantasy and imagination (both of 
which make a demand for liberation), but also of a harmonious relationship between man 
and nature, and thus, of another reality.  Put simply, to witness beauty in an aesthetically 
pleasing form is to be reminded that there is another reality that is possible.  The subject 
experiencing the aesthetic is transported to the “music of another reality.”  That is another 
“strange” claim and is thus in need of explanation. 
 To Marcuse, authentic art refuses to submit to the “limitations imposed upon freedom 
and unhappiness by the [current] reality principle,” that is, the current state of affairs.452  
True art is, in the final analysis, classless and timeless precisely because its sublime 
depiction of the particular (e.g. a song, an image) reveals a universal truth -- that is, it 
imagines a “reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of 
happiness with reason.”453  It also preserves images of freedom and happiness denied in 
the existing society.  Art can bring us to experience the “music of another reality” by 
transmitting a universal message or truth -- even when depicting the particular.  Because 
art transforms the specific historical universe (Marcuse provides the example of the 
Greek tragedy) art opens the established reality to another dimension -- that of possible 
liberation.  The class content of higher art (which is usually considered as bourgeoisie) is 
thus negated and consequently becomes a receptacle of a universal truth beyond that of 
any particular class (or for that matter, time period).
454
   For Marcuse art is a realm 
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permanently antagonistic to reality, a refuge for those possibilities not present in 
everyday life.  The most liberating art dissociates itself from the alienated society and 
creates an unreal “illusory” universe -- this is where art conveys the greatest of universal 
truths.
455
  It is precisely here that art can become a force for liberation, and thus is the 
aesthetic manifestation of The Great Refusal.  Marcuse writes that art: 
 
relates not only to the past but also to the future: the forms of freedom and 
happiness which it invokes claim to deliver to the historical reality.  In its refusal 
to accept as final limitations imposed upon freedom and happiness by the reality 
principle, in its refusal to forget what can be, lies the critical function of 
fantasy.
456
 
 
Marcuse concludes that, in the end, “art contains the rationality of negation.  In its 
advanced positions, it is the Great Refusal -- the protest against that which is.”457   
 Marcuse consistently argued that the advanced industrial system adapts and absorbs 
dissent quite efficiently, and even creates the situation in which those who should be in 
opposition wind up protecting the very system that prohibits their freedom.  Marcuse 
writes: 
 
To be sure, revolutionary consciousness has always expressed itself only in 
revolutionary situations; the difference is that, now, the condition of the working 
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class in the society at large militates against the development of such a 
consciousness.  The integration of the largest part of the working class into the 
capitalist society is not a surface phenomenon; it has its roots in the 
infrastructure itself, in the political economy of monopoly capitalism: benefits 
accorded to the metropolitan working class thanks to surplus profits, neocolonial 
exploitation, the military budget, and gigantic government subventions.  To say 
that this class has much more to lose than its chains may be a vulgar statement 
but it is also correct.
458
 
 
We must remember, in Marcuse’s view, individual existence for many in the advanced 
industrial system is a comfortable, smooth unfreedom.  Marcuse also argues that the 
flattened opposition of the working class serves to mask the reality behind the façade of 
instant gratification.  He insists we differentiate between appearance (i.e. an absorbed 
one-dimensional society) and essence (there are disintegrating tendencies).  Marcuse 
continues: 
 
the integration of organized labor is a surface phenomenon in a different sense: it 
hides the disintegrating, centrifugal tendencies of which it is itself an expression.  
And these centrifugal tendencies do not operate outside the integrated domain; in 
this very domain the monopolistic economy creates conditions and generates 
needs which threaten to explode the capitalist framework.  Anticipating the 
subsequent discussion, I recall the classical statement: it is the overwhelming 
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wealth of capitalism which will bring about its collapse.  Will the consumer 
society be its last stage, its gravedigger?
459
 
 
Marcuse maintains the Marxist argument that the advanced industrial system will 
eventually collapse, but argues a primary cause will be the needs that are created by 
consumer society (transcendental, self-affirming) that it cannot possible satisfy.  To be 
sure, Marcuse does not assume that qualitative socialism will be its successor -- often 
mentioning fascism as a possible scenario.  He writes: 
 
At the present stage of development of the advanced industrial societies, the 
material as well as the cultural system denies this exigency.  The power and 
efficiency of this system, the thorough assimilation of mind with fact, of thought 
with required behavior, of aspirations with reality, militate against the emergence 
of a new Subject.  They also militate against the notion that the replacement of 
the prevailing control over the productive process by “control from below” 
would mean the advent of qualitative change.
460
 
 
In Marcuse’s view, the one-dimensionality of the current subject militates against the 
possibility of qualitative change, even in the face of  “the increasing irrationality of the 
whole; waste and restriction of productivity; the need for aggressive expansion; the 
constant threat of war; intensified exploitation; dehumanization.”461  The presence of 
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disintegrating tendencies within the advanced industrial system and the objective 
conditions that indicate that qualitative change is needed does not indicate that it will 
happen.  For reasons mentioned above, “the facts and the alternatives are there like 
fragments which do not connect, or like a world of mute objects without a subject, 
without the practice which would move these objects in the new direction.
462
  Thus, 
Marcuse was aware that he was advocating a Great Refusal that would seem hopelessly 
utopian. 
 To be sure, Marcuse argues that critical theory can reveal these objective conditions 
for revolution, but it cannot force us to respond -- as Marcuse argued, “contradictions do 
no explode by themselves.”463  Individuals will likely continue under the conditions of 
unfreedom as long as the contradictions do not “become blatant beyond any possible 
denial,” that is, as long as they are sufferable.  Marcuse fully comprehended the 
unlikelihood that humans would act for their own liberation, but insisted that critical 
theory not abdicate its role of exposing the contradictions within society.   Marcuse was 
quick to point out that the reification -- the loss of personal autonomy -- within the 
advanced industrial system is only an illusion, and often reminded us that the 
contradictions and disintegrating tendencies are there, thus opening up the door for the 
Great Refusal.   
 Alas, it is a very small opening.  As Marcuse argued: 
 
Nothing indicates that it will be a good end.  The economic and technical 
capabilities of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for 
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adjustments and concessions to the underdog, and their armed forces sufficiently 
trained and equipped to take care of emergency situations.  However, the spectre 
is there again, inside and outside the frontiers of the advance societies … But the 
chance is that, in this period, the historical extremes may meet again: the most 
advanced consciousness of humanity, and it most exploited force.  It is nothing 
but a chance.  The critical theory of society possess no concepts which could 
bridge the gap between the present and future; holding no promise and showing 
no success, it remains negative.  Thus it wants to remain loyal to those who, 
without hope, have given and give their life to the Great Refusal.
464
 
 
Marcuse is imploring us to ignore the odds because what is at stake is nothing less than 
the “qualitative leap” to a better life.  Marcuse describes it as follows: 
 
The revolution involves a radical transformation of the needs and aspirations 
themselves, cultural as well as material; of consciousness and sensibility; of the 
work process as well as leisure.  This transformation appears in the fight against 
the fragmentation of work, the necessity and productivity of stupid performances 
and stupid merchandise, against the acquisitive bourgeois individual, against 
servitude in the guise of technology, deprivation in the guise of the good life, 
against pollution as a way of life.  Moral and aesthetic needs become basic, vital 
needs and drive toward new relationships between the sexes, between the 
generations, between men and women and nature.  Freedom is understood as 
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rooted in the fulfillment of these needs, which are sensuous, ethical, and rational 
in one.
465
 
 
It is within this society structured around a logic of gratification that significantly reduces 
the conflict between our nature and the external world that “for the first time in our life, 
we shall be free to think about what we are going to do.”466   
 This segment opened with a discussion of Camus’ Sisyphus pushing a rock up a hill 
for eternity, and smiling because he has risen above his fate and has consciously opted for 
personal agency in the face of the “absurdity” of life.  Camus held that there is no telos, 
which argues that life can not be made rational and, in the end, there is no higher purpose.  
It is important to remember that, for Camus, the only purpose in life is what we impose 
on it.  To Camus, there is nothing beyond humanity to validate any type of universal rules 
or logical plan.  On that point, Marcuse does not disagree -- but there is an important 
distinction to be made.  For one thing, life becomes absurd, for Camus, when we try to 
apply reason to a world that is irrational and impossible to really understand.  Even with 
that argument, Camus was not arguing that we should reject reason, for humans and 
reason are intrinsically connected, as are humans and emotion.  That is precisely the point 
in which Marcuse enters the equation.   The Marcusean project rejects reason that 
perpetuates our unfreedom, while advocating a sensibility or intuition -- a sort of third 
faculty found somewhere between our intellect (reason) and senses (emotions, senses, 
“feeling it”) that would move us to action.  It is exactly at this point Marcuse obliterates 
the notion of our absurdity.  While Camus’ Sisyphus is smiling for individualistic 
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reasons, Marcuse’s Sisyphus is smiling because he knows we are (or should) be moving 
toward greater rationality (or freedom).  To be sure, Marcuse was not arguing that life 
can be made completely rational.  Such a scenario, to Marcuse, can not happen because it 
militates against dialectical theory in two ways: first, it presupposes the absence of a 
negation (implying that society is perfect), and second, it implies a complete harmony 
between the subject (individual) and object (society).   Marcuse was arguing that the 
movement of life (and history) can be rational inasmuch as we are moving toward greater 
freedom (rather than less).
467
  In Marcuse’s view, there is no telos other than that 
dialectical movement towards the pre-existing potentialities of greater freedom.   
Sisyphus, by pushing the rock towards greater freedom and thus, greater rationality, is 
refusing to accept the totality of his own absurdity; suddenly there is purpose to his 
action.  We must be careful to realize that Marcuse is not falling into a teleological 
argument, but is asserting that the movement of life and history ought to be towards 
greater freedom rather than less, and is thus purposeful. From a positivist standpoint, in 
viewing life as a movement towards greater rationality, it is the dialectical movement of 
becoming, rather than the existentialist concern of being, that has become rational in the 
Marcusean project.  Conversely, to view this dialectically is to reject the notion that it is 
an either/or proposition.  In other words, the individual and society, by moving in a 
rational direction, is authentic in its being (is authentic-in-the-world) and its movement 
(becoming more real and more authentic).   In this scenario, life is not an end but a 
constant unfolding that ought to move in a rational direction.  Marcuse’s Sisyphus smiles 
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even though he knows he will never reach the top, for he is a multi-dimensional thinker 
and knows there is no top -- but that was never why the rock was being pushed.     
  
In the fall of 2011 Slovenian dissident philosopher Slavoj Žižek stated the following: 
They tell you we are dreamers.  The true dreamers are those who think things can 
go on indefinitely the way they are.  We are not dreamers.  We are the awakening from a 
dream that is turning into a nightmare. 
 
 217 
Bibliography 
Abromeit, John, “. "Herbert Marcuse’s Critical Encounter with Martin Heidegger 1927-1933." In Herbert 
Marcuse: A Critical Reader,, edited by John Abromeit and W. Mark Cobb. New York and 
London: Routledge, 2004. 
Burnham, Douglas. Kant's Aesthetics. June 30, 2005. http://www.iep.utm.edu/kantaest/#H2 (accessed 
September 18, 2013). 
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sysphus: And Other Essays. New York: Vintage; Reissue edition, 1991. 
Dauvé, Gilles, and Denis Authier. Origins of the German Workers Movement. 1976. 
http://marxists.org/subject/germany-1918-23/dauve-authier/ch.02.htm (accessed April 4, 2013). 
Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books (A Division of Random House), 
1964. 
Farr, Arnold L. Critical Theory and Democratic Vision: Herbert Marcuse and Recent Liberation 
Philosophies. New York: Lexington Books, 2009. 
Flynn, Thomas R. Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Frank, Thomas, and Matt Weiland, . Commodify Your Dissent: Salvos from the Baffler. New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997. 
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomemology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1977. 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1978. 
Horkheimer, Max. "Traditional and Critical Theory." In Critical Theory, translated by Matthew J. 
O'Connell, 220. New York: Herder & Herder, 1972. 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Max. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. 
Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford Universit Press, 2002. 
Horowitz, Gad. Basic and Surplus Repression in psychoanalytic theory: Freud, Reich, and Marcuse. 
Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977. 
Katz, Barry. Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography. London: Verso, 1982. 
Kellner, Douglas. Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1984. 
Laudani, Raffaeli, trans. Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War 
Effort. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. 
Marcuse, Harold. Herbert's Hippopotamus: A Story about Revolution in Paradise. June 10, 2005. 
http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/soundvideo/herbhippo.htm (accessed April 1, 2013). 
Marcuse, Herbert. "Beitrage zu einer Phanomenologie des Historischen Materialismus (Contributinos to a 
Phenomenology of Historical Materialism)." Philosophische Hefte (Translation by Douglas 
Kellner and discussed in Ch. 2 of his book "Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism."), 1928: 
45-68. 
Marcuse, Herbert. "Contributinos to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism." Telos 4 (Fall 1969): 3-
34. 
—. An Essay on Liberation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. 
—. Counter-Revolution and Revolt. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. 
—. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, 1966. 
—. Five Lectures. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. 
—. Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity. Translated by Seyla Benhabib. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987. 
—. Heideggerian Marxism. Edited by Richard Wolin and John Abromeit. Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2005. 
Marcuse, Herbert. "Philosophy and Critical Theory." In Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, translated by 
Jeremy Shapiro, 100, 105-107. London: MayFlyBooks, 2009. 
—. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. 2. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1999. 
Marcuse, Herbert. "Revolution or Reform?" Edited by A.T. Ferguson. Chicago: New University Press, 
1976. 
 218 
—. Technology, War, and Fascism. Edited by Douglas Kellner. Vol. 1. 5 vols. London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998. 
—. The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978. 
—. The Essential Marcuse: Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social Critic Herbert Marcuse. Edited by 
Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss. Boston: Beacon Press, 2007. 
—. Toward a Critical Theory of Society (Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse). Edited by Douglas 
Kellner. Vol. 2. 6 vols. London and New York: Routledge, n.d. 
Marcuse, Herbert, Jürgen Habermas, Heinz Lubasz, and Tilman Spengler. "Theory and Politics." Telos, no. 
38 (Winter 1978-1979): 124-153. 
Marx, Karl. "Capital, vol. 1." In The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert Tucker, 32. New York: Norton, 
1978. 
Ocay, Jeffrey V. "Technology, Technological Domination,and the Great Refusal: Marcuse's Critique of the 
Advanced Industrial Society." Kritke 4 no. 1 (June 2010): 54-78. 
Oxford English Dictionary. n.d. www.oxforddictionaries.com/American_english_Utopia (accessed July 9, 
2013). 
Paris, William W. Wilkerson and Jeffrey, ed. New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation. New York and 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. 
Pascal, Roy. The Modern Language Review (Modern Humanities Research Association) 47 (April 1952): 
129-151. 
Pedersen, Christopher. Theory-Frankfurt School. October 23, 1998. 
http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/theory-frankfurt-school/1998m10/msg00016.html (accessed 
October 11, 2013). 
Perlstein, Rick. Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2009. 
Pippen, Robert. "Marcuse on Hegel and Historiticy." The Philosophical Forum XVI, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 
184. 
Sarahana. Slavoj Zizek Speaks at Occupy Wall Street: Transcript. September 17, 2013. 
http://www.imposemagazine.com/bytes/slavoj-zizek-at-occupy-wall-street-transcript (accessed 
October 9, 2013). 
Sheehan, Thomas. Heidegger and the Nazis (Book Review of). June 16, 1988. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1988/jun/16/heidegger-and-the-
nazis/?pagination=false#fn34-337841573 (accessed July 6, 2013). 
Stromquist, Shelton. Re-inventing "The People" The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and the 
Origins of Modern Liberalism. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006. 
Wiggerhaus, Rolg. The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance. Translated by 
Michael Robertson. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994. 
 219 
VITA 
Patrick O’Brien was born in Staten Island, New York in 1975, the child of a New York 
City detective, and a public school paraprofessional.   After completing his undergraduate 
studies (in Philosophy, Politics, and Law) at the State University of New York at 
Binghamton in 1998, he began his career as a public school history teacher.  He has 
taught in New York City and New Jersey.  His early years in the classroom were at the 
middle school level, and he has taught United States history at the high school level in 
Washington, New Jersey since 2006.   In 2007, he entered Lehigh University as a part-
time graduate student in the American Studies Department.   
 
Permanent Address:   
2635 Hickory Drive  
Easton, Pennsylvania 18040  
 
This thesis was typed by the author.  
 
